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JOHN LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY OF DISCOURSE
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Problem of this Study 
Many authors have suggested that Locke has been one 
of the most influential writers and thinkers since the En­
lightenment. Hibben, in The Philosophy of the Enlightenment» 
stated that Locke set the theme for the Age of Reason;
With the principles of Locke widely disseminated and 
discussed in the cafe and salon and even among the rank 
and file of the people generally . . . his philosophy 
exerted a remarkable influence upon the religious, the 
moral, and the political life of that age.1
Leslie Stephen regarded Locke's works as the "keynote of Eng­
lish speculation in the eighteenth c e n t u r y . Locke's formu­
lations of the empirical theory in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding motivated the later development of that school 
of philosophy. Deism took its lead from The Reasonableness
 ^John Grier Hibben, The Philosophy of the Enlighten- 
ment (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), p. 18. See
pp. 6-7 . Also Crane Brinton, The Shaping of the Modern 
Mind (New York: The New American Library, 1950), p. TTo.
^Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the 
Eighteenth Century (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1902),
p. 9 4 .
2of Christianity. Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and, 
hence, the American Constitution demonstrated some influence 
of his theories in political and religious tolerance.5 In the 
recent American Mind, Stow Persons maintained Locke's in­
fluence upon American thought: "Locke was certainly widely
read and quoted by American writers. . . Persons wrote
of America's "indebtedness to Locke."5 Accordingly, Locke's 
thinking has been influential, to some degree, on modern so­
ciety.
The thesis of this study is that Locke contributed not 
only to the political, religious, and philosophical facets of 
modern society, but to the development of rhetorical theory. 
This proposition raises three questions: Did Locke's inter­
ests lead him to consider discourse and language extensively? 
Assuming that he did contribute to rhetorical theory, would 
it be profitable to study his concepts? And .third, and most 
important, what were his contributions? These questions must 
be answered in order.
There is sufficient historical evidence to suggest 
that Locke maintained an interest in linguistic communication 
on both the practical and theoretical levels. At Oxford and 
Westminster Schools, studies in rhetoric and practice in
^Chapter II presents a discussion of Locke's contri­
butions to modern society in the areas of philosophy, poli­
tics and religion.
^Stow Persons, American Mind: A History of Ideas
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 195Ô), p. 130.
5Ibid.
3disputations were an essential part of Locke’s seventeenth 
century education. From his detailed expense account while 
at school we learn that he purchased many of the speeches 
given in Parliament.^ Locke himself wrote and delivered sev­
eral speeches to the Oxford student body.? The fact that he 
owned and was familiar with Lamy’s influential work. The Art 
of Sneaking, and Aristotle’s Rhetoric indicates some interest 
in theoretical rhetoric.& His library also contained the 
rhetorical works of Cicero and Seneca.9 Locke served as 
Reader in Rhetoric at Christ Church at Oxford in 1662.^® In 
Locke’s own words, he suggested that by a more penetrating 
consideration of both "ideas and words as the great instru­
ments of knowledge” he hoped to "afford us another sort of 
logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto
^John Locke, Assays on the Laws of Nature, ed. by 
¥. von Leyden (Oxford! The Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 16.
?Ibid. .-pp. 3, 15, 19. Ton Leyden further wrote of 
two orations written and delivered in Latin by Locke at 
Westminster before Dr. Busby and other masters of the school. 
His work reprinted a valedictory speech written and delivered 
by Locke while he was Censor of Moral Philosophy.. See 
pp. 11, 214-243. One of Locke’s orations is referred to by 
him in a letter to his father as printed in John Locke, An 
Early Draft of Locke’s Essay, ed. by R.I. Aaron and Jocelyn 
G-ibb (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 4.
®G. Bonno, Les Relations Intellectual de Locke avec 
la France (Berkeley; The University of California Press, 
1954), p. 125.
^Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1957), pp. 20-21.
lOlbid., p. 35.
4acquainted  ^ There is sufficient historical evidence,
therefore, to conclude that Locke was concerned with the meth­
odology of discourse.
Several authors have hinted at the value of a rhetor­
ical study of Locke's works. Both C.W. Edney and Warren 
Guthrie asserted that George Campbell's rhetorical formula­
tions were strongly influenced by Locke's t h i n k i n g . E d n e y  
further argued that Locke formulated in Book III of the Essay 
the basic tenets of contemporary "general semantics.
Although this study is centered on Locke's role as a rhe­
torical theorist, Thonssen's and Baird's view of Locke as a 
critic of rhetoric is not unimportant.
There is, moreover, another view of the value of a 
study of Locke's rhetorical contributions. Howell, in Logic 
and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, described the development 
of a "new" rhetoric around the turn of the eighteenth cen­
t u r y . ^5 A preliminary analysis of Locke's works revealed
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
ed. by Alexander Fraser Campbell (New York: Dover Publi-
cation, 1959)* H ,  462.
1^0.W. Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory 
in the 19th Century America," p. 82 and Warren Guthrie, "The 
Development of Rhetorical Theory in America," p. 64, both in 
A History of Speech Education in America, ed. by Karl Wallace 
(New York: Appleton Century-Croft, 1954). Also see, Lester
Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: The
Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 1 3 6.
^^Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in the 
19th Century America," p. 95.
^^Thonssen and Baird, pp. 181-182.
I^wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in
5that his rhetorical positions were at many points parallel to 
those characteristics of the "new" rhetoric. Hence, it be­
comes of significant value to study Locke with regard to his 
influence on this important development of rhetorical history.
The Purpose and Method of this Study 
This study proposes to abstract and systematize Locke's 
philosophy^^ of discourse. Locke never proposed any system 
of prescriptive rules or regulations regarding rhetorical be­
havior. He did analyze, however, the basic philosophical pre-
I
cepts of the methods of producing discourses. Hence, a study 
of Locke's complete works, i.e., letters, diaries, journals, 
notebooks and books, should produce a synthesis of his think­
ing toward linguistic communication.
This study does not attempt to relate Locke's rhetor­
ical views to the historical development of rhetoric. Infer­
ences of this nature which the work presents are incidental 
to the main objective. In the concluding chapter, however, I 
suggest some possible relationships.
Previous Research 
Recently there have been several good biographies 
done on Locke. One of the best and most recent is the Cranston
England. 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1956), p. 364.
 ^^ This term is used to mean a scrutiny of the basic 
or primary postulates of a given discipline, in this case, 
logic and rhetoric.
6work, John Locke; A Biography. An older but still reliable
biography is Henry R.F. Bourne's two volume The Life of John
Locke. Cranston thought highly of the work:
His biography is an excellent one. He showed great 
enterprise in finding new material, and he examined all 
he found with the upmost care. His book is reliable, 
intelligent and systematic and, as far as was possible 
in the circumstances of time, complete. . . .18
Lord King, a nephew of Locke, wrote the first biography of 
Locke in 1829.^9 Unfortunately, the work is not a good one. 
Cranston said: "He transcribed with no great care or method
the more legible of Locke's manuscripts and printed them in 
random s e q u e n c e . "^0 Other works which shed light on Locke's 
life and rhetorical thinking are Benjamin Rand's The Corre­
spondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke and Aaron's and 
Gibb's An Early Draft of Locke's Essay.21 Each of these 
works is important to this study because they made available 
significant primary source material.
There are other works on Locke of a critical, inter­
pretative nature. D.J. O'Connor has done an excellent
ITnenry Richard Fox Bourne, ^ e  Life of John Locke 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 187ë).
Cranston, p. x.
I^Lord King, The Life and Letters of John Locke 
(London: Henry G. Bohn, 1 8 5 8).
20cranston, p. x.
Benjamin Rand, (ed.). The Correspondence of John 
Locke and Edward Clarke (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1927T,  ^ '
7evaluative interpretation of Locke's epistemology in John 
Locke. The Relation of John Locke to English Deism by 
Hefelbower analyzed Locke's theory of religious tolerance.23 
One of the best accounts of Locke's political position is 
"The Politics of a Philosopher" by Maurice Cranston.24 Gragg 
has written a very thorough study of Locke in relation to his 
times, From Puritanism to the Age of R e a s o n .25 s.C.
Carpenter's Eighteenth Century Church and People is also a 
good study of Locke's influence on ideas and theories of the 
eighteenth century.2^ Of course, there are many more inter­
pretative studies of Locke; however, this is a representative
list of a few of the best.
According to various bibliographical sources, only 
one study of Locke has been slanted toward the rhetorical 
point of view. Louis Cockerham wrote an M.A. thesis on Locke's 
theory of logical p r o o f . 27 Cockerham specified the limitations
2^D.J. O'Conner, John Locke (London: Penguin Books,
1952).
23samuel Gring Hefelbower, The Relation of John Locke 
to English Deism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1918).
24Maurice Cranston, "The Politics of a Philosopher,"
The Listener, LXV (January, 1961), 17-19.
25&.R. Gragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason:
A Study of Changes in Religious Thought within the Church of 
England. 1660-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1950).
26g.C. Carpenter, Eighteenth Century Church and People 
(London: John Murray Press, 1959).
2?Loui8 Cockerham, "John Locke's Theory of Logical
8of his own work:
Book IV, "Of Knowledge and Probabilities," embodies all 
of the basic contributions to Locke’s theory of logical 
proof. Book III, "Of Words," is a comprehensive treat­
ment of language which is an important contribution to 
the study of Rhetoric but which will not be considered
in this particular investigation.28
This present study is much more inclusive than Cockerham's. 
Hans C. Aarsleff's dissertation. The Study of Language in 
England 1780-1860. considered Locke’s theory of Language.^9 
With these exceptions there are no works similar enough to 
this investigation to be of immediate usefulness.
Other studies not on Locke gave valuable method­
ological insights. John Cook's work on Bertrand Russell’s 
"conception of an ideal language" is a good example.30 Wayne 
Brockriede did a rhetorical study of Jeremy Bentham, a "phi­
losopher" not usually associated with linguistic communi­
cation.31
Availability of Materials 
There are no deficiencies in this study caused by
Proof" (unpublished Master’s thesis. University of Oregon, 
1959).
28ibid., p. 1.
^^Hans C. Aarsleff, "The Study of Language in England 
1780-1 8 6 0." (unpublished Doctoral dissertation. The University 
of Minnesota, I960).
^Ojohn Cook, "An Essay on Russell’s Conception of an 
Idea Language(unpublished Doctoral dissertation. The Uni­
versity of Nebraska, I960).
Wayne E. Brockriede, "Bentham’s Philosophy of Rhe­
toric," (unpublished Doctoral dissertation. University of 
Illinois, 1954).
9lack of materials. The accessibility of the collection of 
Locke’s papers, journals, letters and lectures in the Lovelace 
Collection in the Bodleian Library at Oxford at first posed a 
serious p r o b l e m . ^2 Little of the material is in print or on 
microfilm and it was possible that some of the material might 
be relevant to this study. However, ¥. von Leyden, who has 
catalogued all of the materials, assured me that none of the 
materials is relevant to this study.^3
Method of Organization
Since this study consists,of systematizing Locke’s 
philosophy of discourse, this work is not restricted to Locke’s 
organizational development. Whenever his organizational pat­
tern was appropriate, it was used. However, in the main, the 
purpose of this study dictated the approach. Accordingly, 
this dissertation presents two major sections. Chapters II 
and III constitute an investigation of the background of 
Locke’s philosophy of discourse. Chapters IV, V, VI and VII
^^In 1948, Lord Lovelace sold to the Bodleian Library, 
Oxford, John Locke’s personal papers which Locke had left 
when he died in 1704 to his young cousin Peter King. Locke’s 
1,000 odd manuscripts include detailed financial accounts, 
library lists, notebooks containing entries on philosophy, 
politics, literature, science, theology, economics and colo­
nial administration; several more elaborate manuscripts on the 
same subjects; recipes, inventories, certificates of various 
kinds, and ten volumes of Locke’s journal. See Cranston, 
pp. ix-xi.
33ln a letter to me, von Leyden stated: "I am sorry
to .say that to my knowledge none of Locke’s lectures on rhe­
toric have been preserved anywhere. Nor do I recollect that 
any of his letters or journals in the Lovelace Collection is 
in any way concerned with speechmaking. . . . ”
10
consist of the discussion of his views on communication and 
language.
CHAPTER II 
JOHN LOCKE AND HIS TIMES 
Introduction
Any serious investigation of Locke's philosophy of 
discourse must include a study of the man and his times. 
Locke's educational background, his various occupations, and 
his wide travels influenced and guided his views of rhetoric. 
Also, underlying all of Locke's writings was a social and 
cultural milieu which tailored and limited what he postulated. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to investigate and 
delineate John Locke and his times. This chapter does not 
constitute a definitive, exhaustive analysis, but it repre­
sents only an attempt to familiarize the reader with Locke's 
background and the intellectual context out of which his phi­
losophy of discourse developed.
The Man 
Early Years
On the 15th of July, 1630, John Locke, senior married 
Agnes (or Anne) Keene at Wrington, her home.^ John Locke the
^Benjamin Rand, (ed.). The Correspondepce nf John
11
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philosopher was b o m  and baptized at Wrington on the 29th of . 
August, 1 6 3 2 .2 The Locke family had since made their home in 
Pensford in Somerset, but at the time of the birth, Locke*s 
mother was visiting relatives in Wrington.3 ■ The only other 
child from this marriage was Thomas, bora at Beluton the 9th 
of August, 1 6 3 7.^
The story of Locke’s childhood is relatively Incom-' 
plete. His parental background was of Puritan middle class.5 
The senior Locke was a "fair-to-do" attorney and clerk to the 
Justices of the Peace in Somerset.^ Cranston suggested that 
in either status "he enjoyed no great . . . distinction."?
Locke and Edward Clarke (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1927), p. 2.
p
^Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 1 and Henry Richard Fox 
Bourne, The Life of John Locke (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1 8 7 6), I, 12, For other good biographies see: A.C. Fraser,
Locke (London: Oxford University Press, I8 9O); Thomas
Fowler, Locke (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906);
S. Alexander, Locke (New York: Dodge Publishing Company,
1 9 0 8); Robert I. Aaron, John Locke (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1 9 3 7); and Lord King, The Life and Letters of 
John Locke (London: Henry G-. Bohn, 1858 ).
^Rand, p. 2.
^Ibid. Thomas Locke married, but died young of con­
sumption, leaving no children.
^Cranston, p. 3 .
^Ibid., p. 5 . Locke's father claimed cousinsMp with 
a John Locke, major of Bristol in 1642, and descendant of an 
earlier John Locke, sheriff of London in 1460, and grandfather 
of Sir William Locke, a great English merchant under Henry
VIII. Bourne also identified a long and not very accurate 
article about early Lockes in Gentleman's Magazine. LXII 
(1 7 9 2), 798. Bourne, I, 1-2.
?Cranston, p. 5.
13
Locke's mother died while he was still young and his care and 
education became the father's responsibility.® Bourne stated 
that his childhood "was passed mainly at Pensford, with oc­
casional visits to Wrington, where relatives lived."9 
Cranston elaborated on the early life of Locke by describing 
the village in which he grew up:
The economic conflict of his village reflected in a 
complicated way the religious conflict, and both were 
reflected in the nation's politics. High Churchmen 
against Puritans, enterprising capitalists against old- 
fashioned landowners, assertive politicians against an 
imperious king; each of these divisions in society 
presaged that great clash of principles, the Civil War; 
an.d as the country was divided, so too was 
Somerset. . . .10
At times Locke's childhood may have been lonely, but he grew
up in a bookish home and, as Cranston indicated, "there was
much to absorb or amuse a child in the vicinity of
Belluton."11
The Civil War which began within a week of Locke's 
tenth birthday had several influential consequences on his 
life. Some years following the War, Locke wrote of the ex­
perience in one of his journals: "I no sooner perceived my­
self in the world but I found myself in a storm which has 
lasted almost h i t h e r t o . L o c k e ' s  father joined the
®Rand, p. 2.
^Bourne, I, 13.
^^Cranston, p. 3*
 ^^ Ibid., p. 13.
^^John Locke's journal, 1677, p. 28 in Ibid., p. 3.
14
Parliamentary army as a captain of a cavalry unit under the 
command of his friend and employer. Colonel Alexander 
Popham.13 The relationship between Locke senior and Popham 
was to be highly significant in Locke's education.
Through the influence of Colonel Popham, Locke en­
tered Westminster School in 1647. Popham, who had entered 
the Parliament as a member for Bath, gained the nomination 
for Locke's entrance into Westminster.14 Cranston described 
Popham's action as a favor to Locke's father:
Colonel Popham found an occasion in 1647 when the Civil 
War was virtually won, to render Locke's father a small 
kindness which had important consequences. While Parlia­
ment had gained control of many educational institutions, 
one of which was Westminster School, Colonel Popham had 
become a Member of Parliament for Bath and thus in a 
position to nominate boys for that distincted founda­
tion. Colonel Popham put up John Locke's name and in the 
autumn of 1647 the boy was admitted to the s c h o o l . 15
Locke studied at Westminster School for the next six years.1^ 
Locke's experiences while at Westminster were signif­
icant in shaping his adult, mâture philosophies. Dr. Richard 
Busby, a liberal and an ardent opponent of Cromwell, was the 
headmaster of Westminster at the time of Locke's entrance.^7 
He taught his pupils "to beware of persuasion, and never to
1^Bourne, I, 7. 
I4jbid.. p. 17. 
I^Cranston, p. 17. 
I^Ibid.. p. 18. 
^?Ibid.. p. 20.
15
accept without reflection the pretensions of men in p o w e r . "18 
Indeed, Locke found certain difficulties with the political 
atmosphere of the school because of his strict Puritan home 
life.19 Nevertheless, Dr. Busby and Westminster deserve much 
of the credit for instructing Locke in the theories of liber­
alism which played such an important role in his later po­
litical and religious works.20 Cranston argued the contribu­
tions of Busby and Westminster to Locke’s intellectual de­
velopment: " . . .  Westminster did purge Locke of the unques­
tioning Puritan faith in which he had grown up; and thus . . . 
Dr. Busby . . . must be given the credit for having first set 
Locke on the road to Liberalism."21 Hence, many of Locke’s 
ideas and concepts which appeared in his later philosophical 
and political works find their genesis in his educational ex­
periences with Dr. Busby and Westminster.
While at Westminster, Locke devoted much of his time 
and attention to the practice and study of the rhetorical 
teaching devices common in his day. Early each morning the 
students spent two hours in Greek and Latin grammar repeti­
tions, in extemporaneous Latin paraphrases and expositions of 
passages from Greek and Latin works, and in repetitions of 
passages that they had learned overnight. The students, next,
I8jbid.
19lbid.. p. 19.
20lbid.
21 Ibid..
16
had one hour in which to prepare other exercises, and between 
nine and eleven the elder scholars of the school examined them . 
in prose and verse composition, still, of course, in Greek and 
Latin. Bourne described the students’ activities between one and 
three: they engaged in "construing and other grammatical
ways, examining all the rhetorical figures, and translating 
out of verse into prose, or out of prose into verse, out of 
Greek into Latin, or out of Latin into G r e e k . "^2 on Saturdays 
the students performed Greek and Latin declamations. Through­
out the week, the headmaster required the students to attend 
numerous s e n t i o n s . Hence, at Westminster Locke received his 
initial introduction to the rhetoric of his day.
In 1 6 5 2, Locke graduated from Westminster and enrolled 
in Christ Church at Oxford with a junior studentship.24 pbe 
routine at Christ Church was busy but varied. During the 
morning Locke attended the lectures of the University profes­
sors or the college readers. After dinner, during which he 
had to speak Latin, he generally heard a second public lec­
ture.^5 He probably used the free time following the lecture
^^Boume, I, 20. Bourne also referred to an account 
of studies at Westminster in "The Public Schools," Blackwood’s 
Magazine, I8 6 7 ).
23lbid.. pp. 19-20.
24rbid., p. 1 9, Locke spent six years at Westminster 
School, a year longer than the ordinary curriculum. He en­
tered Christ Church on the 27th of November.
1649 the college passed the requirement "to 
cause either Greek or Latin to be strictly and constantly ex­
ercised and spoken in their familiar discourse within the
17
to attend the University disputations or declamations.
During Locke's first year at Christ Church he went to lectures
on rhetoric every Monday and Thursday. He enrolled in classes
on logic during his second year. Regulations required Locke
to attend and participate in public disputation during his
fourth year at s c h o o l . ^7 Fowler, in The History of Corpus
Christi College, explained the regulations
Undergraduates were to be lectured in logic, and as­
siduously practised in arguments and the solution of 
sophisms by one or two of the Fellows or probationers 
assigned for that purpose. Moreover, all undergrad­
uates, who had devoted at least six months and not more 
than thirty to the study of logic, were to frequent the 
argumentative contest of the school. . . .28
Locke not only received a thorough theoretical foundation in
rhetoric and logic, but was also a frequent participant in
disputations and declamations.
Locke found little, if any, challenge or satisfaction
in his studies at Oxford. Lady Masham, a very close friend of
Locke, described his reaction to his education;
I have often heard him say, in reference to his first 
years spent in the university, that he had so small 
satisfaction there from his studies, as finding very
said several colleges and halls respectively, and that no 
other language be spoken by any fellow-scholar or student 
whatsoever. . . . ” From the Queen's College MSS cited in 
the appendix to the Fourth Report of the Historical Manu­
scripts Commission (1874), p. 456 as quoted in Ibid., p. 42.
^^Bourne, I, 42.
27%bid.. pp. 44, 54-55.
2^Thomas Fowler, The History of Corpus Christi Col­
lege (Oxford; The Clarendon Press, 1893)» P» 41.
18
little light brought thereby to M s  under standing, that 
he became discontented with his manner of life, and 
wished his father had rather designed him for anything 
else than what he was destined to, apprehending that 
his no greater progress in knowledge proceeded from his 
not being fitted or capacitated to be a scholar..29
Locke considered the time spent in the study .of philosophy 
nearly wasted, "because the only philosophy then known at 
Oxford was the peripatetic, perplexed with obscure terms and 
useless questions."30 He disliked the grammatical exercises 
in which the Oxford students indulged. Locke regarded the 
Latin and Greek verse-writing, "for the pedantic exhibition 
of familiarity with the husks and dry bones of classical lit­
erature," as a total waste of time,31 In disputations, ac­
cording to his college friend James Tyrell, he spent no more 
time than he could help, and then resented that time as 
wasted. Lady Masham indicated Locke's dissatisfaction with 
disputation: " . . .  Locke never loved the trade of disputing
in public in the schools, but was always want to declaim 
against it as being invented for wrangling or ostentation, 
rather than to discover truth."32 Closely related to his 
dislike of disputation was Locke's distaste for "Greek and
^%anuscript in the Remonstrants' Library: Lady
Masham to Le Clerc, 12 January, 1704 in Bourne, I, 47.
30l6 Clerc, "Eloge de M. Locke," Bibliothèque 
Choisie, p. 347 in Bourne, I, 61,
31 Bourne, I, 61.
^%anuscript in the Remonstrants' Library: Lady
Masham to Jean le Clerc, 12 January, 1704 in Bourne, I,
42-43.
19
Latin declamations in fantastic support of Aristotelian and 
pseudo-Aristotelian dogmas."^3 He considered such activities 
"destructive of sound intellectual energy."3^ Hence, by and 
large, "Locke spent . . . his first years at the university 
In reading romances, from his aversion to the disputation 
then in fashion t h e r e . "55
Locke finished his bachelor's degree in February, 
1 6 5 5» abridging the usual time period by one term. He short­
ened his Master's work by two terms, finishing on the 29th of 
June, 165 8. He thus completed his curriculum twelve months 
before the end of the seven years covered by his junior stu­
dentship which expired in 1659*^^ His election to a senior 
studentship made it possible for him to remain at the Uni­
versity.57 Soon afterwards, Locke received appointments as a
^^Boume, I, 4 9-5 0.
54ibid.
35gpence, "Anecdotes," p. 107 in Bourne, I, 54. 
Bourne, p. 44, made a judgment as to the quality of Locke's 
courses. ". . . I f  the rhetoric and logic now imparted to 
him were not altogether stale, there was not much profit in 
them. The logic was Aristotelian logic, which had been fil­
tered— perhaps we should say vitiated— through the minds of 
some thousands of Greek, Roman, dark-age and mediaeval com­
mentators. . . . "  Chapter III will describe in more detail 
the rhetorical climate of Locke's times.
5^Bourne, I, 36, 52.
57Rand, p. 4. Bourne stated that nearly every ca­
pable Westminster student received a senior studentship which 
was equivalent to a fellowship at any other college. These 
senior studentships, unless taken away for bad behavior, or 
for some other special reason, were tenable for life. Locke 
held one of the Studentships until 1684. Bourne, I, 52-53.
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Reader in Greek (I6 6I) and a Reader in Rhetoric (l662) at 
Christ Church. He also held, "between I6 6I and 1664, the cen° 
sorship of moral philosophy in the c o l l e g e . ^8
During his year as Reader in Rhetoric (or Greek and 
Latin), Locke lectured on many of the Greek and Roman clas­
sical authors. On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, he lec­
tured from some portion of the Grammar of Theodorus or some 
other approved Greek grammarian, together with some of Lucian, 
Philostratus, or the orations of Isocrates. On Tuesdays, 
Thursdays, and Saturdays, he taught Aristophanes, Theocritus, 
Euripides, Sophocles, Pindar, or Hesiod, or some other ancient 
Greek poets, in addition to parts of Demosthenes, Thucydides, 
Aristotle, Theophrastus, or Plutarch. The Reader in Rhetoric, 
also, taught from Cicero and Quintilian. Moreover, three 
times a week he gave private instructions in Greek grammar or 
rhetoric to all members of the college below the degree of 
Master of Arts.39
Adult Years
The temper of Locke’s nature and personality made him 
a student of human nature all of his life. During his adult
3®Bourne,- I, 86-87, Clergymen generally occupied 
these offices. See Rand, p. 5» Bourne, I, 89, maintained: 
"It is most likely that, without pledging himself to any 
course of action, he had serious thoughts of entering the 
church, and that with this prospect, if not on this under­
standing, he was not only allowed to hold his studentship ir­
regularly, but was appointed . . . [to the ReadershipsT^"
39powler, The History of Corpus Christ! College,
pp. 3 8-3 9 .
21
life, he traveled extensively, engaged in various occupations, 
studied and taught at Oxford. From each of these experiences 
he was able to learn; these experiences tended to broaden his 
scope and his interests.
In 1664 Locke first entered public affairs as secre­
tary to Sir Walter Vane, the King’s new envoy to the Elector 
of Bandenburg. Locke performed his duties so efficiently 
that in a letter to a friend, he stated: "I am now offered a
fair opportunity of going into Spain with the ambassador.
. , . Nevertheless, Locke decided to return to his studies 
and teaching at Oxford, where he stayed until the end of 
March, 166?.^^
While at Oxford, Locke's work and scholarship matured 
and in November, 1668, members of the Royal Society proposed 
him for membership. On the 23rd of the same month, they 
elected him into full standing in the order. However, Bourne 
allowed that although the members of the Society made several 
efforts to secure his support, Locke appeared to have taken
Bourne, I, 99-100. Rand, p. 5, explained this ap­
pointment: "The desire to increase the strength of England
through diplomacy during the first Dutch War had led to the 
appointment of an embassy to the Elector of Brandenburg.
. . . "  Bourne, I, p. 99, added: "One of the several efforts
to increase the strength of England by indirect means was an 
embassy to the elector of Brandenburg, whose territory was in 
immediate proximity to Holland, and whom it was therefore de­
sirable to keep neutral if he could not be secured as an 
active ally."
Letter from Locke to Strachey, 22 February, 1665 in 
Bourne, I, 122.
42Bourne, I, 123, 127.
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very little part in their activities.
One of the most significant and far reaching events ' 
in Locke's life occurred in July, 1666, when he met Lord 
Ashley who later became the Earl of Shaftesbury.44 Following 
the meeting, Ashley invited Locke to London to serve as a 
physician in his household.45 Locke accepted the offer and 
from the 15th of June, I667, as Lady Ma sham indicated, "he 
was with my Lord Ashley as a man at home, and lived in that 
family much esteemed . . .  by all the friends of the fam­
i l y .  *'46 For the next several years, Locke was a family phy­
sician, tutor, and private adviser and friend to Lord Ashley.4^
As Ashley's power developed and unfolded, Locke at­
tained higher public office. In 1668 Ashley secured for Locke
43lbid.. p. 2 4 5.
44ibia., p. 1 3 6. Rand gave a full description of the 
meeting: ^In July Lord Ashley . . . came to Oxford to drink
the waters of the neighbouring village of Astrop. Ashley had 
appealed for advice in regard to his health to Dr. Thomas, 
with whom he had an acquaintance. . . . Dr. Thomas, being in 
London, wrote to Locke to advise Ashley in his stead."
p. 6.
4^Rand, p. 6. Bourne argued that it was not until 
1666 when Locke decided to be a physician instead of a clergy­
man. Bourne, I, 91. However, it does seem odd that Dr.
Thomas would ask Locke who had not studied medicine to "ad­
vise Ashley in his stead." Nevertheless, Rand, p. 5, 
claimed: "He never . . . received the degree of doctor of
medicine, and moreover, never having taken a regular medical 
course, he had difficulty in obtaining, in 1674, the bachelor's 
degree in that subject."
4^Letter from Lady Masham to Le Clerc, 12 January,
1704 in Bourne, I, 143-144.
4 7Bourne, I, 199•
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the appointment of chief secretary to the proprietors of the 
O a r o l i n a s . 4 8  Lord Ashley received a peerage with the title 
-of Earl of Shaftesbury in April of 16?2 and in the following 
September he became the president of the Council of Trade and 
Plantations. Two months later, in November, the Earl rose to 
the position of Lord High Chancellor of England. Again Locke 
profited from Shaftesbury's rise to power as the new Chancel­
lor made him his Secretary for the Presentation of Benefices 
and later promoted him to the Secretaryship of the Board of 
Trade.49 However, the King dismissed Shaftesbury as Chancel­
lor in March of 1675 and Locke consequently lost the positions 
which the Earl had provided for h i m . 50
During his sundry occupations, Locke continued to 
view medicine as his proper vocation.51 in 1666 and 1670 he 
made two futile efforts to obtain his doctorship in medicine 
without complying with the ordinary qualification of residence 
at Oxford. In 1666 the King would not recommend the degree
48lbid., p. 236.
49Rand, p. 7*
5Qlbid., p. 10. The loss of Shaftesbury's position 
dated back to 1672 when he, a strong supporter of nonconform­
ity, did not support the King's 1672 indulgence. See Harry 
Grant Plum, Restoration Puritanism: A Study of the Growth of 
English Liberty (Chapel Hill; The University of North Caro- 
lina Press, 1943), p. 43.
51 Bourne, I, 235» Bourne further stated: " . . .
There seems to have been no abatement of the interest taken 
by him in medical studies and pursuits. He allowed himself 
to drift into other occupations, and in each he did so much 
that posterity has almost forgotten that he was ever a medi­
cal man at all."
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for him but did excuse him from taking holy orders as a con­
dition of retaining his studentship at Christ C h u r c h . 52 Lord 
Ashley, in I6 7 0, wrote a letter in Locke's behalf asking that 
the college assign him the next vacant faculty studentship 
in m e d i c i n e . 53 Locke received'-his bachelorship of medicine 
in February, 1674 and in January of the next year he accepted 
the appointment to a medical studentship at Christ Church.5^ 
Locke soon found that the barriers which had kept him from re­
ceiving the doctor's degree in 1666, still p r e v a i l e d . 55 Thus, 
while he spent his life in medicine, he never received his 
doctorship.
Locke's governmental work and study at Oxford proved 
to be a severe strain on his already poor health. As a result 
of his constant battles with chronic consumption and periodic 
attacks of asthma, he took frequent vacations.56 Locke made 
two trips to France, the first of short duration and the lat­
ter much longer.57 His first trip began in September, 1672
52%bid., pp. 330-3 3 1 .
5 3 i b i d ., p .  2 1 0 .
5'^ Ibid.. p. 3 3 0. ". . . It was then expected by his
college acquaintances that in the following spring he would 
become a doctor of medicine."
55ibid., p. 211.
55Rand, pp. 6-7»
These trips are described in some detail in John 
Lough, (ed.), Travels in France, 1675-1679. as Related to His 
Journals. Correspondence and Other Papers (Cambridge; Uni- 
versity Press, 1953).
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and lasted only two or three w e e k s . 58
Again poor health forced Locke to leave England for 
his second visit to France in November of 1675.^9 He lived 
at Montpellier, a health resort and the seat of a famous medi­
cal school for the next fifteen months.^0 During this time 
Locke revised and expanded his notes for An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding.^  ^ In March, 1677» Locke left Montpellier 
for Paris to meet Caleb Banks who he had consented to tutor 
for five or six m o n t h s . D e s p i t e  the fact that Banks origi­
nally intended to spend only a few months, Locke, and his 
pupil stayed in Paris for over a year and then toured France 
during the remainder of the time which they spent on the Con­
tinent. Locke*s second trip to France which was originally 
planned to last only a short time ended after some three and 
half years.63
58Rand, p. 7» See also Lough, p. xv. Who stated that 
" . . . very little is known about {%he short trip to France
in 167^ . . .".
^^Lough; p. xvi, indicated that his original plans
were to make a relatively short stay in France. See also
Bourne, I, 337»
60Lough, p. X V .  Montpellier was a famous health re­
sort for those who, like Locke, were consumptive.
6^Bourne, I, 355-
6^Lough, pp. xvi-xvii. Lough elaborated on Locke’s 
decision to accept the pupil for tutoring: "In March 1677,
Locke received a pressing request from Sir John Banks, a 
wealthy London merchant, to return to Paris and take charge 
of his son, Caleb, whom he was proposing to send over to spend 
five or six months in France. Locke accepted this request, 
which was backed by his patron, Shaftesbury. "
63ibid., pp. xvii-xviii, xix, xv. Lou^ stated; "A
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Last Years
Locke, on his return to England in 1679» -renewed his 
connections with Shaftesbury. In the spring of 1679» the 
Earl became president of a reorganized Privy Council and again 
desired Locke’s advice and c o u n s e l . ^4 However, Shaftesbury 
was arrested and sent to the Tower in June, 1680 because of 
his connection with the "Popish plot." He was acquitted, but 
lost his political influence and eventually retreated to Hol­
land where he died.^5
Locke’s close connection as friend and adviser to 
Shaftesbury soon aroused suspicions about his own loyalty to 
the Crown. Deciding that he was no longer safe in England, 
Locke fled to Amsterdam in September, 1683 where he remained 
for the next five y e a r s . T h e s e  years proved to be the most 
fruitful of his entire career in educational and philosophical 
writings.^? Soon after Prince William came to England and the
good deal of his time seems to have been spent in showing his 
pupil the sights of Paris; occasionally they went to the 
theatre or the opera. He also had a certain number of con­
tacts in learned and scientific circles. During these months 
he occasionally practised as a physician, numbering among his 
few patients such illustrious personages as Thomas Herbert,
8th Earl of Pembroke, whom he already encountered at Montpel­
lier, and to whom he was later to dedicate his Essay on Human 
Understanding and the Countess of Northumberland, now the 
wife of the English Ambassador, Ralph Montagu."
^"^Rand, p. 12.
^^Cranston, pp. 184-204, 214-231, gave a detailed ac­
count of the Popish plot and Shaftesbury’s and Locke’s rela­
tion to the movement. See also Rand, p. 15.
^^Rand, pp. 15-16.
67Ibid., pp. 17, 24.
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throne, Locke returned in February of 1689.^®
Locke spent the last five years of his life engaged 
in various minor governmental positions. For his aid in the 
"Bloodless" revolution, King William offered him the new Am­
bassadorship to Brandenburg. He refused the position on the 
grounds of his ill health but later he accepted the more 
modest and less demanding appointment of Commissioner of Ap­
p e a l s . ^9 In spite of his poor and failing health, Locke took 
the office of Commissioner of Trade in 1698 which kept him 
active during the next four years.70
Locke died on the afternoon of October 28, 1704, after 
a life filled with writing, studying, traveling and serving 
his government. Hibben briefly summarized Locke's life; he 
was
. . .  a scholar of Christ Church, Oxford, trained in 
diplomatic service, widely travelled, secretary of the 
first Earl of Shaftesbury, a profound student of the 
theory of government, champion of toleration, a man of 
affairs, and withal a philosopher, whose habit of mind 
fitted him in an eminent degree to deal with specula­
tive problems from a practical point of v ie w .71
G^ibid.. pp. 23-24. Rand described Locke's political 
activities while in Holland: "Whatever secrecy and avoidance
of political activity he may have exercised during the ear­
lier period of his residence abroad, it is very evident that 
in the later stages of it he was in touch with the movement 
in Holland for placing William of Orange on the English 
throne."
Bourne, II, 143-145. See letter of refusal, 
pp. 144-146. See also Rand, p. 32.
70Rand, p. 54.
7"' John G. Hibben, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, I9 1 0 ), p. 6.
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His Times
The Enlightenment
Historians generally view the Enlightenment as a de­
velopment of thought rooted in the eighteenth century. Hib- 
ben regarded the period as extending from Locke to Kant;
"The period of philosophy which is referred to in a general 
way as the eighteenth century began with Locke's Essay Con­
cerning Human Understanding in 1690 and ended with Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason in 1781.'^^ Manuel described the Age 
of Reason or the Enlightenment in political dimension; "The 
Age of Reason usually characterizes the period from the Peace 
of Utrecht (1713) to the French Revolution of 1789.
Various authorities describe the Enlightenment in 
several different ways. Berlin,, in The Age of the Enlighten­
ment, maintained that it was "perhaps the last period in the 
history of Western Europe when human omniscience was thought 
to be an attainable goal."7'^  Gragg characterized the period 
as one which broke away from medieval scholasticism;
Gradually . . . the authority of Aristotle —  the symbol 
of the scholastic method —  was broken and the dis­
coveries of the later seventeenth century filled in the 
details of the new world picture whose outlines an ear­
lier period had supplied.75
72lbld.. p. 3.
73prank E. Manuel, The Age of Reason (Ithaca;
Cornell University Press, 1951)» P» 1.
7^1 sal ah Berlin, The Age of the Enlightement (New 
York; The American Library, 1956), pp. 6-7.
75g-,R. Gragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason;
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Snyder suggested that the Enlightenment was important because 
of its results; "The Age of Reason was one of the few move­
ments in history that resulted in an important, new outlook 
upon existence and prepared the way for new and untried ways 
of future d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e s e  views of the Enlightment 
indicate that the period was in fact a matrix of movements 
and emphases.
These are various characteristics of the Enlighten­
ment. Snyder identified four distinct ideas;
1. The secularization of learning: Where medieval
philosophers and theologians interpreted the universe 
and man in terms of the Scriptures, the rationalists 
tended to avoid ecclesiastical authority and turned 
more and more to the secularization of knowledge.
2. Faith in Reason: The age of Reason was an age of 
faith in the rational behavior of nature and immutable 
scientific laws.
3. Utilitarianism: The spirit of the age of Reason 
was utilitarian and practical.
4. Optimism and Self-Confidence: The rationalists
were supremely confident and optimistic men, fully con­
vinced of their ability to discover natural laws and
to perfect the world and life in accordance with 
them.77
Jones, in different terminology, summarized three assumptions 
on which the Enlightenment was based: "(1) there are certain
rational ’principles' at work in the universe: (2) the mind 
is capable of understanding these principles: (3) the will
A Study of Changes in Religious Thought Within the Church of 
England, 1660-1700 (Cambridge ; Cambridge University Press, 
1950), p. 87.
7^Louis L. Snyder, The Age of Reason (New York:
D. Van Nostrand Company, 1955), p. 13*
??Ibid., p. 7.
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is capable of acting on this knowledge."7^ In substance 
these two views sensitize the essence of the Enlightenment.
Now we need to investigate these characteristics in some de­
tail.
One of the most significant changes of this period was 
a shift of emphasis from the Christians' supernatural heaven 
to the rationalists' natural heaven on e a r t h . W i l l e y  
stated that this transformation was one in which a scien­
tific' explanation replaces a theological" view of the 
world.80 Snyder maintained the same contention:
In contrast both to Renaissance humanism and the moti­
vating ideas of the Reformation, the Age of Reason was 
an intellectual, rational movement, which substituted 
for the medieval Age of Faith an Age of Faith in 
science.81
Writers and thinkers of the late sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries were hostile and antagonistic to the old forms of 
dogmatic religious authority and certainty. They rejected 
the unquestioned acceptance of tradition and historical au­
thority and adopted a spirit of critical inquiry which de­
manded rational justification.82
78#.T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952), p. Ô08.
7^Crane Brinton, Ideas and Men— The Story of Western 
Thought (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 376.
®*^Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background 
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1946), p. 3.
8 1 Snyder, p. ?.
82jjajiuel, p. 1. Ses also Gragg, p. 57» Most his­
torians generally accept the proposition that this was a move
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Reason, during the Enlightenment, became the dom­
inating theme in practically all thou^t. Cassirer described 
the status of reason as "the unifying and central point of 
. . . the Enlightenment, expressing all that it longs and 
strives for, and all that it a c h i e v e s . "83 Reason could lead 
man to understand and to mold his conduct after the princi­
ples of nature. Reason could destroy the restrictions and 
superstitions inherited from the dark ages and create a new 
society.
For the men of this age, "reason" had rich emotive- 
connotative overtones; it stood for "cool" objectivity 
(as opposed to "passion"), for impartiality (as op­
posed to prejudice), for intellection (as opposed to 
revelation). They held it to be . . . the instrument 
by which they were to fashion for themselves a new and 
better l i f e . 84
The philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
therefore, hailed reason as the panacea for the evils created
toward modern thought. However, Carl Becker is an exception. 
In the Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers 
(Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), Becker attempted to
disclose the fallacy of believing that the eighteenth cen­
tury was essentially modern in its temper. He sought to 
demonstrate that the period commonly described as the Age of 
Reason was, in fact, very far from it; that Voltaire, Hume, 
Diderote, and Locke were living in a medieval world; and 
that philosophers "demolished the Heavenly City of St. 
Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials." 
He stated: I shall attempt to show that the underlying
preconceptions of the eighteenth-century thought were still 
. . . essentially the same as those of the thirteenth cen­
tury." p. 31.
83Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlighten- 
ment, trans. by Fritz C.A. Koelin and James P. Pettegroye 
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 5.
84Jones, p. 721 .
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by tile medieval society. "Reason will clear up the mess that 
superstition, -revelation, faith (the devils of the rational­
ists) have piled up here on earth.
This supreme confidence in human reason inferred that 
all human beings can progress to a state of perfection. If 
reason could improve society, and if man could manipulate 
reason, there was no barrier to the perfectibility of man's 
environment and, hence, of man. Much of the preparatory work 
for this development was the result of John Locke's thinking.8^
Most of Locke's writing dates from the end of the 
seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries.
His works constitute a summing up of the seventeenth century 
conclusions and a starting point for eighteenth century in­
vestigations.^7 One author suggested that "the early eight­
eenth century did not, like the early seventeenth, witness a 
great intellectual revolution; it merely inherited the results 
and consolidated the certainties of the previous century."®® 
Locke's works were certainly a major part of that eighteenth 
century heritage as he synthesized the conclusions of his age 
with the needs of the coming age.89 Locke accordingly did 
influence the development of thought during the Enlightenment
85Brinton, p. 371•
®®Ibid.. p. 369.
®7cragg, p. 114.
88willey, p. 264.
89lbid.. p. 266.
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in philosophy, politics, and r e l i g i o n . 90
Locke's Relationship to the Enlightenment 
What is the relevancy of Locke's relationship to the 
Enlightenment to his philosophy of discourse? Locke's think­
ing on rhetoric did not develop in a vacuum; his reactions to 
the philosophic, religious, and political climate of his time 
directly influenced his philosophy of discourse. Any analysis 
of his thought must include an investigation of his relation 
to the Enlightenmento
Philosophic Relationship. Locke viewed his efforts 
in the Essay as a definite break from the Continental Ration­
alists, such as Descartes, Spinoza, and as a significant con­
tribution to an empirical epistemology. Locke sought a prac­
tical, "common sense" philosophy in contrast to the "specu­
lative theories" in vogue on the Continent. Some of Locke's 
metaphysics was in contradistinction to Spinoza's. Where 
Spinoza preferred the rational and the ideal, Locke argued 
the concrete and practical.91 Locke, however, was unable to 
accomplish completely either of his avowed purposes. In some 
respects he founded his approach to reality on a rationalistic 
metaphysics, and in other aspects, he was thoroughly an em- 
piricalist.
^^Leslie Stephen» History of Engli^ Thouph-t in the 
Eighteenth Century (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1902),
p. 94.
91 Jones, p. 720.
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One of Locke*s philosophic contributions was his epis- 
temology.^^ He encountered difficulties in establishing va­
lidity in the-areas of morality and revealed religion. In 
his philosophical investigations, he read unfounded assertions 
about "Truth," while in the sciences he discovered cautious 
generalizations and reliance on empirical e v i d e n c e . 93 Locke 
compared the confusion and uncertainty in theology and ethics 
with the precision and accuracy in the natural sciences.
Hence, he attempted to bring to ethics and theology, to meta­
physics and politics, the same empirical inductive method of 
investigation which was so valuable in astronomy, optics, 
physics, and medicine.9^
On the other hand, however, basic to Locke's philosophy 
was his faith in the rational foundation and structure of the 
cosmos. He postulated an objective logical necessity in the 
processes of the world and nature, even if man could not dis­
cover this necessity:
If we could discover the figure, size, texture, and mo­
tion of the minute constituent parts of any two bodies, 
we should know without trial several of their operations 
one upon another, as we know the properties of a square 
or a triangle.95
Nature is a machine, each part of which is related to each
92cragg, p. 35.
93John Locke, Locke; Selections, ed. by Sterling P. 
Lamprecht (New York; Charles Scribner‘s Sons, 1928), 
pp. xxxv-xxxvi.
94ibid.
93iMd., p. xliv.
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other part by a necessary and rational connection.9^ Man's 
failure to perceive the "really real" lies with his inability 
to comprehend the science of nature, not with nature and its 
logical operations.
Locke's analysis of the human mind and its operation 
was a significant contribution to his times. It came to be, 
in the eighteenth century "the normal possession of the edu­
cated and enlightened of E u r o p e . B e c k e r  described Locke's 
contribution: " . . .  His Essay . . . became the psychological
gospel of the eighteenth century."98 The role of Locke's 
philosophy and epistemology in the Enlightenment was that, 
while demonstrating that knowledge is founded on experience 
and tempered by reason, "he literally created a new science 
of the human mind."99
Political Relationship. During the seventeenth cen­
tury, theology still greatly influenced political thought. 
" . . .  Religious developments were so closely related to po­
litical affairs that changes in one area inevitably produced 
important results in the other."^00 With the Age of Reason, 
however, governments tended to produce more secularized and 
politically freer societies. Snyder explained this movement:
98jbid.
97willey, p. 265.
98Becker, p. 64.
99snyder, p. 48. 
lOOcragg, p. 13.
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governments encourage "the pursuit of individual happiness, 
the security of individual liberties, constitutionalism, tol­
erance, cosmopolitanism, the unfettering of thought, and a 
society of free citizens based on law."^®^ The new secular­
ized middle class abandoned many of the traditional political , 
religious concepts and enthusiastically accepted the trans­
formations in the new political and social order.
Locke was instrumental in formulating the doctrine 
behind this new political order, along with Hobbes and others. 
Locke based his political philosophy on the concept of the 
"state of nature." He argued that any state of political so­
ciety ought to parallel the state of nature. This former 
state will be bound by a social contract between the governor 
and the governed. Most of the ideas involved in his theory 
were current in the seventeenth century, but the manner in 
which Locke argued them was unique. The Lockian form of this 
view became a potent political program of action during the
following century.102
Charles II's ascension to the Crown in I66O revital­
ized the ancient doctrine that kings govern by divine right.
In 1 6 8 8, with the fall of James II, however, the divine right 
of kings lost its strength completely and f o r e v e r . 103 The
101 Snyder, pp. 14-15.
102gterling P. Lamprecht, The Moral and Political Phi­
losophy of John Locke (New York: Columbia University Press,
1918), pp. 2 2-2 3.
103cragg, p. 157.
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Bloodless Revolution did in fact achieve the acceptance of 
political toleration as a characteristic of English govern­
ment, but the complete triumph of toleration as a theory was 
due to Locke. Plum suggested that Locke's work. The Two 
Treatises of Government, served as a justification for the 
Revolution in 1688. "John Locke, who had retired to Holland 
when James (II) became King, published the first clear state­
ment of the philosophy of the Revolution before William had 
crossed the channel." 1 Plum's interpretation regarded 
Locke's efforts as a rationale of the Revolution. However, in 
a recent article Cranston argued convincingly that the Trea­
tises should be considered as arguments for action which pro­
ceeded the Revolution;
The book remains a piece d'occasion . . . only it be­
comes a piece of a different occasion. It is revealed 
as something written not to justify a revolution which 
had already taken place but to set forth arguments for 
a revolution which was being planned. It does not be­
long to the settled years of the reign of William and 
Mary, but to the perilous years of Protestant Plot 
against Charles II. The Two Treatises of Government, 
when it was first written, was a seditious and inflam­
matory document.105
In either case, Locke argued that the governed have the legit­
imate and natural right of revolution when a King betrays the 
social contract. When Locke maintained the rights of the in­
dividuals, the sovereignty of the people and the invalid 
ri^ts of Kings or Bishops, he established a foundation for
10-^ Plum, p. 71.
^^%aurice Cranston, "The Politics of a Philosopher," 
The Listener. LXV (January 5, 1961),18.
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much of modern political thought.
Locke*s political concept developed into the most
widespread political philosophy of the Age of Reason. Willey
described Locke's influence by stating that "Locke is the
father of nineteenth century as well as eighteenth century
' l i b e r a l i s m . '"106 Cranston, on the other hand, identified
Locke's political influence on modern thought:
The influence of Locke's teaching in these matters has 
been worldwide and his belief that a denial of the 
rights of man can justify rebellion has had the explicit 
approval even of the United Nations. In the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Na­
tions in 1948, the rights which are specified are more 
detailed than Locke's "life, liberty and property", 
but Locke's three rights contain the essence of most 
of them.107
Religious Relationship. Locke was immensely inter­
ested and involved in the religious controversies of his day. 
Yolton suggested the results of this involvement:
. . . [ÂiH important factor accounting for Locke's 
popularity was the way in which he orientated his dis­
cussions around the religious and moral questions of 
great significance to the majority of people of the
seventeenth century.108
One of the most notable religious precepts which Locke 
questioned was the method for demonstrating the existence of 
God. The Scholastics, during the seventeenth century,
lOÔBasil Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), p. 267.
1^'^Maurice Cranston, "Two Treatises of Civil Govern­
ment," The Listener. LXII (November 19» 1959), 867.
10®John W. Yolton, John Locke ^ d  the Way of Ideas 
(London : Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 21.
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maintained that God had imprinted on the mind of man certain 
innate truths. The truth of His own existence was one of the 
clearest and most important of these innate ideas. Hence, 
men did not question or reason to the existence of God; they 
simply knew His existence. Locke, however, approached the 
existence of God by quite a different avenue. Man starts with 
himself instead of innate ideas; he "knows that he himself 
is;" but he also knows that "nothing can produce a being, 
therefore something eternal."109
Locke explicitly argued the role of reason in dis­
covering the existence of an eternal being;
. . . From the consideration of ourselves, and what we 
infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason 
leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident 
truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful and 
most knowing Being. . . TTTD
Locke, then, avoided relying on innate ideas for demonstrat­
ing the existence of God; he argued that His existence could 
be proven rationally. We will consider this controversy in 
some detail in Chapter V.
The significance of Locke's proof of God's existence 
is not that he exalted reason, although that emphasis is im­
portant. But Locke supplied a detailed account of what many
^^^John Locke, An Essay. Concerning Human Underm tend­
ing, ed. by Alexander Campbell Fraser (New- York: Dover Pub-
lications, 1959), II, 308. (Hereafter referred to as An Es- ' 
say.) See also Herbert McLachlan, The Religious Opinions of 
Milton. Locke and Newton (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1941).
^^^Locke, An Essay. II, 309.
40
people had felt must be the true origin of their idea of God. 
Crags summarized Locke’s contribution on reason's place in 
religions
He did more than affirm the importance of reason in re­
ligion: he explained how it worked, and made it seem both 
necessary and inevitable. He laid bare the workings of 
the mind, with the result that those who followed him 
could confidently affirm as fact what had previously 
been put forward as hypothesis.]11
In maintaining the theory that religion was "reason­
able" Locke necessarily discussed the relationship between 
reason and revelation. Instead of opposing each against the 
other, he synthesized the two modes of knowledge:
Reason is natural revelation, whereby . . . God com­
municates to mankind that portion of truth which he had 
laid within the reach of their natural faculties. 
Revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of 
discoveries communicated by God immediately, which 
reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and 
proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he 
. that takes away reason to make way for revelation puts 
out the light of both: and does . . . the same as if he 
would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to 
receive the remote light of an invisible star by a
telescope.112
Locke, thus, explicitly stated that Christianity is a religion 
of both reason and revelation. The value of his contribution 
was his analysis of the way in which man receives revelation 
and its relationship to reason.
Shortly after the publication of The Reasonableness 
of Christianity, the Deists interpreted Locke’s position to 
mean that traditional Christianity was invalid because much
IllCragg, p. 118.
H^Locke, An Essay, II, 431.
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of it was "mysterious" and empirically unverifiable. Locke
was not, properly speaking, a deist; religiously, he was a
Unitarian. His theological methods and views, to he sure,
led toward deism, but the Deists' view of Locke's statement
was a misrepresentation. Carpenter confirmed'this contention:
Locke would certainly have been startled and shocked 
by their teaching, if he had lived to see it. At the 
same time while fully acknowledging the reality and 
necessity of a divine revelation, he pursued a common- 
sense and matter-of-fact approach to Christian theology, 
which tended to make it, if not, in the language of 
full-blown Deism, "not mysterious", at least less sO.''3
Therefore, to call Locke a Deist is a misnomer. Nevertheless, 
Deism preached, to a large degree, a biased view of his re­
ligious position.
Locke's role in the Toleration Act of 1689 was a sig­
nificant contribution to religion of his day. The Act pro­
claimed a new era for religion in England; it provided for 
the acceptance of religious minorities. Carpenter argued that 
Locke was instrumental in drawing up the terms of the Toler­
ation Act.  ^^ ^  In writing to a friend on the 6th of June,
1 6 8 9, Locke described his feelings about the Act:
Toleration has indeed been granted but not with that 
latitude which you, and men like, true Christians with­
out ambition or envy or desire. But it is something 
to have got thus far. On these beginnings I hope are
Carpenter, Eighteenth Century Church and 
People (London; John Murray Press, 1959)» p. 39. See also 
Samuel G-ring Hefelbower, The Relation of John Locke to 
English Deism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1918).
^^^Carpenter, pp. 21-22.
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laid the the foundations of liberty and peace on which 
the Church of Christ will hereafter be established.115
For this new attitude and outlook Locke provided the intel­
lectual justification with his Letter on Toleration. As 
Grimm insisted: "It remained, for John Locke to formulate the
most potent theories for religious toleration and liberty.
. . .''116
Several authors have summarized Locke's influence on 
the religion during the Enli^tenment. Willey stated: "In
his religious writings . . .  he gave his age just what it was 
ready to receive, a reasoned plea for toleration and a demon­
stration of the Reasonableness of Christianity. G r a g g  
described Locke's relationship to the religion of his times:
'All passion spent' might stand as the epitaph of 
seventeenth-century theology, and Locke, more than 
any other man, was responsible for giving religious 
thought the self-possesgessed assurance which it 
carried into the Age of Reason.H°
Mark Pattison, finally, maintained Locke's religious influence
during the Enlightenment : "The title of Locke's treatise.
The Reasonableness of Christianity, may be said to have been
the solitary thesis of Christian theology in England for the
l15powler, Locke, p. 59*
II^Harold J. Grimm, The Reformation Era (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1954), p. 592. See also, Roland N. 
Stromberg, Religious Liberalism in Eighteenth-Century England 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1954) and Wilbur K.
Jordan, The Development of Religious Toleration in England 
(Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1932).
IITwilley, The Seventeenth Century Background, p. 26?. 
IlScragg, p. 121.
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great part of a century."1^9
This chapter has set the stage for Locke's philosophy 
of discourse by investigating the man and his times —  both 
essential items in comprehending his theory of discourse. It 
has presented several conclusions. Locke was well inforaied 
in the rhetorical theories and practices of his day. Because 
of his wide and varied experiences, he was probably aware of 
the movements and schools of thought around him. Locke's 
period was an age of transition between the medieval and mod­
em. Locke made some significant contributions in the phil­
osophic, political, and religious spheres of the Enlighten­
ment, such as, his analysis of the human understanding and 
its processes, his political concept of the "state of nature," 
his synthesis of reason and revelation, and his theory of re­
ligious toleration.
‘•'•9jjark Pattison as quoted in Ibid., p. 118.
CHAPTER III 
THE RHETORICAL CLIMATE OF LOCKE’S TIMES 
Introduction
While reading Locke's works, one is struck by his 
criticism of the contemporary logical and rhetorical prac­
tices. His criticism of the rhetoric and logic of the seven­
teenth century indicated his awareness of the rhetorical tra­
ditions common to his day. Because Locke’s appraisal is basic 
to his philosophy of discourse, a survey of the rhetorical 
thought and practices with which he was familiar is necessary 
for an understanding of his thought.
This chapter discusses three stages of rhetorical de­
velopment to provide the proper perspective. First, because 
the rhetorical tradition of Locke's age was partly "medieval" 
in character, the medieval rhetorical tradition is considered. 
Next the rhetorical characteristics peculiarly common to 
Locke's age, and, finally, a rhetorical transformation which 
took place duri% the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
are discussed.
The Medieval.Rhetorical Tradition
Abelson stated that medieval rhetoric focused on the
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communicative arts then needed, including the writing of let­
ters and documents.1 Valios viewed rhetoric as a liberal art 
subject until the close of the twelfth century and then as a 
practical discipline concerned with preaching and prayer.2 
Haskins was concise in his description of medieval rhetoric; 
"Ancient rhetoric was concerned with oratory, mediaeval rhet­
oric chiefly with letterwriting.Finally Howell affirmed a 
larger view- of rhetorical scope:
Between the year 700 and the year 1573, rhetoric flour­
ished continuously in England as that branch of the 
theory of communication in which directions were set 
down, and observations made, for the guidance of speakers 
or writers whose audience was populace and whose purpose 
was instruction or persuasion by means not primarily con­
nected with the use of fictions.4
These four observations of medieval rhetoric identified it as 
a patchwork of emphases. In Howell's, view, rhetoric during 
the Middle Ages was classical in scope and nature. Abelson, 
Valios, and Haskins emphasized the lack of any realistic com­
munication outlet and characterized rhetoric as a very limited 
discipline. The characteristics of medieval rhetoric, then,
''p. Abelson, The Seven Liberal Arts; A Study in 
Medieval Culture, pp. 52ff. as quoted in Richard McKeon, 
"Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," Critics and Criticism: Ancient 
and M o d e m , ed. by R.S. Crane (Chicago; University of 
Chicago Press, 1925), p. .262.
% .  Valois, Guillaume d'Auverqna. pp. 224ff, as cited 
in McKeon, p. 262.
^C.H. Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, 
p. 138, quoted in McKeon, p. 262.
^Wilbur Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in Engird. 1500- 
1700 (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 64. 
(Hereafter referred to as Logic and Rhetoric.)
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depend on the vantage point.
One of the most consequential medieval rhetorical 
movements occurred when logic absorbed much of rhetoric.
McKeon suggested that this transition was "accomplished when 
the increased influence . . .  of -the New Logic led to the 
separation of scientific . . . proof from probable p r o o f . "5 
In the classical scheme, Aristotle differentiated science, 
dialectic, and rhetoric on the bases of two factors, the level 
of probability obtainable in each division and the logical 
mode employed by each discipline. Science-searches for exact 
knowledge, or certainty, through the logical mode of demon­
stration and pure induction. Dialectic seeks conclusions of 
very high probability by the syllogism and induction. Rhet­
oric through the enthymene, sign and example seeks probable 
conclusions also, but it uniquely searches for persuasive 
materials "contingent in human a f f a i r s . T o  Scholastic lo­
gicians of the Middle Ages, Aristotle’s distinction between
^McKeon, pp. 277-278. He stated; " ^This transi­
tion^ . . . is a gradual transition, dependent as much on 
increase of erudition in logic as in rhetoric. In the compre­
hensive collection of texts in the liberal arts prepared by 
Thierry of Chartres under the title Heptateuchon about 1141, 
all of Aristotle’s Organon except the Posterior Analytics and 
the Prior Analytics appears, while under rhetoric are in- 
cluded only Cicero's De partitione oratoria and Julius 
Severianus’ Precepts on the Art of Rhetoric." See also, 
Richard McKeon, "Aristotelianism in Western Christianity." 
Environmental Factors in Christian History, ed. by J.T.
McNeill (Chicago: University Press, 1939;, pp. 215-219.
^Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. by ■ 
Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941). See Rhetoric, 
1354 a 1, 1355 b 7, and 1357 a 1-5. See Topics. 101 b 1-4 and 
104 b 1-3. See also. Posterior Analytics. 71 a 1-5.
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dialectic and rhetoric vanished and the logical modes of each 
division became confused.
The Scholastics characterized logic (the term they 
used to symbolize Aristotle’s dialectic) by the procedures of 
invention and Judgment formerly assigned to rhetoric.? For 
them invention entailed discovering materials concerning de­
batable propositions. Judgment or disposition consisted of 
methods for arranging words into propositions, propositions 
into syllogisms or inductions, and syllogisms or inductions 
into whole discourses. Howell described the combination of 
these two procedures;
Taken together, these two procedures constituted a 
machinery of analysis and synthesis on the level of 
language— a machinery for assembling materials to 
prove the truth of an assertion and for combining 
those materials into complex discourses.®
Scholasticism, thus, viewed the scope of logic as "the process
of combining logical propositions so that a fully articulated
act of thought, a complete inference or. demonstration, is
created."9
With the absorption of invention and Judgment by 
logic, rhetoric retained only the canons of style and delivery. 
Because of this emphasis rhetorical theory developed into a 
sophistic traditions^ocused on an elaborate style.
?Howell, pp. 16-1 7.
Qjbid., p. 1 5.
9lbid., p. 53.
lOj.w.H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism; The 
Medieval Phase (London; Methuen and Company, 1943), p. 26.
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Atkins illustrated this significant medieval movements it 
was
. . . that morbid revival of Asiatic tendencies in rhet­
oric which had marked the opening centuries of the 
Christian era throughout the Empire, and which had drawn 
its inspiration . . . from the traditions of Gorgias 
and the early Greek sophists.11
The movement was limited to occasional oratory; that is, to 
displays of verbal skill on occasions suitable to pane- • 
gyrics.12. The sophists turned their attentions to questions 
of composition relating to stylistic devices utilized in 
novel and striking speech. Sophistic theorists gave little 
attention to methods for discovering valid subject matter 
(inventio) or for arranging a discourse (dispositio), for 
these materials were within the province of logic.13 Atkins 
maintained that the essence of the New Sophistic was the con­
centration on matters of style.
In their places [invention and arrangemei^ demands were 
made for more ingenuity of expressions, for the use of 
fixed patterns for structural purposes; and in this way 
were neglected not a few of the basic principles of 
good speaking (or writing) laid down by antiquity, the 
value of coherent structure, for instance, that organic 
quality inherent in all good prose, or again, the im­
portance of psychological factors in all matters of ex­
pression. In short, rhetoric as a result became little 
more t h ^  a barren study of a fixed and elaborate tech­
nique. 1 4-
Accordingly, rhetoric became more and more centered on style.
1 ll b i d .
12ibid., pp. 15-16.
13lbid.. pp. 26-27.
I^Tbid., p. 27.
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The educational use of the declamation paralleled 
the growth of the sophistic tradition. Declamations were 
scholastic exercises in which the student elaborated ficti­
tious themes with a flambuoyant and ornate style. Since 
rhetoricians viewed style as mere verbal artistry, students 
could obtain an "artistic" style simply by the mechanical ap­
plication of certain specific devices. Atkins identified 
some of these devices for exaggerating style.
Hence the importance attached to episodic descriptions, 
prolix amplifications, neat antitheses, pointed epi­
grams, far-fetched and paradoxical expressions, which now 
became the main ingredients of an attractive style. It 
was not that such figurative devices were inherently 
wrong; but, used mechanically and indiscriminately, they 
led to sheer absurdity, providing little more than 
specious ornament and artifice, and a burlesque exag­
geration of the "pomp of Roman speech."15
The declamation, then, was the practice of adding an ornate 
glamour to student’s speech through the use of these styl­
istic devices.
The rhetorical heritage of Locke’s age was the view 
that rhetoric was little more than style. Clark character­
ized this view of rhetoric as "personified in picturesque 
mediaeval allegory, never as being engaged in any useful oc­
cupation, but as adding beauty, color, or charm to life."^^
 ^5lbid. See also, Donald Lemen Clark, "The Rise and 
Fall of Progymnasmata in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century 
Grammar Schools," Speech Monographs XIX (1952), 259-263 and 
Karl Wallace, "Rhetorical Exercises in Tudor Education," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech XXII (1936), 28-51.
1^Donald L. Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renais­
sance (New York; Columbia University Press, 1922), p. 4?.
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The Rhetorical Climate
Rhetorical theorists of Locke's age inherited from 
the Middle Ages a theory of communication, divided into three 
areas; grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic.1? These three dis­
ciplines, or the trivium, assumed the responsibility for the 
rhetorical training of students.Howell identified grammar 
as the study of the language of communication, Latin for 
learned discourse or English for popular speech. Dialectic 
centered on communication for learned audiences, while rhet­
oric was the study of the means of making a discourse to a 
popular audience. Therefore, rhetoric emphasized style and 
delivery.
1 "^Howell, pp. 2-4.
1^Wilbur Samuel Howell, "Renaissance Rhetoric and 
Modern Rhetoric: A Study in Change," The Rhetorical Idiom, 
ed. by Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1 9 5 8), p. 55* (Hereafter referred to as "Renaissance and 
Modern.")
19jbid., pp. 5 4, 58-5 9 . In Logic and Rhetoric, 
pp. 5-4, Howell enlarged on this distinction between logic 
and rhetoric: "Rhetoric was then regarded as the theory be­
hind the statements intended for the" populace. Since the 
populace consisted of laymen, or of people not learned in the 
subject being treated by a speaker or writer, and since the 
speaker or writer by his very office was to some extent a 
master of the real technicalities of his subject, rhetoric was 
regarded as the theory of communication between the learned 
and the lay world or between the expert and layman. Over and 
over again in logical and rhetorical treatises of the English 
Renaissance, logic is compared to the closed fist and rhetoric 
to the open hand, this metaphor being borrowed from Zeno 
through Cicero and Quintilian to explain the preoccupation of 
rhetoric with the more open discourses of orator and popu­
lariser. . . . The conviction of Renaissance learning . . . 
[was] that logic and rhetoric are the two great arts of com­
munication and that the complete theory of communication is 
largely identified . . . with both." See Donald Lemen Clark,
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This rhetorical tradition survived the Middle Ages 
mainly because of the prominence of disputation and declama­
tion in the universities.^0 The Chancellor of Oxford Univer­
sity maintained the value of the rhetorical activities as a 
part of the degree requirement:
I did in the time of the last vice' chancellor recommend 
to him and the convocation's consideration whether it 
might not be of some use to impose some exercise in 
Rhetorick to be formed by the Bac. of A. before they 
take the degree of Mr., and whether the enjoyning them 
to make some public declamation in the Schooles might 
not be an exercise verie sutable to that season of their 
studies', etc.21
Later the delegates of Oxford ordered students to en­
gage in rhetorical exercises: " . . .  According to duty and
order in the Lent following, vie. 2. that all Bachelaurs of 
this University who have not determined j^isputed^ the last 
yeare do determine this Lent."22 These activities were a 
significant element in the rhetorical climate of Locke's 
times: " . . .  Rhetoric was of Importance . . . because of
the public disputations which had to be undertaken by students 
who had completed their studies in the trivium."^3 The
John Milton at St. Paul's School (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 19^6), pp. 2-lé for a detailed description of 
the trivium.
2%. Fraser Mitchell, English Pulpit Oratory From 
Andrews8 to Tillotson (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1932), p. 68,
21Andrew Clark, The Life and Times of Anthony Wood 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1891), p. 464. .
22ibid., p. 149.
Z^Mitchell, p. 60.
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rhetorical education of the time influenced, to a notable de­
gree, the rhetorical climate of the times.
The emphasis of Locke's age was largely "traditional." 
This "traditional" rhetoric consisted of three distinct pat­
terns; Ciceronian, formulary and s t y l i s t i c . T h e  Ciceronian 
and stylistic traditions emphasized different aspects of the 
five classical canons, (invention, delivery, style, memory . 
and arrangement), while formulary rhetoric focused on teaching 
discourse by imitation.
The Ciceronian rhetorical tradition concentrated on 
all five of the rhetorical canons. Alcuin, who wrote a Latin 
version of Ciceronian rhetoric in the late eighth century, 
first identified the five canons for the English. McKeon pos­
ited that Cicero's rhetorical thinking and writing were sig­
nificant during the Renaissances "Cicero's achievement, 
originality, and consistency, his choices and emphases, fixed 
the influence and oriented the interpretation of ancient 
thought, Greek as well as Latin . . .  in the Renaissance.
. . ."25 In the middle of the sixteenth century, Thomas 
Wilson provided a thorough discussion of Ciceronian rhetoric 
for the first time in E n g l i s h . 26
Theorists of the formulary tradition also sought to
2%owell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 6. Howell provided 
much of the material used to develop and amplify these three 
patterns.
25McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," p. 263. 
26Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 7.
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emphasize all five classical canons. However, they imple­
mented their objectives not by the study of rhetorical prin­
ciples but by the imitation of models. Howell amplified this 
characteristic of formulary rhetoric:
Rhetorical education has always rested upon the as­
sumption that practice in communication is necessary for 
the development of proficiency, and that the best pos­
sible practice consists in performing exercises like 
those required in the actual processes of civilized 
life. Sometimes these exercises (^ erë] performed by 
students in conscious imitation of models. . . .27
Formulary rhetoricians posited that to master "effective" 
public speaking the student must imitate models of "effec­
tive" discourse.
Stylistic rhetoric emphasized the canon of style al­
though stylistic theorists were aware of the other four 
canons. This rhetorical emphasis was the conclusion of a 
transition which began in the Middle Ages and climaxed during 
the Renaissance. The study of poetry gradually narrowed to 
current rhetorical teachings and the whole division of rhet­
oric became part of poetry. Rhetoric and poetic became al­
most synonymous terms while both disciplines focused on the 
single item which they held in common —  diction or style.28 
Atkins described the relationship between rhetoric and poetic:
. . . Rhetoric was being limited to a consideration of 
style, and its treatment was held to embrace the style 
of poetry as well as that of oratory or prose. Hence,
27Ibid., pp. 7, 1 3 8. Richard Rainolde, in 1563, 
produced the first formulary rhetoric written in English.
oft
Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance, p. 55<
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poetry came to be regarded as a sort of versified rhet­
oric; and rhetoric assumed in some sense the function 
of the earlier poetic.29
Baldwin, in Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice, re­
garded Renaissance rhetoric as preoccupied with style and 
poetics.30 Clark stated that "throughout the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries . . . the term rhetoric . . . regularly 
connoted skill in diction."31
This emphasis led to a number of treatises on style, 
by such authors as Sherry, Peacham and others.32 These au­
thors limited rhetoric to style, and style to the art of dec­
oration; they concentrated on those schemes and tropes which
29Atkins, p. 29.
30charles Sears Baldwin, Renaissance Literary Theory 
and Practice, ed. by Donald Lemen Clark (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1939), pp. 44-53.
31 Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance, 
p. 51. Ronsard, 1574, in Abbrege. regarded elocution as or­
nament or style. Ronsard is cited in Vere L. Rubel, Poetic 
Diction in the English Renaissance (London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1941), p. 100. Another writer gave perhaps 
the most potent evidence that rhetoric was equated to poetry 
when he described the manner in which an orator treated a 
given subject matter: . "Orateurs and Philosophers treat 
Nature after a very different manner; . . . [^atorsj rep­
resent her with all her graces and ornaments, and ir there 
be anything which is not capable of that, they dissemble it, 
or pass it over slightly." Burnet, Theory of the Earth, 
p. 109 in Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background 
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1949), p. 2o.
^^Richard Sherry, Treatise of Schemes and Tropes and 
Treatise of the Figures of Grammer and Rhetorike; Henry 
Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence Contevning the Figures of 
Grammar and Rhetorick. Other works and authors which are 
notable: John of Salisbury, Metalogicon; Geoffrey of Vinsauf,
Poetria Nova; Stephen Hawes, Pastime of Pleasure; and The 
Court of Sapience. See Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 118- 
137, for a full description of each of these works.
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had been influential in medieval rhetoric.33 Atkins main­
tained that "since the earlier confusion between poetic and 
rhetoric still persisted, these same devices are found oc­
cupying a prominent place in exposition of poetry by Puttenham 
and others."34 Thus these theorists advanced a stylistic 
concept of rhetoric and proposed a speaking style character­
istic of both medieval poetry and prose.
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, rhetoricians 
viewed style almost exclusively as tropes and schemes:
Figurative language was considered rather to be a means 
of carrying out a literal as well as a figurative in­
tention, and thus the figures of speech were part of the 
machinery of scientific, of popular, and of poetic dis­
course, and were assigned formally and with equivocation 
to rhetoric during the Renaissance.35
Style was differentiated into two types: one for conversation
and one for formal writing or speaking. The style appro­
priate for formal communication was distinctive in the use of 
figures of s p e e c h . 36
Englishmen of the Renaissance did not believe the lan­
guage of ordinary life to be suitable for formal dis­
course. They believed instead that formal discourse 
must be deliberately contrived to appear systematically 
unlike the language of ordinary.37
Howell claimed that the political structure of England during
the Renaissance regulated the rhetorical emphasis on style.
33Atkins, pp. 196-197»
34ibid.
35Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 5*
^%owell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 6 7 .
37lbid., p. 56.
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In the feudal and monarchial periods the elaborate, grandiose 
style' was predominant but became less influential with the 
growth of parliamentary government.^8
The characteristics of sacred rhetoric during this 
era were very similar to those of secular rhetoric. This 
parallelism is logical since nearly all the ordained minis­
ters were graduates of universities in which rhetoric consti­
tuted a great part of the education.39 Their rhetorical edu­
cations, therefore, determined the temper and style of their 
preaching;
. . . It is plain that the English sermon . . . bears 
a direct relation to the rhetorical bias of contem­
porary English education, in so far as the majority 
of those who became the preachers of the period had
^^Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 17-18. Howell 
elaborated on his contention: "It is suggestive to specu­
late upon the cultural implications of a rhetorical theory 
which equates true eloquence and hence true effectiveness 
with a system of studied departures from the established pat­
tern of everyday speech. Such a theory appears to be the 
normal concomitant of a social and political situation in 
which the holders of power are hereditary aristocrats who 
must be conciliated by the commoners if the latter are to 
gain privileges for themselves. In a situation like that, 
persuasive forms of speech would emerge as agreeable forms 
and agreeable forms would be those which sound more agreeable 
to the aristocrat than those which originated in a repudiation 
of the speech of the lower classes? Would not such forms re­
mind him of the superiority of his own origin and thus be a 
way of softening his will by the subtle inducements of flat­
tery? Would not the patterns of ordinary speech, if used by 
a commoner in seeking advantage from a great lord, be a way 
of showing contempt for the august person addressed? And 
would not that implication of contempt be enough to secure 
the prompt denial of the advantage sought?"
39caroline R. Richardson, English Preachers and 
Preaching. 1640-1670 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928),
p. 36.
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received the conventional training in theme, declama­
tion, and o r a t i o n . 40
The sermon, thus, should indicate the trends of sacred rhe­
torical theory.
The stylistic extravagances characteristic of secular 
rhetoric also influenced preaching. Bacon complained that the 
revival of preaching during the Reformation led to "an af­
fectionate studie of eloquence" which degenerated into "the 
sweet falling of the clauses," with special emphasis on tropes 
and s c h e m e s . Some years later, Dryden remarked that cor­
ruptions in style tended to find "benefit of clergy" and sur­
vived among p r e a c h e r s . 42 Critics praised sermons on a styl­
istic criterion, not on the soundness of their presentations. 
The sermon which received the highest praise was the one which 
consisted of an elaborate style embellished with ornate fig­
ures of speech. Richardson mentioned some of the most used 
figures: " . . .  Strained metaphors and startling similies
. . . long sentences complicated with clauses and entangled 
with parentheses. . . ."43 Mitchell described the transition 
in preaching from the theological emphasis to the stylistic:
. . . The transition from the old ‘metaphysical* 
preaching to the ‘quaint and elegant," with continually 
less delight in the quaintness and a continually grow­
ing insistence on the elegance, until, with the gradual
40Mitchell, p. 90. See also, pp. 9, 129-130.
4lBacon quoted in Ibid.. p. 11.
42pryden cited in Mitchell, p. 11.
43Richardson, p. 81.
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change of view as to what might be considered ele- 
elegance, even the most conservative of preaching 
vogues succumbed to the prevailing taste of the Court 
and of the most highly educated part of society.
The sermon during Locke's time accordingly bore testimony to 
the contemporary taste in style.
The stylistic tradition was perhaps the most influ­
ential and extensive rhetorical movement of Locke's period. 
Rhetoric was style and style was ornate and exaggerated.
Atkins succinctly summarized the stylistic tradition:
Waat was aimed at was not the enunciation of broad gen­
eral principles based on human nature, but rather the 
provision of elaborate systems of devices, with ample 
divisions ^ d  subdivisions, capable of mechanical ap­
plication.^5
A Rhetorical Transformation 
Coexisting with the rhetorical tradition peculiar to 
Locke's time were the beginnings of a rhetorical transformation. 
In fact, roots of this rhetorical change occur long before 
Locke's period as well as extend beyond his day. Howell sug­
gested that at the end of the seventeenth century, no new 
rhetoric had appeared in any single w o r k . 46 However, there 
were indications of an evolutionary process under way in rhe­
torical theory. Howell identified the Renaissance as the tran­
sition between ancient and modern rhetoric:
. . . The Renaissance is the one point in the history
4'^itchell, pp. 310-311.
^^Atkins, p. 16.
4%owell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 364.
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of Western Europe where the communication theory of 
ancient Greece and Rome and that of modern Europe and 
America are ranged side by side, the older one still 
alive but losing ground, the young one still imma­
ture but growing.
Mitchell substantiated.Howell's thesis when he posited that
"the Renaissance gave new life to rhetoric.
A definite and influential revolt occurred between 
1574 and 1600 which indirectly affected the development of 
rhetorical thought. Clark maintained that "the most influen­
tial dialectition who . . . robbed rhetoric to pay logic was 
Petrus R a m u s . T h e  Ramistic reform of rhetoric carried on 
by Ramus' disciples consisted in limiting rhetoric to style 
and delivery, while transferring the canons of Invention and 
arrangement to logic as the Scholastics had done earlier.
Later traditional theorists realized that much of Ramus' 
criticism was justified. Howell described the results of 
this realization:
. . . [traditional rhetoricians^ sought to restore 
Ciceronian concepts to rhetoric . . . but at the same 
time they sought to purge those concepts of re­
dundancy and to arrange them methodically, as the
^^Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 53.
^Mitchell, p. 60.
^^Clark, John Milton at St. Paul's School, p. 12.
See also, Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. ?• In describing 
the scope of Ramus' work and influence, Howell stated;
" . . .  The English Ramists . . . were responsible for most
of the logical treatises produced in England during the seven­
teenth century."" p. 343. ""Debates in the learned world often 
had Ramism as an ingredient at the turn of the sixteenth cen­
tury. . . . "  p. 1 9 3.
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Ramists were effectively advocating.50 
Although Ramus’ works were directed toward reforms of redun­
dancies in the liberal arts, his. criticisms originated a 
limited reformation in rhetorical theory.
In the area of sacred rhetoric, there was also a not­
able transformation. The English sermon in the seventeenth 
century represented an evolutionary process. Mitchell de­
clared that "the sermon . . . is a . . . medium in which to 
study the changing tastes of ... . the seventeenth century."51 
A new era in politics and new leadership in the church, 
coupled with a revitalized 'rhetoric, provided the motivation 
for this transition. Carpenter suggested a "new spirit" in 
preaching during the eighteenth century:
The English sermon remained throughout the whole of the 
eighteenth century, even in its most decadent form, a 
norm of dignified, sustained and beautifully modulated 
prose . . . till upset by the irruption of a new 
spirit. . . .52
Even in sacred rhetoric, therefore, there were evidences of
change from the old order to the new.
Five basic changes, identified by Howell, occurred 
during this period of rhetorical development; the change in
SORowell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 146, 318. Signif­
icant Ramian treatises were Audomari Talaeus’ Rhetorica and 
Dialection, Abraham Fraunce's Lowiers Logike and Arcadion 
Rhetoric, and Dudley Fenner’s The Artes of Logike and Rhet­
orike.
5lMitchell, p. 5.
5 2 3,0, Carpenter, Eighteenth Century Church and 
People (London; John Murray Press, 1959), p. 32. See also 
p. 7 and Mitchell, pp. 136, 343.
61
the relationship between logic and rhetoric, in the scope of 
rhetoric, in the emphasis on rhetorical invention, in arrange­
ment, and finally in rhetorical style. And, as Howell stated, 
"these changes help to explain why modern rhetoric is as it 
is."53
One of the most important departures from the medi­
eval system of communication was the separation of logic from 
the communicative arts and its identification as a discipline 
of scientific investigation. Descartes was one of the ear­
liest theorists to advocate this new direction for logic. In 
Discourse he indicated a need for a logic of inquiry to re­
place the older logic of communication. He argued for a logic 
that would accept experiment rather than disputation as the 
chief instrument in the quest for truth.54 in his work, 
Descartes evolved a new method of inquiry as opposed to the 
method of communication among scholars. Another evidence of 
this separation between logic and rhetoric occurred in 1553, 
when Thomas Wilson wrote the first complete work on rhetoric 
in English. His exclusion of the apparatus of scientific in­
vestigation in the Arte of Rhétorique indicated that he felt 
that the methods of inquiry should be left to logic and that 
only modes of communication should be discussed under rhetoric. 
As a matter of fact, he was the first Englishman to write a
53Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 55» The idea 
and much of the information on these changes come from Howell.
54pescartes, Discours de la Méthode, pp. 62-63 cited 
in Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 346. See also p. 348.
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logical treatise in English, indicating once again that he re­
garded these two disciplines separately.55 Hence, contem­
porary rhetoricians no,longer consider logic a means of com­
munication, but they view it as a method of testing the con­
sistency and validity of arguments and conclusions. As Howell 
summarized; . . In the main the two disciplines have 
parted company. . . .*'56
A second significant change in the nature of rhet­
oric, closely related to the first, was in its scope. Rhet­
oric evolved into the theory of communication encompassing 
both popular and learned discourses. The "new" rhetoric was 
a fuller, a more inclusive and comprehensive discipline than 
it had been in the classical tradition. Wilson was one of the 
first to argue the enlarged view of rhetoric when he main­
tained that rhetoric was concerned with all oral discourse 
and not merely communication to the populace.57 The new, en­
larged province of rhetoric in the eighteenth century was 
speech for both scholarly exposition and popular persuasion.58
A third result of this evolutionary process involved
55Russell H. Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Contributions 
to Rhetoric," Papers in Rhetoric, ed. by Donald G. Bryant 
(St. Louis: Printed by Subscription, 1940), p. 1. See also 
p. 5. Howell gives a detailed account and analysis of 
Wilson's work in Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 12-32.
S^Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 57*
57v)agner, "Thomas Wilson's Contributions to Rhet­
oric," p. 3.
58Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 365*
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the canon of invention. Rhetoricians gradually discarded in­
vention which emphasized commonplaces and adopted methods of 
thorough investigation.59 The classical commonplace system 
during the medieval period had degenerated. Speakers used 
commonplaces not for discovering arguments or for finding the 
status of a question but as devices for describing and con­
structing an ornate style.
The seventeenth century sermons also bore witness to
the use of the commonplace book which was nothing more than a
collection of tropes and schemes, "appropo quotations for any 
occasion," and arguments. Sermons of the age were full of 
catchy and elaborate phrases, indicating the preachers’ use 
of commonplace books. Many clergymen used Erasmus* first 
work which is an excellent example of a commonplace book.^l 
The Book of Homilies, published under the direction of Queen 
Elizabeth, was very similar to a commonplace book.^2 Mitchell 
cited the use of commonplaces in sermons in the seventeenth 
century:
. . . In a century famous for the citations and al­
lusions in its sermons, the influence of the common­
place book is manifest, and the approval with which
these quotations were received is quite plainly con­
nected with the prevailing practice in school and
59ibid.. p. 376.
^^McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," pp. 296,
291-2 9 2.
61 Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 61. 
f^Mitchell, pp. 63, 17-18.
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c o l l e g e . •
Thus the invention, of rhetorical matter by the use of the com­
monplace book was widely practiced in both sacred and secular 
rhetoric.
The commonplace system, as,the medieval rhetoricians 
used it, decreased in use during the Renaissance and Reforma­
tion when men became dissatisfied with the ready made argu­
ments, pat answers, and accepted opinions. Speakers realized 
the need for an exhaustive investigation of the individual 
case as the most profitable means of finding arguments which 
would have a persuasive effect upon the a u d i e n c e . ^4 Howell 
summarized this transition from the commonplace system to the 
inventive process of investigation and analysis:
Perhaps the best way to describe this change is to say 
that nowadays rhetoric in the quest for a theory of 
subject matter emphasizes external realities somewhat 
more than mental interpretation, whereas in the Renais­
sance, and for a thousand years before, mental interpre­
tation was emphasized somewhat more» at time consider­
ably more, than external realities.
A fourth transformation in rhetorical theory concerned 
the arrangement of ideas in speech. The evolution in dispo­
sition consisted of moving from the complicated classical 
speech structures to simpler ones.^G Wallace identified the
G^lbid.. p. 82.
^^Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 5=6. See also
pp. 10-11.
^^Howell, “Renaissance and Modem," p. 61.
^ ^ I b i d . . p p .  6 4 - 6 5 .
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transition in a similar manner; “The change in arrangement 
away from the long tedious classical exordium, narration or 
exposition, proposition, confirmation, confutation and con­
clusion was toward a more functional'and logical progres­
sion, “^7 Erasmus was one of the earliest to discard the us­
ual classical arrangement and to argue that the order of a 
discourse is contingent upon the nature of the subject.^8 
Wallace also maintained that the Tudor and early Stuart rhet­
oricians, in addition to the rhetorical theorists during the 
time from Henry VIII to Charles I maintained a simplified 
rhetorical arrangement "more adaptable to the purpose of the 
communication, to the mood and nature of the audience and the 
surrounding conditions of time, place and o c c a s i o n . B a c o n ,  
in Advancement of Learning, recognized the fact that there 
could be no static, fixed pattern of arrangement for all dis­
courses. He argued that the subject, the purpose of the speech
and the other variables of the communicative situation must 
determine the structural form.70
This new “psychological, logical" emphasis in speech 
arrangement also influenced sacred rhetoric. Richardson
^7%arl Wallace, "Early English Rhetoricians on the 
Structure of Rhetorical Prose," Papers in Rhetoric, ed. by 
Donald C. Bryant (St. Louis: Printed by Subscription, 1940),
p. 18.
GGl b i d .. p. 21.
G9ibid.. p. 18.
70lbid.. p. 13.
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described a typical sermon prior to this transition:
The framework' of a technically correct sermon was an 
elaborate arrangement of main topics, sub-topics, 
illustrations, authorities, "uses," and applications, 
the, whole held together by formal transition, phrases, 
even sentences. . . .71
Soon, however, clergymen realized the necessity for simplicity 
in the arrangement of their sermons. Sacred rhetoricians, 
such as Hyperius in Practice of Preaching and William Perkins 
in Arte of Prophecying, complained of the long, involved clas­
sical divisions and suggested simpler forms of arrangement.72 
Mitchell mentioned the results of the clergy's realization of 
the relationship between form and function: "The devices of
rhetoric were employed (in sermons), but in such a way as 
made less for a display of these devices than for the better 
management of the subject in h a n d . "73 The significant trend, 
therefore, seemed to be away from the ancient system of or­
ganization to the more logical and functional schemes.
The theory of style experienced the fifth transition. 
Rubel maintained that "about the middle of the sixteenth cen­
tury, critics of discourse became interested in redefining the 
medieval view of style."7^ Chaucer's influence in the treat­
ment of style was significant. He abandoned the "astonishingly
7^Richardson, p. 71.
72wallace, "Early English Rhetoricians on the Struc­
ture of Rhetorical Prose," pp. 23-24.
T^Mitchell, p. 126.
7^ubel, pp. 10, 2.
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artificial" stylistic tradition of the medieval sophistics 
and employed a style based on a "close observation of life and 
the exercise of the creative im a g i n a t i o n . W i l s o n  in the 
sixteenth century illustrated the changing emphasis in style 
when he insisted on plainness, aptness, and sound composition, 
as essential qualities of good style.76
Preaching also experienced the transformation in styl­
istic emphasis. The clergy discovered that the rhetoric of 
tropes and schemes was not really persuasive. Hence, preachers 
began to question this rhetorical approach. Thomas G-lanvill, 
an English theologian, criticized the preoccupation which 
preaching had with style in the seventeenth century.?? Out of 
this questioning evolved a stylistic emphasis based on per­
spicuity. Burnet summarized the introduction of perspicuity 
into preaching style:
Preaching has past through very different Forms among 
us, since the Reformation. But without flattering the 
present age, or any Persons now alive, too much, it 
must be confessed, that it is brought of late to a 
much greater Perfection than it was ever before in
Manly, Chaucer and the Rhetoricians (London:
The British Academy, 1926), p. 5. Manly further stated:
" . . .  ^auce]Q began his career, not as a disciple and 
imitator of a thoroughly artificial school of writing, but as 
a conscious exploiter of the formal rhetoric taught by the 
professional rhetoricians, and that it was only gradually and 
as the result of much thought and experiment that he replaced 
the conventional methods of rhetoric of imaginative construc­
tion which give his best work so high a rank in English lit­
erature." pp. 20-21.
7^Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Contributions to Rhet­
oric," pp. 5-6.
f^Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 10-11.
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among us. . . . Our language is much refined and we 
have returned to the plain Notions of simple and gen­
uine Rhetorick. 78
In a similar vein, Mitchell declared that during the seven­
teenth century "the plain sermon, which aimed at perspicuity 
but at the same time did not neglect grace and flexibility, be­
came an accomplished fact."79
The shift in the emphasis on style correlated closely 
with the evolution of political power from the monarchy to the 
new middle class. Howell contended that before this shift in 
power the persuasiveness of a discourse depended upon the ap­
propriate use of the language of the nobility. However, as 
the Crown lost its power there was no reason to equate per­
suasion with the style of the upper, ruling class.®® Howell 
stated that "a new political structure made an old theory of 
popular appeal u n w o r k a b l e . H o w e l l  summarized the transi­
tion in stylistic emphasis:
We may elaborate this image a bit and say that the 
great change in the theory of rhetorical style since 
Wilson's day has been a change from the convention of 
imperial dress to the convention of the business suit.®^
A theory of communication modifies its emphases to 
handle new communicative needs. The communicative situations
"^®Burnet cited in Mitchell, pp. 128-129.
'^^Mitchell, p. 3 3 2.
®®Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 68.
®^Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 10, 118.
Op
Howell, "Renaissance and Modern," p. 66.
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of both antiquity and the Renaissance were much the same, but
the needs and demands were different.
. . . The theory of communication as expressed in . . . 
rhetoric was throughout the Renaissance a response to 
the commimicative needs of English society of that 
time, and thus it is not to be considered in a vacuum, 
but in complex relation to the culture surrounding it.
A theory of communication is an organic part of a 
culture. As the culture changes, so will the theory 
of communication."3
Accordingly, the five significant changes in the theory of com­
munication identified by Howell were adjustments to the needs 
of a dynamic, changing society. These changes, however, did 
not appear full grown and distinct at the turn of the eight­
eenth century, but they evolved from a slow, gradual, over­
lapping process. Over a period of time during the last half 
of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eight­
eenth century these different rhetorical emphases coexisted.
Chapter III presented the climate of rhetorical 
thought and practices out of which Locke's thinking on dis­
course developed. During his age the most persistent and in­
fluential rhetorical emphasis was stylistic. In the next 
chapter, "Locke's Criticism of Rhetoric," we will study his 
criticism of this tradition. Another significant rhetorical 
development during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
was the evolution of what Howell termed the "new" modern rhet­
oric. This new direction in communication theory is important 
in an analysis of Locke's philosophy of discourse because of 
his contributions to the movement.
S^Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 9-10.
CHAPTER IV 
LOGEE’S CRITICISM OF RHETORIC 
Introduction
Locke, like Plato in the Phaedrus, based his construc­
tive view of rhetoric on his critical appraisal of contempo­
rary rhetorical and logical practices. He was highly dis­
satisfied with the rhetoric and logic of his day. In a biog- 
graphy of Locke, Fowler maintained; "With . . . logic and 
rhetoric . . . Locke is almost equally discontented."1 Locke 
himself declared that the art of rhetoric "attempts to insin­
uate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby all dis­
courses wherein the aim is truth and knowledge the trickeries 
of rhetoric should be avoided."2 He further declared that 
criticism of the art of rhetoric was fruitless:
Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties 
in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against; and it 
is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, 
wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.3
^Thomas Fowler, Locke (New York: The Macmillan Com­
pany, I960), p. 6.
2John Locke, "Lie Philosophical Works of John Locke, 
ed. by J.A. St. John (London: George Bell and Sons, 190Ô),
II, 112. (Hereafter referred to as The Philosophical Works.)
3lbid.
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Thus, the practices and precepts of seventeenth century rhet­
oric and logic did not please Locke.
Locke’s criticism of rhetoric extended to six areas: 
Scholasticism; rhetorical education; the art of disputation; 
speeches, sermons, and disputations; invention by commonplace; 
and finally, stylistic tradition.
Criticism of Scholasticism
During Locke’s connection with Oxford, Scholasticism
was the predominant philosophical view at the University.
Locke described his own reactions to the Scholastic methods
and practices;
In which abstract speculations young men have had their 
head employed a while, they are apt to have mean thoughts 
either of learning or themselves, to quit their studies, 
and to throw away their books, as containing nothing 
but hard words and empty sounds; or else concluding, if 
there be any real knowledge in them, they themselves 
have not understanding capable of it. And that this is 
so, perhaps I could assure you upon my experience.^
Regardless of the predominance of the methods of Scholasticism,
Locke questioned the validity of the practices. He suggested
that
it would perhaps be thought an affection of novelty to 
suspect the rules that have served the learned world 
these two or three thousand years, and which . . . 
the learned have rested in, are not sufficient to guide 
the understanding.5
^Letter, Locke to Clarke; 8th February - 15th March,
1 686 cited in Benjamin Rand, (ed.),. The Correspondence of 
John Locke and Edward Clarke (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1927), p. 137.
^Locke, I, 24.
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Scholarship based on Scholasticism was limited, ac­
cording to Locke, because It encompassed only the Scholastic 
view. Locke offered his eplstemology as another metaphysics 
of reality:
If men are for a long time accustomed only to one sort 
or method of thoughts, they grow stiff In It, and will 
not readily turn to another. It Is therefore to give 
this freedom that I think they should be made to look 
Into all sorts of knowledge, and exercise their under­
standing In so wide a variety and stock of knowledge.
But I do propose It as a variety and stock of knowl­
edge . . . .0
Locke thus advocated his philosophy of knowledge as an alter­
native to the Scholastic eplstemology.
Locke centered the majority of his criticism of Scho­
lasticism on the syllogism which was the methodological foun­
dation of the Scholastics. He Indicated that the syllogism 
was "at best, the art of fencing with the little knowledge we 
have."7 He specified that the syllogism was "more adapted to 
catch and entangle the mind, than to Instruct and Inform the 
understanding" and was "abundantly liable to fallacies."&
He was critical of the concept which affirmed the syl­
logism as the only form of human reason. If, as the Scholas­
tics argued, the syllogism was the only valid Instrument of 
reason, then It follows that "before Aristotle, there was not
^Ibld., pp. 62-63.
"^John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
ed. by Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publica-
tlon, 1959), II» 402. (Hereafter referred to as An Essay.)
^Ibld., p. 399.
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one man that did or could know anything by reason."9 Locke 
suggested, however, that "God has not been so sparing to men 
to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to 
Aristotle to make them rational. . . .”'•0 Locke added that he 
was not criticizing the person of Aristotle but that he was 
revolting against the view that the syllogism was the only or 
best means to knowledge.
If the syllogism were the sole method of knowledge, 
how could men obtain knowledge who were not aware of this form 
of reasoning? They could not obtain knowledge. But Locke 
maintained that many men "are not at all helped by the 
[£yllogisti0 forms they are put into; though by them the nat­
ural order; wherein the mind could judge of their respective 
connexion. . . Syllogistic reasoning followed knowledge
since there must be knowledge before there is syllogistic 
proof of that k n o w l e d g e . Locke's point was that syllogisms 
cannot produce knowledge; knowledge is not discovered simply 
by placing propositions in syllogistic form. He concluded
9lbid.. p. 390.
lOlbid., p. 391. Locke said: "I say not this way to
lessen Aristotle, whom I look on as one of the greatest men 
amongst the ancients; whose large views, acuteness, and pene­
tration of thought and strength of judgment, few have equalled; 
and who, in this very invention of forms of argumentation, 
wherein the conclusion may be shown to be rightly inferred, 
did great service against those who were not ashamed to deny 
anything."
Ibid., p. 395.
I^Ibid., p. 402.
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that the syllogism was not the avenue "for the leading of 
those into truth who are willing to find it, and desire to 
make the best of their reason, for the attainment of knowl­
edge."13
Locke further thought that the syllogism was too lim­
ited to include investigation of probabilities. Syllogistic 
investigation of probable statements is unprofitable because 
it leads to "running away with one assumed probability, or 
one topical argument, pursues that till it has led the mind 
quite out of sight of the thing under consideration. . . .”14 
This form of reasoning, Locke affirmed, tends to analyze only 
one side of the problem and does not consider on which side 
the greater probability exists.
. . . |Such reasoning forcing it upon some remote dif­
ficulty, holds it f a ^  there; entangled perhaps, and as 
it were, manacled, in the chain of syllogisms, without 
allowing it the liberty, much less affording it the 
helps, requisite to show on which side, all things con­
sidered, is the greater p r o b a b i l i t y . 15
Locke conceded that the syllogism is helpful in that 
it demonstrates the connection of proofs and premises; how­
ever, it "is of no great use, since the mind can perceive such 
connexion, where it is, as easily, nay, perhaps better, without 
it."1^ He advocated that other forms of reasoning are more
13ibid.. p. 392. 
I^ I b i d . . p. 401.
1 5 % b i d .
I^Ibid., p. 389.
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capable of perceiving the connection among ideas than the syl­
logism, although he did not elaborate on any of these forms. 
"Reason, by its own penetration, where it is strong and exer­
cised, usually sees quicker and clearer without s y l l o g i s m . 7 
The syllogistic form of reasoning, then, is useful and valuable 
in only one instance, Locke concluded;
Indeed, syllogism is made use of, on occasion, to dis­
cover a fallacy hid in a rhetorical flourish, or cun­
ningly wrapt up in a smooth period; and, stripping an 
absurdity of the cover of wit and good language, show 
it in its naked deformity.To
Locke, hence, credited the syllogism with the ability of dis­
covering fallacious reasoning.
Since Scholasticism and its practices saturated the 
educational system, Locke was extremely sensitive to con­
temporary educational practices and especially to rhetorical 
education.
Criticism of Rhetorical Education 
The student, for Locke, was the most important in­
gredient in the educational process. He characterized the 
curiosity of the students as "an appetite after k n o w l e d g e . " ^9 
Moreover, he suggested that this quest for knowledge should 
be e n c o u r a g e d . 20 i n  some advice to a friend on the education
17ibid., p. 400.
p. 3 8 9 .
ISRand, p. 137.
20jbid.
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of his son, Locke recommended that education should start 
early in life. . . If my rules have any advantages in
them, jtheyj . . . are to be put in practice as soon as chil­
dren begin to speak, and therefore no time is to be lost."^1
Locke considered the study of rhetoric important in a 
student's education. In addition to rhetoric, he suggested 
studies in arithmetic, geography, grammar, chronology, his­
tory, geometry, astronomy, natural philosophy, French and 
Latin.22 For Locke, the value of studying rhetoric was ob­
vious; however, it did not merit first place in the curriculum.
There are so many advantages of speaking one's own 
language well, and being a master in it, that let a 
man's calling be what it willy it cannot but be 
worth our taking some pains in it, but it is by no 
means to have the first place in our studies; but he 
that makes good language subservient to a good life and 
an instrument of virtue, is doubly enabled to do good 
to others,23
Locke, accordingly, subordinated rhetoric to other studies, but 
maintained that rhetoric was of certain importance for everyone 
regardless of one's planned occupation.
Skill in a practical art, such as rhetoric or logic, 
cannot come from reading a book of rules and principles, ac­
cording to Locke. Much as a theorist in the formulary tra­
dition would suggest, he maintained that students of rhetoric
21lbid.. pp. 117-1 2 1.
Burt, A History of Modern Philosophy (Chicago; 
A.C. McClurg and Company, 1892), I, 155.
^^Lord King, The Life and Letters of John Locke 
(London: Henry G. Bohn, 1858), p. Ï7I
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and logic should study examples of effective speaking and rea­
soning.
. . .  I have seldom or never observed any one to get the 
skill of reasoning well, or speaking handsomely, by 
studying those rules which pretend to teach it: and
therefore I would have a young gentleman take a view 
of them in the shortest systems could be found, without 
dwelling long on the contemplation and study of those 
formalities. Right reasoning is founded on something 
less than the predicaments and predicables, and does 
not consist in talking in mode and figures itself.
. . .  If you would have your son reason well, let him 
read Bacon; and if you would have him speak well, let 
him be conversant in Tully to give him the true idea of 
eloquence; and let him read those things that are well 
writ in English, to perfect his style in the purity of 
our language.24
In addition to studying models and examples, the stu­
dent learns rhetoric and logic by practice. Locke related 
practice to the development of man's potentialities. " . . .
It is only exercise of these potentialities which gives us 
ability and skill in anything, and leads us towards perfec­
tion. "25 Locke was an unreserved advocate of the maxim "Prac­
tice makes perfect." Moreover, Locke attempted to synthesize 
practice with inherent abilities and potentialities:
I do not deny that natural disposition may often give 
the first rise to it, but that never carries a man 
far without use and practice, and it is practice alone 
that brings the powers of the mind» as well as those 
of the body, to their perfection.2o
Practice and exercise constituted an essential role 
in rhetorical education. They were indispensable, for Locke,
24-Rand, p. 155.
^^Locke, An Essay,I, 34.
Z^lbid., p. 36.
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in gaining a high, degree of effectiveness in "right reasoning" 
and oratory.
And he will not have much better success who shall 
endeavour . . .  to make a man reason well, or speak 
handsomely, who has never been used to it, though you 
should lay before him a collection of all the best pre­
cepts of logic or oratory. .  ^ . Practice must settle 
the habit of doing without reflecting oh the rule; and 
you may as well hope to make a good painter or musician 
extempore, by a lecture and instruction in the arts of 
music and painting, as a coherent thinker or a strict 
reasoner by a set of rules showing him wherein right 
reasoning consists.27
Thus, the proper and adequate means of teaching rhetoric and 
logic, from Locke’s view, was through the study of models sup­
plemented with practice. Although Locke’s pedagogical tech­
niques seem to correspond closely with the formulary rationale 
for teaching rhetoric, he did hot advocate the imitation of 
models and examples.
Locke was critical of the contemporary devices used 
in teaching rhetoric. He viewed the teaching techniques of 
"long discourses and philosophical reasonings" as a little 
educational value to the students except to "amaze and con­
found . . . them."28 Locke was persistent in his stand against 
using themes, verses, and declamations in rhetorical education. 
He advised Edward Clarke not to allow Clarke’s son to dabble 
in these practices:
. . .  I would be glad we might preserve as much of our 
education as -could be, and at least not perplex him
2 7 l b i d .. p. 37.
^^Letter, Locke to Clarke: 28th January, 1688 cited
in Rand, pp. 285-286.
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witîi grammar, much less with themes, declamations, and 
making of verses, but only reading and translating prose 
authors, beginning with those of (easier sort, and) so 
proceeding to h a r d e r . 29
So firm was Locke in his views, that in a later letter
to Clarke, he again warned of the uselessness of the "making
of themes" and further elaborated his rationale against this
educational device.
But yet by all means obtain, if you can, that he be 
not employed in making Latin themes and declamations, 
and least of all verses of any kind. You may insist 
upon it to the Learned Dorn, (inics) if it will do any 
good, that you have no desire to make him either a Latin 
orator and poet, but would barely have him understand 
perfectly a Latin author.30
Locke was quite explicit in his criticism of contemporary rhe­
torical teaching devices.
Locke advanced two specific criticisms against making 
themes. Theme-making failed in its defined purpose to in­
culcate the principles of effective speech making. This 
teaching technique required a student to speak on subjects 
about which he knew nothing, a practice of no benefit to the 
students
As to themes, though they have, I confess, the pretence 
of something useful, which is to teach people to speak 
handsomely and well on any subject. . . . But this I 
say, that the making of themes, as is usual in schools, 
helps not one jot toward it: For 1st. Do but consider 
what it is in making a theme that a young lad is employed 
about; it is to make a speech upon some Latin saying as 
* Omnia vincit amor' or 'Dulces sunt fructus radix
^^Letter, Locke to Clarke: 27th December, 1691 cited
in Rand, p. 327. Rand added the material in parenthesis.
30Letter, Locke to Clarke: 8th February - 15 March,
1686 quoted in Rand, p. 148. Rand added the material in pa­
renthesis.
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virtutls amara.' And here the poor lad, who wants 
knowledge of these things he is to speak of, which 
is to be had only from time and experience, must set 
his invention on the rack, to say something where he 
knows nothing which is a sort of Egyptian tyranny to 
bid them make bricks who had not yet any of the ma­
terials.31
Before a student can speak on any subject they must 
know something about it or "else it is as foolish to set him 
to discourse about it, as to set a blind man to talk of 
colours, or a deaf man of m u s i c . "32 Locke struck at the very 
essence of the sophistic tradition in a query to Clarke:
"And would you not think him a little cracked who should re­
quire another to make an argument on a moot question, who un­
derstood nothing of our l a w s ? "33 Locke in this first criti­
cism of theme-making inferred that the subject matter of a 
discourse is of no small concern, that what is to be said must 
be given prime consideration. "And what, I pray, do school­
boys understand concerning those matters, which are used to 
be proposed to them in their themes, as subjects to discourse 
on, to whet and exercise their fancies?"3^
Locke, next, maintained that making themes was not 
effective because of the language in which the student de­
livered them. Students prepared and delivered themes in Latin 
which Locke described as "a language foreign in their country,
31 Rand, pp. 148-149.
32%bid.. p. 149. 
33ibid. 
34%bid.
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and long since dead everywhere'* and he suggested that the 
chances were "an hundred to one" that a student would ever 
have the occasion to make a speech in Latin.35 Making themes 
in Latin was not profitable because Latin was a language 
"wherein the manner of expressing one's self is so far dif­
ferent from ours, that to be perfect in that, would very lit­
tle improve the purity and facility of his English style."3^
The proponents of theme-making argued that this device
aided the student in learning and improving their Latin. Locke
disagreed strongly with this rationale;
. , , But the making of themes is not the way to it; 
that perplexes their brains about invention of things 
to say not about the signification of words to be 
leamt; and when they are making a theme, it is thoughts 
they search and sweat for, and not language. But the 
learning and mastery of a tongue, being uneasy and un­
pleasant enough in itself, should not be cumbered with 
any other difficulties, as is done in this way of pro- 
. ceeding. In fine, if boys' invention is to be quickened 
by such exercise, let them make themes in English, where 
they have facility and command of words, and will better 
see what kind of thoughts they have, when put into their
own language. And, if the Latin tongue is to be
learned, let it be done the easiest way, without toiling 
and disgusting the mind by so uneasy an employment as
that of making speeches joined to it.57
Thus, the combination of two dubious tasks improved neither.
Locke's views on making verses were as critical as his 
views on theme-making. His major contention was that in mak­
ing verses students are required to perform tasks for which
35ibid.
3^Ibid.
37ibid.
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they are not prepared. "For If he has no genius to poetry, 
it is the most unreasonable thing in the world to torment him 
and waste his time about that which can never s u c c e e d . "38 
Locke implied that education ought to have some utility and 
should not exist simply because it is the thing that is done.
Closely associated with Locke*s criticism of rhetor­
ical education was his appraisal of the art of disputation 
which was practiced by the schools.
Criticism of the Art of Disputation
In Locke’s attack on disputation, he first related a
history of the growth and development of the activity from
the "philosophers of old" to his day. According to Locke, the
original motivation for the "invention and growth" of dispu­
tation was the desire to hide ignorance.
. . . The philosophers of old, (the disputing and 
wrangling philosophers, I mean, such as Lucian wittily 
and with reason taxes,) and the Schoolmen since, aiming 
at glory and esteem, for their great and universal 
knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to than 
really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover 
their ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of 
perplexed words, and procure to themselves the admira­
tion of others, by unintelligible terms, the apter to 
produce wonder because they could not be under­
stood. . . .39
The advent of the disputation produced very little new knowl­
edge "unless the coining of new words . . .  or the perplexing 
or obscuring the signification of old ones, and so bringing
38%bid.
^^Locke, An Essay, II, 127.
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all tilings into question and dispute, were a thing profitable 
to the life of man. . . ,’*^ 0
The art of disputation, in fact, constitutes a bar­
rier to knowledge and produces some serious deficiencies in 
language.
, . . This art of keeping even inquisitive men from 
true knowledge hath been propagated in the world, and 
hath much perplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the 
understanding. . . . There were philosophers found who 
had learning and subtlety enough to prove snow was 
black; i.e. to prove that white was black, lifhereby 
they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and 
means of discourse, conversation, instruction, and 
society; whilst with great art and subtlety, they did 
no more but perplex and confound the signification of 
words, and thereby render language less useful than the 
real defects of it had made it. . . .^ 1
And, hence, in tracing the history of the art of disputation, 
Locke concluded that this "artificial ignorance and learned 
gibberish" which is "the direct opposite to the way of knowl­
edge," has developed "under the laudable and esteemed names 
of subtlety and acuteness, and has had the applause of the 
schools, and encouragement of one part of the learned men of
the world."^2
Locke’s main criticism of the art of disputation was 
that it focused on words and not ideas. Since words are inac­
curate signs of ideas, disputera are more concerned with 
sounds than with ideas. He elaborated his contention by
40lbid.. pp. 127-128. 
4llbid.. pp. 128-129, 
4^lbid.. p. 127.
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describing the typical practice of a disputer:
In arguing, the opponent uses as comprehensive and 
equivocal terms as he can, to involve his adversary 
in the doubtfulness of his expressions: this is ex­
pected, and therefore the answerer on his sides 
makes his play to distinguish as much as he can, and 
thinks he can never do it too much; nor can he indeed 
in that way wherein victory may be had without truth 
and without knowing. This seems to me to be the art 
of disputing. Use your words as captiously as you 
can in your arguing one side, and apply distinctions' 
as much as you can on other side to every term, to 
nonplus your opponent, so that in this sort of schol­
arship there being no bounds set to distinguishing.
• ♦ •
Locke viewed this "playing with words," this "artifice and 
fallacy of words, which makes so great a part of the business 
and skill of the disputers" as contemptible to rational man.44 
Disputation is nothing more than an art "whose business is 
only the vain ostentation of sounds."45 in closing this line 
of criticism, Locke compared the disputer with "him that 
should walk up and down in a thick wood, outgrown with briars 
and thorns, with a design to take a view and draw a map of 
the country."46 There was little implicit in Locke's out­
spoken appraisal that the method of disputation gets so in­
volved in the signification of words that as an investigative 
method it loses sight of knowledge and truth.
Disputation, by the same token, does not inculcate a
4^Locke, The Philosophical Works. I, 86.
44sing, pp. 362-364.
45Locke, An Essay. II, 151.
46ibid., I, XXV.
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desire for knowledge, tut, quite apart, it'concentrates solely
on victory in verbal skills. Locke was very lucid in this
charge :
Truth and knowledge have nothing to do with all this 
bustle; nobody thinks them concerned, it is all for 
victory, —  a trial of skill, without any appearance 
of a true consideration of the matter in question, 
or troubling their heads to find out where the truth 
lies. . . . The mischief has been brought in by 
•placing too high a value and credit on the art of dis­
puting, and giving that the reputation and reward of 
learning and knowledge.47
The procedures of disputing indicate that truth and knowledge
do not concern disputers whose primary goal is victory.
Nor is it to be wondered, since the way of disputing
in the schools leads them quite away from it, by in­
sisting on one topical argument, by the success of 
which the truth or falsehood of the question is to 
the determined, and victory adjudged to the opponent 
or defendant, which is all one as if one should bal­
ance an account by one sum, charged and discharged, 
when there are a hundred others to be taken into con­
sideration. 48
Locke was convinced that a disputer was an
insignificant wrangler, opiniated in discourse, and 
priding himself in contradicting others; or, which 
is worse, questioning everything, and thinking there 
is no such thing as truth to be sought, but only 
victory, in disputing.49
Therefore, in one of Locke's most outspoken attacks, 
he disapproved of one of the prominent rhetorical activities 
of his day. The art of disputation and all it stood for was 
antagonistic to Locke's way of thinking mainly because
47King, p. 362.
4^Locke, The Philosophical Works. I, 44.
Ibid.. II, 189.
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because disputation, for him, was a hindrance to knowledge 
and truth. We will now move from Locke’s appraisal of the 
general art of disputing to his evaluation of specific com­
municative acts.
Criticism of Speeches. Sermons 
and Disputations
Locke sprinkled his journals with evaluations and 
descriptions of various discourses which he had heard. Dur­
ing his travels in France, he analyzed and criticized several 
sermons, speeches, and disputations. In describing the "man­
ner of making a doctor in physic," Locke elaborated on the 
procedures of a speech given by one of the professors:
When they had plaid a litle while, the professor 
made signs to them to hold that he might have oppor­
tunity to enterteine the company, which he did with a 
speech against innovations as long as an ordinary 
declamation. When he had don, the musick took their 
tume, & then the inceptor began his speech . . .  it 
being, I believe, chiefly designed to complement the 
Chancellor & other professors who were present. In 
the midle of his speech he made a pause, & then we 
had an interlude of musick, & soe went on till he came 
to thank us all for our company & so c o n c l u d e d . 50
Locke maintained that he "found litle for edification" in the
speech. 51 The journal which Locke kept during his exile in
Holland contained a description of an oration made by "the
young Gronovius:"
His subject was the original of Romulus. The harangue
John Loug^, (ed). Travels in France. 1675-1679. as 
related to His Journals. Correspondence and Other Papers 
(Cambridge : University Press, 1953), p. 57»
51Ibid.
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Itself 'began with, a magnificent and long compliment 
to the curators I and then something being said to 
'professors and scholars, he came to the main business, 
which was to show that Romulus was not an Italian 
born, but came from the east and was of Palestine or 
therabout. This, as I remember, was the design of his 
oration, which lasted almost two h o u r s . 5 2
In each of these instances, Locke focused on the content of
the discourse with little regard for style or delivery. Such
attention infers that Locke placed emphasis on the message of
the discourse.
Locke was notably critical of some disputations which 
he heard at the Medical School in Montpellier. Of the first 
disputation, Locke declared: "At the Physick Schoole a
Scholler answering Q.isputin^ for the first time, a Profes­
sor moderating. 6 other professors oppose with great violence 
of Latin & French. Grimasse & h a n d ."53 u© characterized an­
other disputation as "much French, hard Latin, little Logic 
and little Reason."5^ In his evaluations of disputations Locke 
appeared concerned with the. presence or absence of logic and 
reasoning.
Locke criticized several sermons and disputations 
during his employment as secretary to the elector of Branden­
burg. On December 24th, he described a sermon as "a good 
lusty, rattling High Dutch sermon, the sound whereof would
S^Henry Richard Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, I8 7 6), II, 1 5.
^^Lough, p. 5 4 . That portion of the quotation which 
appears in italics was in Locke's shorthand.
54ibid., p. 5 0.
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have made one think it had the desire of reproof. . . ,”55 
Later Locke evaluated another sermon given at a Lutheran 
church.
His sermon, I think, was in blank verse; for by the 
modulation of his voice, which was not very pleasant, 
his periods seemed to be all nearly the same length.
But, if his matter were no better than his delivery, 
those that slept had no great loss, and might have 
snored as harmoniously.5o
In this last note Locke hinted at the reason why he failed to 
comment on the content of the sermons. He explained that he 
did not speak or understand Dutch when he noted ”if the matter 
were no better than his delivery." Since he could not under­
stand the message he naturally centered his entries on the 
delivery of the sermons.
In discussing the metaphysical disputations of some 
Franciscan monks who entertained him while he was in Branden­
burg, Locke stated: "Poor materia prima was convassed
cruelly, stripped of all the gay dress of her forms, and shown 
naked to us; though, I must confess, I had not eyes good 
enough to see h e r . "57 Locke elaborated on one disputation at 
length :
The professor of philosophy and moderator of the dis­
putation was more acute at it than Father Hudibras.
He was top-full of distinctions, which he produced with 
so much gravity, and applied with so good a grace, that 
ignorant I began to admire logic again, and . . . with 
the right stroking of his whiskers, the settling of
55%ing, p. 17.
55Bourne, I, 109.
57ibid.. p. 115.
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111 s hoodt and with. M s  sta'tely walk, made M m  seem to 
himself and me something more than Aristotle and 
Democritus. But he was so hotly charged hy one of the 
seniors of the fraternity, that I was afraid sometimes 
what it would produce, and feared there would he no 
other way to decide the controversy between them but by 
cuffs; but a subtle distinction divided the matter be­
tween them, and so they part good friends. . . , But 
it behoves the monks to cherish this art of wrangling 
in its declining age, which they first nursed and 
send abroad into the world to give it a troublesome,
idle employment.58
Finally Locke further identified his own reactions to the dis­
putation of the Monks;
I being a brute, that was rode there for another's 
pleasure profited little by all their reasonings, 
and was glad when they had done, that I might get home 
to my ordinary provender, and leave them their sublime 
speculations, which certainly their spare diet and 
private cells inspire abundantly, which such gross 
feeders as I am not capable of.59
Even though Locke viewed the Monks* debate much superior to
the disputation at Oxford, he found little satisfaction in
the activity.GO
Underlying all of Locke's notes on these speeches, 
sermons, and disputations are his critical standards for the 
practice of effective communication. One of Locke's most pro­
nounced criticisms of contemporary speech practices was of the 
use of commonplaces.
Criticism of Commonplaces
During Locke's day, speakers relied heavily on
5 8 i b i d . , pp. 115-116.
59ibid.
GOlbid.
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commonplace books for the collection of the materials for their 
discourses. A typical commonplace book consisted of little 
more than a collection of cliches, quotations and arguments 
which were categorized around certain general topics. In lieu 
of investigating and analyzing the ramifications of a problem, 
a speaker or writer simply "invented" his "case" from the com­
monplace book. Locke gave an apt description of the use of 
commonplaces;
There is another but more innocent way of collecting 
arguments very familiar among bookish men, which is to 
furnish themselves with arguments they meet with pro 
and con in the questions they study. This helps them 
. . .  to talk copiously on either side . . . for such 
arguments gathered from other men's thoughts, floating 
only in the memory, are there ready indeed to supply 
copious talk with some appearance of reason. . . .
Locke singled out for criticism another practice 
closely related to collecting arguments on both sides of a 
question and that was "hunting after arguments to make good one 
side of the question, wholly to neglect and refuse those which 
favour the other s i d e . "^2
Two objections motivated Locke's criticism of medieval 
and contemporary uses of "commonplaces." Whereas the de­
fenders of commonplaces maintained that the commonplaces were 
materials for knowledge, Locke insisted that commonplaces 
could not produce knowledge.
If their memories retain well, one may say, they have 
the materials of knowledge, but like those for building
Locke, The Philosophical Works. I, 57»
G2lbid.. pp. 56-57.
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they are of no advantage if there be no other use 
made of them but to let them lie heaped up to­
gether.^3
Knowledge does not necessarily follow from the fact that a 
speaker is a copious talker, Locke again affirmed his posi­
tion:
The memory may be stored, but the judgment is little 
better, and the stock of knowledge not increased by 
being able to repeat what others have said or produce 
the arguments we have found in them.°^
The speaker who uses commonplaces, indeed, appears
knowledgable and well read on his topic when in reality he has
very little "knowledge" of the topic.
This, when it succeeds to the purpose designed . « . 
sets a man off before the world as a very knowing 
learned man, but upon trial will not be found to be so; 
indeed, it may make a man a ready talker and disputant, 
but not an able man. It teaches a man to be a fencer; 
but in the irreconcileable war between truth and false­
hood, it seldom or never enables him to choose the 
right side, or to defend it well, being got of it.°5
When a speaker uses commonplaces, he is "but-a retailer of
o t h e r s . H e  cannot defend the foundation of his case since
commonplaces provide only superficial insight. The essence of
Locke’s first criticism was that if the mind does not digest
commonplaces, "it produces nothing but a heap of crudities."^7
Locke, next, contended that "truth needs no
63lbid., pp. 54-55.
64ibid.. p. 64.
65King, p. 104.
^^Locke, The Philosophical Works, I, 57.
67lbid.. p. 54.
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recommendation, and error is not mended by it."^® Hence, he
based his second criticism of commonplaces on the proposition
that investigation for knowledge must not rely on the opinions
of others. He paralleled relying on the conclusions of others
with a man traveling on a journey :
. . .  In our inquiry after knowledge, it as little con­
cerns us what others have thought, as it does one who 
is to go from Oxford to London, to know what scholars 
walk quietly on foot, inquiring the way and surveying 
the country as they went, who rode past after their 
guide without minding the way he went, who were carried 
along muffled up in a coach with their company, or 
where one doctor lost or went out of his way, or where 
another stuck in the mire. If a traveller gets a 
knowledge of the right way, it is not matter whether 
he knows the infinite windings, by-ways, and the right 
secures him from the wrong, and that is his business: 
and so methiÿts it is our pilgrimage through this 
world. . .
Locke implied that materials for discourses must be gleaned 
from personal experiences without any aid, except in a very 
general manner, from the experiences of others.
Locke realized that he had overstated his case and he
softened his position on the use of other people’s knowledge.
He admitted that there is some profit and value to be gained
from reading and knowing what others have said, if the study
is not overdone:
I do not say this to undervalue the light we receive 
from others, or to think there are not those who 
assist us mightily in our endeavours after knowledge; 
perhaps without books we should be as Ignorant as the 
Indians, whose minds are as ill clad as their bodies; 
but I think it is an idle and useless thing to make
^^King, p. 94. .
G9lbid.
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it one's business to study what have been other men's 
sentiments in things where reason is only to be judge, 
on purpose to be furnished with them, and to be able 
to cite them on all o c c a s i o n s . 70
In the end, therefore, Locke gave some credit to the wisdom of
others.
Locke concluded that commonplaces are as "empty 
sounds" and can no more improve the understanding or strengthen 
the reason than "the noise of a jack will fill our bellies or 
strengthen our bodies."7'* He compared the skill in using com­
monplaces to being "dexterous in tying and untying knots in 
c o b w e b s . "72 in addition to the use of commonplaces, he ana­
lyzed the stylistic emphasis of contemporary communication 
practices.
Criticism of Style
At the outset of Locke's short critical analysis of 
style, he delineated his objective which was "not to decry 
metaphor, or with design to take away that ornament of 
speech."73 He stated that he was writing for the philosopher 
and "lovers of truth" and was not concerned with the rhetori­
cian or orator.74 Notwithstanding Locke's exclusion of speech 
makers, his evaluation of style is relevant to his philosophy
70lbld.. p. 94.
71 Ibid.. p. 3 6 0.
72jbid.
73bocke, The Philosophical Works. I, 88.
74jbid.
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of discourse.
¥h.ile not directly opposed to figurative language,
Locke suggested that the use of devices such as similes and
metaphors should be regulated. There is some justification
for utilizing figurative devices but there are, at the same
time, some deficiencies in them:
• . . Though it may be a good way and useful in ex­
plaining our thoughts to others, it is by no means a 
r i ^ t  method to settle true notions of anything in our­
selves, because similes always fail in some part, and 
come short of that exactness which our conceptions, 
should have to things if we would think a r i g h t . 75
Locke praised the "well chosen" similes, metaphors, and al­
legories as excellent means for conveying new concepts.
These devices relate new information well because
being taken from objects already known and familiar 
to the understanding, they are conceived as fast as 
spoken, and the correspondence being concluded, they 
think they are brought to explain and elucidate is 
thought to be understood too.76
Locke illustrated his view on figurative language,
. . . For those are always most acceptable in discourse 
who have the way to let their thoughts into other men's 
minds with the great ease and facility; whether those 
thoughts are well formed and correspond with things 
matter not; few men care to be instructed but at an easy 
rate. They who in their discourse strike at the fancy, 
and take the hearers' conceptions along with and go for 
the only men of clear thoughts. Nothing contributes so 
much to this as similes, whereby men think they themselves 
better, because they are the better u n d e r s t o o d . 77
While equating figurative language with "plausible"
7 5 i b i d . . p . 8 7 .
7 6 i b i d . . p . 8 8 .
7 7 i b i d . , p . 8 7 .
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speech., Locke also warned that a genuine investigation for
knowledge must go beyond the use of these devices.
If all our search has yet reached no further than 
simile and metaphor, we may assure ourselves we rather 
fancy than know, and have not yet penetrated into the 
inside and reality of the thing, be it what it will, 
but content ourselves with what our imaginations, 
not things themselves, furnish us with.'"
In different terminology, Locke enlarged on the same idea. He 
suggested that many students never find truth because of some 
"rhetorical discourse," that they "are struck with some 
lively metaphorical representations they neglect to observe 
. . . what are the true ideas upon which the inference de­
pends."79
Locke recognized both virtue and vice in the use of 
figurative language. He indicated where metaphors, similes, 
etc. could be used advantageously and where they could not.
In this chapter we have looked at Locke's criticism 
of both the theoretical and practical aspects of the contem­
porary rhetorical tradition. The examples, descriptions, and 
notes of Locke's reactions to this tradition are indicative of 
his standards of rhetorical effectiveness. Locke's rhetorical 
standards have significant ramifications in the development 
of his philosophy of rhetoric.
78lbid.. p. 88.
79Locke, An Essay, II, 397-
CHAPTER V 
LOCKE'S EPISTEMOLOGY 
Introduction
The genesis of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Under­
standing dates from about 1670. A discussion among Locke and 
some of his colleagues late In I670 centered on "principles 
of morality and revealed religion."1 Because they were unable 
to reach any definite conclusions about this subject, Locke 
became Interested In some fundamental eplstemologieal ques­
tions ;
After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming 
any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed 
us. It came into my thoughts that we took a wrong 
course; and that before we set ourselves upon Inquiries 
of that nature. It was necessary to examine our own 
abilities, and see what objects our understandings were 
or were not fitted to deal with.2
Locke and his friends agreed to consider the problem 
of knowledge, and Locke proposed to prepare and read a paper 
on the subject at the next meeting. This original brief on
 ^John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
ed. by Alexander Campbell Eraser (New York : Dover Publlca-
tlons, 19 5 9), I, xvll. (Hereafter referred to as An Essav.)
p
Ibid., p. xvl,
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the intricacies of knowledge raised an inquiry which ulti­
mately ended in 1690 with the official publication of An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding»^  Throughout these twenty 
years Locke pursued the query; Ifliat is knowledge and how do 
we obtain it? As he declared early in the Essay. his purpose 
was to "inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of 
human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of be-» 
lief, opinion, and assent. . .
There is a direct relationship between epistemology 
and rhetorical theory. A given metaphysical position logi­
cally determines what is judged as certain or probable, how 
and why the mind assents to knowledge or probability, what 
constitutes proof of probability, and other important rhe­
torical questions. Without a systematic epistemological foun­
dation, a philosophy of rhetoric is little more than an empty 
shell of style, delivery, and arrangement. Further, a speaker, 
has some significant insight into the rhetorical situation
^Henry Richard Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1876), II, 94, 100. The
Essay grew and matured for, sixteen years in Locke*s mind and 
notebooks. He substantially completed the work in 1687. In 
that year while in Amsterdam, he prepared the abstract of the 
Essay which appeared in the Bibliothèque Universella for 
January, 1687. Locke released the work for official publi­
cation in London in 1690 and then revised and enlarged It 
two or three times within the next decade.
^Looke, I, 25-26. . See the following works for dis­
cussions of Locke's epistemology: George Boas, Dominant
Themes of Modem Philosophy; A History (New York; The Ronald 
Press Company, 1957) pp. 184-205; Raymond Gregory, "A Study 
of Locke's Theory of Knowledge" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta­
tion, Ohio State University, 1919); and H u ^  Miller, An His­
torical Introduction to Modern Philosophy (New York; The 
Macmillan Company, 1947), pp. 207ff, 277ff.
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when he recognizes the processes which an audience follows in 
accepting or rejecting propositions as valid or invalid.
The subsequent theory of knowledge which Locke pro­
duced in his Essay is the ideological foundation for his phi­
losophy of rhetoric. Accordingly, this chapter traces Locke*s 
theory of how the mind comes to have knowledge. This investi­
gation includes his views on four topics; ideas, propositions, 
faculties of the mind, and the accumulation of the preceeding 
three elements, knowledge.
Ideas
In the seventeenth century there existed a widespread 
acceptance of the concept of innate ideas.5 Before discussing 
the sources and types of ideas, Locke felt that it was neces­
sary to refute the theory of innate ideas. The proponents of 
the theory of innate ideas maintained that there was some 
knowledge with which a person was born and which he intui­
tively knew to be true, certain, and real. They supported 
their position by citing the "universal agreement" of certain 
ideas such as, the existence of God, and A is not non-A.^
5james Gibson, Locke's Theory of Enowledee and its 
Historical Relations (Cambridge : University Press, 1917)»
p. 30. Some of the most famous advocates were the Cambridge 
Platonists and Lord Herbert of Cherbury. Lord Edward 
Herbert of Cherbury, 1583-1648, was matriculated May, 1596 
at University College, Oxford. Published De Veritate in . 
London, 1642. See Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, (ed.).
The Dictionary of National Biography (London; Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, 1917)» IX, 624-632.
^Gibson, p. 36.
99
Their argment ran, if people universally admit an idea, the 
idea is innate ; if the idea is innate, it is certain and be­
yond question.7 They further affirmed that syllogistic de­
ductions from these innate first principles produced all other 
knowledge. These deductions or conclusions were true and 
valid beyond proof or criticism.&
Locke realized that in attacking the theory of innate 
ideas he was engaged in a conflict with the philosophy of the 
Scholastics.9 He anticipated that his criticisms of innate 
principles would "seem absurd to the masters of demonstration," 
that the Scholastics would censure him for departing from the 
"common road" and for "pulling up the old foundations of knowl­
edge and certainty."10
Locke's arguments against innate knowledge presented 
a dilemma to the Scholastics. Either their epistemology sig­
nified that certain ideas and principles were explicitly pres- - 
ent from the earliest period of consciousness, or the theory 
asserted the existence of a natural capacity for knowledge.
In the former case, the Scholastics admitted that the theory 
was false. In the latter, the theory could not maintain the
?Ibid. See Locke, I, 37-39» for his statement of the 
argument for innateness.
®Gibson, p. 40.
9lbid.
10Locke, I, 38-39» 116.
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standard of certainty so closely associated with, it^^l
Locke recognized that the theory of innateness stood 
in direct conflict with his epistemological position. He con­
cluded, therefore, that there are no innate ideas, that "at 
its beginnings the mind is an empty surface," and that ideas 
must come from some source other than innateness.12
Ideas originate in what Locke designated "experience."15 
There are two sorts of experience which produce ideas, sensa­
tion and reflection. The experience of sensation produces 
data of external things, while ideas of the operation of the 
mind originate in reflection.
Our observation employed either, about external sensi­
ble objects, or about the internal operations of our 
mind perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that 
which supplies our understandings with all materials 
of thinking. These two are the foundations of knowl­
edge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally 
have, do spring.14
Therefore, the ideas of sensation are data of the natnre of 
material things and ideas of reflection are simply represen­
tation of the operations of the mind.15
11 Gibson, p. 20.
I^Locke, I, 121-122.
15John Locke, An Early Draft of Locke's Essay, ed. by 
R.I. Aaron and Jocelyn Gibb (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1 9 3 6), p. 3 . (Hereafter referred to as An Early Draft.)
I^Locke, An Essav. I, 122. See also R.I. Aaron, "The 
Limits of Locke’s Rationalism," Seventeenth Century Studies, 
ed. by Herbert Grierson (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1938).
15por an excellent discussion of the sources of ideas, 
see Gibson, pp. 52ff.
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The term “idea” had a dual meaning for Locke. Gibson 
described these two uses: "The idea is . . . at once the ap­
prehension of a content and the content apprehended; it is 
both a physical existent and a logical meaning."^^ Locke re­
peatedly compared the function of the idea with that of the 
word; both are essentially representative.1? He used the term 
"idea" to stand for the object of the understanding.^® The 
word "idea" is an all inclusive one, "a term of most compre­
hensive generality, embracing all that is in any way immediately 
apprehensival by the mind of man. . . ,"^9 Locke summarized 
his definition of ideas "Whatsoever the mind perceives in it­
self, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or 
understanding, that I call idea. . .
Objects, or things in reality, have powers to produce
ideas in the mind. Locke designated these powers "qualities." 
"Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas 
of white, cold, and round, —  the power to produce in us the 
idea, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities. . . ."21 
Primary qualities are those powers which a body or object
1%ibson, pp. 19-20.
ITlbid.. p. 20.
1®Locke, An Essay, I, 32.
19lbid.. p. 33.
20lbid.. p. 169.
21%bid.
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maintains in whatever state it is, ''such, as are utterly in­
separable from the body."22 Locke defined secondary qual­
ities:
. . . .  Such qualities which in truth are nothing in the 
object themselves but powers to produce various sensa­
tions in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, 
figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, 
as colours, sounds, tastes, etc. These I call second­
ary qualities.23
Primary qualities of objects produce ideas which are very sim­
ilar to the object.Secondary qualities, however, originate 
ideas which bear no resemblance to the object; "there is 
nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies t h e m s e l v e s . "25
There are two major types of ideas which the mind 
utilizes, simple and complex.26 simple or particular ideas 
are the unaltered sense data from e x p e r i e n c e . 27 They are not 
capable of descriptions because experience Is the only means 
to knowledge of them. For instance, one cannot describe color 
for a blind man; the blind man must experience color to know 
it. From experience through the senses, the mind receives 
such simple ideas as pain and p l e a s u r e , 28 extension, mobility,
22lbid.
23ibid., p. 140.
24ibid.. p. 143.
25ibid.
Z^Ibid.. p. 144.
2^Ibid., p. 48.
2 8 i b i d . ,  p .  302.
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perceptivity and motivity,^^ as well as solidity.30 Such 
ideas are representations of the power in things (qualities) 
to produce such sensations in the mind.31 The mind acts on 
these simple ideas in chiefly three ways i (1) combining them 
into compound ideas: (2) comparing them; (3) separating them 
from their real existence or abstracting them.32
The understanding constructs "complex ideas" when it 
combines several simple ideas into such ideas as beauty, grat­
itude, a man, an army, the u n i v e r s e . 33 These ideas, as Locke 
explained, are "complicated of various simple i d e a s . "34 Once
the formulation of the complex idea is completed, the mind
fixes the combination by means of a name. Locke illustrated 
his point with an example:
For the several simple modes of numbers being in our 
minds but so many combinations of units, which have no 
variety, nor are capable of any other difference but 
more or less, names or marks for each distinct combi­
nation seem more necessary than in any other sort of
ideas. For, without such names or marks, we can hardly
well make use of numbers in reckoning, especially 
where the combination is made up of any great multitude 
of units; which, put together without a name or mark to 
distinguish that precise collection will hardly be kept 
from being a heap of confusion.35
29lbid.. p. 373. 
30lbid.. p. 151 .
31lbid.. p. 511 .
32lbid., pp. 213-214.
33ibid.. p. 214.
34ibid.
35ibid.. p. 272.
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Locke divided complex ideas, according to the nature of the 
content apprehended, into ideas of modes (simple and mixed), 
substance and relations.36 He elaborated on each of these 
categories, but a detailed analysis of them would be extra­
neous to the purposes of this chapter.
The understanding also utilizes simple ideas to formu­
late general ideas.37 General ideas pose the question of how 
ideas which are particular in their existence come to be uni­
versal in representation and meaning. Universality of general 
ideas is contingent upon a two-fold mental function. In the 
first place, the mind considers the generalized meaning, by 
the process of abstraction, apart from its original setting 
in experience. The understanding further recognizes a general 
idea as representing all other particulars of the same class 
or kind.38 Locke maintained that an idea is capable of gen­
erality only in its meaning.39 As an existing entity, the 
idea must retain its particularity, even though that which it 
represents is universal. Locke repeatedly emphasized this 
distinction between the particular existence and the universal 
meaning of a general i d e a . ^ O
3^See for a discussion of these types of complex 
ideas. Ibid.. pp. 215-216, 381, 3 8 5, 505, 512-513*
37ibid.. p. 4 9 .
38ibid.. p. 214.
Ibid.
40ibid.
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Ideas, in the literal sense of the word, are incapable 
of confusion with one another.^ An idea is what it is and it 
can be nothing more because the act of sensation sufficiently 
distinguishes it from all other ideas, 1^ However, in an ap­
parent contradiction, Locke differentiated "clear" from "con­
fused" ideas :
. . .  A clear idea is that whereof the mind has such a 
full and evident perception, as it does receive from an 
outward object operating duly on a well-disposed organ, 
as a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a 
difference from all other; and a confused idea is such 
an one as is not sufficiently distinguishable from 
another, from which it ought to be different.42
The solution to this dilemma is in the references to 
names. Ideas, properly speaking, are not capable, of con­
fusion on the mental level. However, confusion among ideas 
occurs when two names which were intended to stand for dif­
ferent ideas are used for the same idea or when a single name 
is used for two distinct i d e a s , ^3
There are two basic reasons for this confusion of 
names. This confusion prevails, first, when a complex idea 
consists of too few particular ideas. In this case, the com­
plex idea is not distinguishable from other complex ideas.^ 
Ambiguity also arises when a complex idea consists of suf­
ficient simple ideas, but they are so confused, "so Jumbled
4llbid.. p. 488.
42lbid.« p. 487.
43rbid., p. 488.
^Ibid.
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together," that the complex idea cannot be distinguished from 
other complex i d e a s , ^5 such confusion of simple ideas creates 
a case in which, as Locke stated, "it is not easily discernible 
whether it more belongs to the name that is given it than to 
any other.
Ideas inherently possess three discernible character­
istics; they are either real or fantastical, adequate or in­
adequate, and true or false. An idea is "real" when it con­
forms to an external real object. By "fantastical" ideas,
Locke meant those ideas which have no foundation in reality, 
"nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which 
they are tacitly referred, as to their archetypes."^7 Those 
ideas are "adequate" which "perfectly represent" that reality, 
or that object, for which they stand. Locke designated an 
"inadequate" idea as one which is "but a partial or incomplete 
representation" of that archetype to which it refers.^8 
Ideas are true or false in three instances. An idea is true 
or false, in the first place, in its conformity to the ideas 
of other men. Locke explained this dimension of truth:
" . . .  When the mind intends or judges its ideas of justice, 
temperance, religion, to be the same with what other men give
45rbid.. p. 489.
4Glbid.
"‘^'^Ibid., p. 497.
^ Ibid.. p. 502.
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those names of, Secondly, ideas are true or false in re­
gard to their conformity to r e a l i t y . 50 Finally, Locke main­
tained that an idea is true "when the mind refers any of its 
ideas to that real constitution and essence of anything, 
whereon all its properties depend, . , ,"51
Having completed his survey of ideas, Locke considered 
himself, as Gibson stated, "in a position to attack the ques­
tion of the nature , , , of the knowledge of which ideas are 
but the 'materials* or 'instruments.'"52
Propositions
The second step toward knowledge consists of placing 
ideas into propositions. Locke consistently made the point 
that the "mental proposition," as distinguished from mere 
ideas is the unit of knowledge or judgment.53 Therefore, once 
the mind has ideas, or materials for knowledge, it formulates 
them into propositions.
Locke theorized two sorts of propositions: mental
and v e r b a l . 54 mental propositions, the understanding for­
mulates propositions with ideas only. Locke specified this 
process as "wherein the ideas in our understanding are without
49jbid.. p. 515.
5 0 l b i d .
51 Ibid.
52Q.j_bson, p. 120.
55Locke, An Essay. II, 168.
54ibid.. p. 245.
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the use of words put together or separated. . . .*’55 se_
cause verbal propositions consist of words which are signs of
ideas, they logically follow mental propositions.5^ Locke
elaborated on the verbal proposition:
. . . Verbal propositions . . . are words, the signs of 
our ideas, put together or separated in affirmation or 
negative sentences. By which way of affirming or denying, 
these sighs, made by ,sounds, are, as it were, put to­
gether or separated one from another. So that propo­
sition consists in the putting together or separating 
those signs, according as the things which they stand 
for agree or disagree.57
locke’s distinction between the mental and verbal propositions 
has some significant ramifications in his philosophy of dis­
course.
Propositions are not only an essential item in knowl­
edge, but propositions also contain "truth.” Locke used the 
term "truth" to signify "the joining or separating of Signs. 
as the Things signified by them do agree or disagree one with 
another."58 Truth, then, in Locke’s usage of the word, is con­
tingent upon the correspondence of signs relations, either 
ideas or words, to the relations among things which the signs 
represent. Locke, in an effort to clarify his position, dis­
tinguished truth from falsehood:
Truth is the marking down in words the agreement or 
disagreement of ideas as it is. Falsehood is the
S^Ibid., p. 246.
56lbid. 
57lbid. 
58lbid.. p. 245.
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marking down in words the agreement or disagreement 
of ideas otherwise than it is. And so far as these 
ideas, thus marked by sounds, agree to their arche­
types, so far only is the truth r e a l . 59
Propositions contain real truth as distinguished from verbal 
truth when the terms are "joined as our ideas agree, and when 
our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an exist­
ence in nature. . . . Verbal truth, then, exists when 
ideas in a verbal proposition have no correspondence to re­
ality.
In addition to the real and verbal truths contained in
propositions, Locke specified two other sorts of truth. Moral
truth consists in "speaking of things according to the per­
suasion of our own minds, though the proposition we speak 
agree not to the reality of things."^2 The second sort of 
truth is metaphysical truth. This truth exists when ideas con­
form to reality.
This, though it seems to consist in the very beings of 
things, yet, when considered a little nearly, will ap­
pear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind 
joins that particular thing to the idea it had before 
settled with the name to it.°3
It is difficult to see any significant distinction between
real truth in propositions and metaphysical truth.
59ibid., p .  249.
GOlbid.. p. 248.
Gllbid.
G Z i b i d .. p .  249.
63lbid.. pp. 249-250.
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In his analysis of propositions, Locke divided propo­
sitions into different types, such as general and trifling 
propositions. General propositions constitute certainty 
"when the terms used in them stand for such ideas, whose 
agreement or disagreement, as there expressed, is capable to 
be discovered by us."^^ The mind can never base general cer­
tainty on ideas because they are particular in nature, but 
only general propositions afford general knowledge.
Under the heading of trifling propositions Locke in­
cluded both the purely identical propositions, in which a 
term is predicated of itself, and analytical propositions. 
Although both classes of propositions are "certainly" true, 
they add nothing to the understanding.^^ Locke explained why 
identical propositions cannot made a contribution to knowledge.
These obviously and at first blush appear to contain 
no instruction in them; for when we affirm the said 
term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether 
it contains any clear and real idea, it shows us 
nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether 
such a proposition be either made by, or proposed to 
us. 67
The second sort of trifling proposition Locke identi­
fied as those in which "a part of the complex idea is predi­
cated of the name of the whole : a part of the definition of
G^ibid., p. 266.
GSibid.
. GGibid., p. 292.
67lbid.
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the word defined.”^® Such propositions are certain but not 
instructive. Finally Locke concluded that instruction is 
something different from the nature of these two sorts of 
propositions; propositions which are instructive "find out 
intermediate ideas, and then lay them in such order one by 
another, that the understanding may see the agreement or dis­
agreement of those in question."^9
Faculties of the Mind
Once the mind has ideas and has formulated these ideas 
into mental propositions, two of its faculties, perception and 
retention, are required in the final step toward knowledge.
Perception is the most general name for all the opera­
tions of the mind or the understanding. Locke defined per­
ception as a specific act of thought by which the mind has ex­
plicit consciousness of some object or c o n t e n t . B u t  how is 
this faculty different from sensation or reflection? Percep­
tion is synonymous to thinking; it is an active function of 
the understanding while sensation and reflection are passive 
actions. Locke suggested that his readers through introspec­
tion were capable of comprehending the process of perception.
What perception is, every one will know better by re­
flecting on what he does himself, when he . . . thinks, 
than by a discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what 
passes in his own mind cannot miss it. And if he does
68ibid., p. 2 9 6 .
89ibid.. p. 2 9 5.
TOfiibson, p. 21.
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not reflects all the words in the world cannot make 
him have any notion of it.71
According to Locke, perception is of three sorts; the 
perception of ideas or simple apprehension, the perception of 
the meaning of words, and the perception of the connection or 
repugnancy between i d e a s . 72 Locke divided the perception of 
the agreement or disagreement among ideas, which is essential 
to knowledge, into several separate, but not distinct, actions. 
One such action consists of discerning and distinguishing be­
tween ideas. Of this process, Locke contended: "Unless the
mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their 
qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge.
'. . ."73 Another operation of the understanding is that of 
comparing ideas "one with another, in respect of extent, de­
grees, time, place, or any other circumstance."74 This act 
of perception produces, of course, the ideas of relation.
There seems to be little difference between comparing and dis­
cerning ideas, for the process of discerning or distinguishing 
ideas one from another would not be possible save for the pro­
cess of comparison. Finding differences and similarities 
among ideas is nothing more or less than comparing them. Fin­
ally, Locke mentions two other operations of the mind.
^^Locke, An Essav, I, I8 3 .
7^Ibid.. p.  3 1 4 .  
7 3 l b i d ., p. 2 0 2 .  
7 4 i b i d . .  p. 2 0 4 .
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Composition is the act which the understanding performs when 
it combines simple ideas into complex ohes.75 The action of 
abstraction consists of giving generality to particular 
i d e a s . 76 These facets of perception are essential to knowl­
edge, to the use of language, and to the process of reason­
ing . 77
Locke termed the next major faculty of the mind, re­
tention, or "the keeping of those simple ideas which from 
sensation or reflection (the mind) hath received."78 The pro­
cess of retention functions in two ways. First, retention con­
sists of contemplation which is retaining an idea in the con­
sciousness of the m i n d . 79 The second act of retention is 
memory, which consists of "the power to revive again in our 
minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared, 
or have been as it were laid aside out of si^t. . . ,”80. The 
memory is, as it were, the "storehouse of our ideas."81 Locke 
was necessarily concerned with the memory’s inability to fur­
nish the mind with "dormant" ideas.
75ibid., p. 205.
7 8 i b i d .. p .  2 0 9 .
77ibid.
?8lbid., p. 193.
79lbid.
G°Ibid.
81Ibid.
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. . . Ideas (in the mind) quickly fade, and often vanish 
quite out of the understanding, leaving no more foot­
steps or remaining characters of themselves than shadows 
do flying over fields of corn, and the mind is as void 
of them as if they had never been there.82
Locke suggested attention and repetition as two tech­
niques for improving the retentive power of the m e m o r y . 83 
Repetition is accomplished "by a frequent return to the ob­
jects or actions that produce Q h e  ideas and^ . . . fix them­
selves best in the memory, and remain clearest and longest 
there. . . . " 8 4  However, in another instance, Locke maintained 
that ideas which are accompanied by pleasure or pain make the 
deepest and most lasting i m p r e s s i o n s . 85 Locke was quick to 
proclaim the value of memory to the progress of k n o w l e d g e . 88
Now that Locke had considered the three basic elements 
in knowledge —  ideas, proposition, and the faculties of the 
mind, he was ready to inquire into the fundamental objective 
of the Essay, the origin, certainty, and extent of human 
knowledge.
Knowledge
Knowledge is the "perception of the connection and
^^Ibid., p. 195.
0*2
I b i d . , p .  1 9 4 .
84
° l M d . ,  p. 197.
^ ^ I b i d ., p .  1 9 4 .
^^Ibid.. pp. 198-199.
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agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas 
{Tn mental proposition^ . Knowledge consists of an act of 
thought in which an affirmation or denial is made.88
Knowledge exists in four sorts of agreement or dis­
agreement :
To understand a little more . . . wherein this agree­
ment or disagreement consists . . .  we may reduce it 
all to these four sorts: (1) Identity or diversity,
(2) Relations, (3) Coexistence, or necessary connec­
tion, (4) Real existence.89
When Locke wrote of identity or diversity as one of the four
types of agreement or disagreement, he was not referring to
the identity of an object but to the identity of the content
of an idea and its distinction from every other idea. The
recognition of an idea in this sense involves the very meaning
of an idea.
It is the first act of the mind, when it has any senti­
ments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and, so 
far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and 
thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one 
is not another. This is so absolutely necessary that 
without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, 
no imagination, no distinct thoughts at all.90
The first act of knowledge, then, is the realization of an
idea "for what it is" and of its distinction from other ideas.
Closely related to the first sort of affirmation or
87%bid., II, 167.
8%ibson, p. 121.
89Locke, An Essay. II, 168. 
90lbid., p. 169.
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negation is the act of perceiving relations.91 Locke desig­
nated this act as "nothing but the perception of the relation 
between any two ideas, of what kind so ever, whether sub­
stances, modes, or any other."92 gg the mind obtains knowl-, 
edge when it perceives the relationship of ideas.
. . . Since all distinct ideas must eternally be known 
not to be the same, and so be universally and constantly 
denied one of another there could be no room for any 
positive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any 
relation between our ideas, and find out the agreement 
or disagreement they have one with another, in several 
ways the mind takes of comparing th em .93
The act of affirmation or denial of relations consists of com­
paring two or more ideas for their similarities and differ­
ences.
The third type of agreement or disagreement is the per- 
ception of coexistence or non-coexistence. This act amounts 
to perceiving certain characteristics about ideas. Locke re­
lated an instance of the act of coexistence:
Thus when we pronounce concerning gold, that it is 
fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more 
but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the 
fire unconsumed, is an idea that always accompanies 
and is joined with that particular sort of yellowness, 
weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in
^^It is difficult for me to see any difference be­
tween the action of "identity or diversity and "relation." 
TOien one perceives the relationship of an idea, he at the 
same time sees its identity or diversity with other ideas.
An idea has identity or diversity not within itself but be­
cause of its relationship to other ideas, and hence, the two 
acts, for me, have little distinction.
92Locke, An Essav. II, 170.
93ibid.. pp. 170-171.
117
aqua regia, which, make our complex idea signified by 
the word gold.9^
The perception of coexistence consists of an affirmation or
denial of the entities of two or more ideas, whether they exist
in one body or object, or whether they are separate entities.
Finally, the fourth sort deals with the real existence
of the idea. This facet of knowledge comes from deciding
whether the mental idea has an actual counterpart in reality.
Locke illustrated this type of knowledge with an instance of
perceiving the real existence of the idea of "whiteness."
The first and most natural predication or affirmation 
is of the existence not of the Idea but something with­
out my minde answering that Idea, as haveing in my 
minde that Idea of white the question is whether any 
such quality i.e. that whose appearance I can possibly 
have and to which my facultys can atteine is the 
testimony of my eys, which are the proper and sole 
judges of this thing, and whose testimony I rely on as 
soe certaine, that I can noe more doubt whilest I 
write this that I see white and black and that they 
really exist then that I write. . . .95
In the knowledge of real existence, the mind judges the re­
lationship of an idea to reality.
The mind sometimes possesses "actual knowledge" which 
exists in the present perception the mind has of the agreement 
or disagreement of any of its i d e a s . 96 on the other hand, 
sometimes in the past the mind perceived the agreement or dis­
agreement of a proposition and retained this knowledge in the
94ibid., p. 171.
95Locke, An Early Draft, p. 20.
9^Locke, An Essay. II, 172.
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memory. Locke termed this “habitual k n o w l e d g e . " ^ ?  The per^ 
ception that "A is not non°A" recognized early in life is an 
example of habitual knowledge. As this proposition later oc­
curs, the understanding simply affirms the knowledge supported 
by the earlier perception.
Locke contended that there are two degrees of knowl­
edge. The mind; in some cases, immediately perceives the 
agreement or disagreement of ideas. In other cases, the un­
derstanding recognizes the agreement or disagreement only by 
the aid of other ideas. In the former instance, when the 
mind perceives simply on the consideration of the ideas in 
question, there is intuitive knowledge which is self evi­
dent. 98 The understanding recognizes immediately, without the 
intervention of any other ideas, that "white is not black, 
that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two 
and equal to one and two. "99 Such truths the mind realizes by 
simple intuition. This knowledge is
irresistible, and like bright sunshine forces itself 
immediately to be perceived ... . and leaves no room 
for hesitation, doubt or examination, but the mind
97lbid.. p. 1 7 3 .  Locke speaks of two degrees of ha­
bitual knowledge: "First, the one is of such truths laid
up in the memory as, whenever they occur to the mind, it 
actually perceives the relation is between those ideas. And 
this is in all those truths whereof we have an intuitive 
knowledge; where the ideas themselves, by an immediate view, 
discover their agreement or disagreement one with another. 
Secondly, the other is of such truths whereof the mind having 
been convinced, it retains the memory of the conviction, 
without the proofs.**
98jbid.. p .  1 7 6 .
99ibid.. pp. 176- 177.
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is presently filled with the clear light of it. . .
Locke did not equate intuitive knowledge with innateness be­
cause the understanding must be directed toward the former 
knowledge while innate ideas simply exist in the mind from 
birth.
The second degree of knowledge is demonstrative knowl­
edge. This category of knowledge depends upon proof or inter­
vening ideas, which reveal the agreement or disagreement that 
the mind cannot directly perceive. Locke elucidated this 
knowledge in defining demonstration as "the beare shewing of 
the things or proposing them to our sense or understanding soe 
as to make us take notice of them as is evident in mathe- _ 
matical demonstration. . . Demonstrative knowledge con­
sists of a connected series or chain of intuitions, in which,
the mind immediately perceives the agreement or disagreement
of each proposition with the next in order.^02 this manner,
the understanding establishes a connection between the first 
and last propositions in the series. Such perception would 
have been beyond the power of the mind to perceive directly. 
Gibson related the act of "intuition" to demonstrative knowl­
edge :
Demonstration itself, it is clear, is dependent upon 
our ability to perceive intuitively relations of neces­
sary connection between the contents of our ideas,
lOOlbid., p. 1 7 7.
lOlLocke, An Early Draft, p. 47.
lO^Locke, An Essay. II, 1 7 8.
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since we can only mediately perceive an agreement 
or disagreement between two ideas if each of these 
is seen to stand in some necessary relation to a 
third.103
Demonstrative knowledge possesses the same objective certainty
as intuition, but the former is more difficult to obtain and
is less clear than the l a t t e r . 104 Locke summarized the basic
difference between the two types of knowledge:
Now, in every step reason makes in demonstrative 
knowledge, there is an intuitive knowledge of that 
agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next inter­
mediate idea which it uses as proof; since without the 
perception of such agreement or disagreement, there 
is not knowledge produced: if it be perceived by it­
self, there is need of some intervening idea, as a 
common measure, to show their agreement or disagree­
ment. 105
To these two former types of knowledge Locke added a
third. This type of knowledge he termed sensitive knowledge
which expresses an awareness of external objects.10^ Conse­
quently, man has unconditional certainty of knowledge in three
»
degrees of clearness, that is, in simple or self evident per­
ception, complex or demonstrated perception and sense percep­
tion. 107
From his discussion of the types and degrees of knowl­
edge, Locke inferred six conclusions.
^®^G-ibson, p. 148.
lO^Locke, An Essay, II, 178-179*
lOSlbid.. p. 180.
IQ^Ibid.. p. 188.
lOTlbid.
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1. Knowledge is dependent upon ideas; that is, the 
mind can have no more knowledge than it has ideas.
2. The understanding can have knowledge only so far 
as it has perception of the agreement or disagree­
ment among ideas.
3. The mind cannot have intuitive knowledge of all of 
its ideas.
4. The mind cannot have rational or demonstrative 
knowledge of all its ideas.
5. Sensitive knowledge can reach only to the extent 
of the mind’s sense experience.
6. The extent of one’s knowledge necessarily comes 
short of the reality of things and of one’s own
ideas.108
Knowledge must possess three characteristics, the first
of which is certainty. For Locke, knowledge and certainty were
equivalent terms :
With me to know and to he certain is the same thing: 
what I know, that I am certain of; and what I am certain 
of, that I know. What reaches to knowledge, I think 
may he called certainty; and what comes short of 
certainty, I think cannot he called knowledge.109
Knowledge excludes the possibility of hoth douht and error.110 
"What we once know, we are certain is so; and we may he secure 
that there are no latent proofs undiscovered, which may over­
throw our knowledge, or hring it in douht."Ill This certainty 
which constitutes knowledge is an objective certainty which 
Locke distinguished from the highest degree of probability.
Even in cases of very high probability, Locke refused the name
lO^Ibid., pp. 190-1 9 1.
lO^second Letter to Stillingfleet, Works. v. iv, 145 
as cited in Gibson, pp. 2-3.
II^Locke, An Essay, II, 168. 
1lllbid.. p. 3 7 1.
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of knowledge.112
Besides certainty, knowledge must contain two other 
general features. Knowledge must possess the character of 
being Instructive or synthetic, which Locke distinguished from 
the merely verbal certainty of the trifling proposition. In 
addition to being certain, and Instructive, knowledge must be 
real. In real knowledge, the mind must recognize Its Ideas In 
their relationship to the reality of things for which they 
stand. Locke related real knowledge to a conformity to re­
a l i t y .113 In his consideration of the characteristics of 
knowledge, Locke concluded that knowledge, as he used the term, 
Is at once absolutely certain, Instructive, and real.
The results of Locke's analysis Into the nature and 
possible extent of knowledge are Important and far-reaching. 
Locke described the essential nature of knowledge and, by a 
survey of the thinking process, the requirements of knowledge. 
He established strict standards for the use of the term knowl­
edge and demonstrated how other forms of cognition, such as 
opinion, belief, and probability, are Inferior to knowledge. 
Locke summarized his efforts:
Nobody, that I had met with, had. In their writings, 
particularly set down wherein the act of knowing pre­
cisely consisted. . . .  If I have done anything new.
It has been to describe to others more particularly 
than had been done before, what It Is they do, when
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they perform that action which they , call knowing.
Locke's epistemology consists of four essential units. 
First, ideas are obtained from experience through the sensation 
of reality and the reflection of the operations of the under­
standing. The mind then formulates these ideas into propo­
sitions. The perceptive faculty of the mind views the agree­
ment or disagreement of the ideas in these mental propositions. 
The knowledge which results from this perception is either in­
tuitive or demonstrative but in both cases it is certain. The 
level of probability and judgment which is considered in 
Chapter VI is of special interest to the rhetorician.
 ^^ ^Works, iv, 143-144 as quoted in Gibson, p. 8.
CHAPTER VI 
PROCESS OF INVENTION 
Introduction
In the last pages of the Essay, Locke divided science
into three categories.
. . . First. the nature of things, as they are in them­
selves, their relations, and their manner of operation: 
or, Secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a 
rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any 
end, especially happiness: or. Thirdly, the ways and 
means whereby the knowledge of hoth the one and the 
other of these is attained and communicated* . . .1
The first category constitutes information about things which 
Locke identified as physica or natural philosophy and whose 
end is speculative truth.^ Ethics, or practica, the second 
class, concentrates on "the skill of right applying our own 
powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and use­
ful* The legitimate objective of the second category is 
regulated human conduct or "the seeking out those rules and 
measures of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the
T John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
ed. by Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publica-
tions, 1959), II, 459* (Hereafter referred to as An Essay.)
^Ibid., p. 460*
3lbld., pp. 460-461.
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means to practise them. The third branch of science, the
J
doctrine of signs, consists "the business whereof is to con­
sider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the un­
derstanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others."5 
Locke made this branch of semiotics inclusive of the other 
two classes of science. The third category is subjectless 
until the mind uses signs (ideas and words) for the attainment 
and communication of information about things and/or rules and 
measures of human actions.
Explicit in Locke's three categories are two facets of 
these sciences. In one of his Journals, he clarified these 
two aspects: "The end of study is knowledge, and the end of
knowledge . . .  is communicati on. In  the Essay, Locke in­
ferred that each science functions on the levels of ideas and 
words :
The consideration, then of ideas and words as the 
great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable 
part of their contemplation who would take a view of 
human knowledge in the sole extent of it.7
Hence, the three sciences, natural philosophy, ethics and
semiotics, function in two dimensions, that is, the attainment
^Ibid.
5lbid.
^John Locke, The Philosophical Works of John Locke, 
ed. by J.A. St. John (London: George Bell and Sons, 1908).
I, 92. (Hereafter referred to as The Philosophical Works.)
By "knowledge," as used here, Locke did not mean '‘certainty," 
but only information, either certain or probable, about 
something.
7locke, An Essay, II, 462.
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of knowledge on the mental level and the communication of that 
knowledge on the verbal level.
Locke maintained that the method of discourse con­
sists of both the mental and the verbal levels. The two basic 
elements of what Locke termed "the art of speaking well" are 
"right reasoning" and "perspicuity,"® Locke related valid 
reasoning to the mental operations and perspicuity to the 
verbal functions of the understanding. In writing about 
"Study" in one of his journals, Locke again referred to the 
two levels of cognition. "Reading and meditation" connote the 
mental level of ideas while "discourse" infers the verbal 
level of words and statement.
Reading, jne thinks, is but collecting the rough materials, 
amongst which a great deal must be laid aside as useless. 
Meditation is, as it were, choosing and fitting the ma­
terials, framing the timbers, and squaring and laying 
the stones, and raising the building; and discourse with 
a friend . . .  is, as it were, surveying the symmetry 
and agreement of the parts, taking notice of the solid­
ity or defects of the works, and the best way to find 
out and correct what is amiss; besides that it helps 
often to discover truths, and fix them in our minds, as 
much as either of the other two.9
Locke was suggesting that the doctrine of signs deals with both
the attainment and communication of knowledge.
Hence, the next two chapters, "Process of Invention" 
and "Process of Statement" consider the two facets of Locke’s 
sciences.
®Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 499.
^Lord King, The Life and Letters of John Locke (London: 
Henry G. Bohn, 1858), pp. 108-109.
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On the mental level of attainment and collection of 
knowledge Locke maintained that the understanding seeks specu­
lative truth in the category of natural philosophy and rules 
of conduct in the class of ethics. Later we shall see that 
speculative truth must come before rules of conduct because 
knowledge and judgment direct the will. But for now it is 
sufficient to distinguish between tiie objectives of these two 
sciences. Although Locke did not use the terms conviction and 
persuasion, his description of the ends of natural philosophy 
and ethics relate very closely to the concepts for which these 
terms stand. Conviction connotes enlightenment of the under­
standing, while for Locke the results of natural philosophy is 
the knowledge of things. Persuasion usually refers to moving 
the will, and Locke designated the objective of ethics as 
rules and measures of human action. Hence, the use of these 
terms would not misrepresent Locke's thinking. Accordingly, 
this chapter investigates the mental process as related to 
natural philosophy and ethics.
What occurs in this mental process corresponds closely 
to the rhetorical concept of invention, though Locke did not 
use the term. Invention, as used here, signifies a dual proc­
ess. As Locke admitted in an earlier quotation, invention in 
its broadest interpretation is "collecting the rough materi­
als", and in its more limited and usual sense it is "choosing 
and fitting the materials, framing the timbers, squaring and
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laying the stones, an-! raising the b u i l d i n g . Invention, 
therefore, includes the c o l l e c t i o n  of knowledge generally, as 
well as the specific t a s k  of obt a i n i n g  evidence for a  dis- 
courae.
Processes Related to Conviction
Consideration of Reason
The process of reasoning, according to Locke, is the 
investigation and discovery of the agreement or disagreement 
among i d e a s . R e a s o n  consists of four functions. Vhat Locke 
depicted as "the highest" task of reason is the discovery of 
truths.12 Secondly, the understanding utilizes reasoning for 
the arrangement of ideas in order to perceive their agreement 
or disagreement.15 The next role of reason is the perception 
of the connection of ideas in mental propositions.1^ The 
fourth and final function of reason is "making the right con­
clusion. "15 Underlying these four functions of reason is the
IQjbid.
11 John Locke, "First Letter to Stillingfleet," Works, 
V. iv. p. 62 as cited in James Gibson, Locke*s Theory of 
Knowledge and Its Historical Relations (Cambridge : University
Press, 1917); P« 127.
12Locke, An Essay. II, 388.
15jbid.
I^Ibid.. p. 389.
15ibid. Louis Cockerham, "John Locke's Theory of 
Logical Proof” (unpublished Master's thesis. University of 
Oregon, 1959), P» 60 related these four levels of reason to
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basic objective of the understanding which is to obtain knowl­
edge and judgment. The method by which reasoning accomplishes 
the arrangement of ideas is argument. In First Letter to 
Stillingfleet, Locke characterized argument as the arranging 
of intervening proofs in order to suggest probability.^^
Reason operates in two capacities: first, in ascertain­
ing knowledge and secondly in regulating judgment and assent. 
The former aspect of reason determines intuitive or demon­
strative knowledge in certainty and in the latter case, reason 
infers judgments or opinions in probabilities, Locke desig­
nated these two distinct functions of reasoning as "sagacity" 
and "Illation."
By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it so orders 
the intermediate ideas as to discover what connexion 
there is in each link of the chain whereby the extremes 
are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into 
view the truth sought for, which is that which we call 
illation or inference, and consists in nothing but the 
perception of the connexion there is between the ideas, 
in each step of the deduction; whereby the mind comes 
to see, either the certain agreement or disagreement of 
any two ideas, as in demonstration in which it arrives 
at Knowledge ; or their probable connexion, on which it 
gives or withholds its assent, as in opinion.17
Locke seemed to make this point; In intuitive knowledge,
reason is not used; the understanding immediately perceives
the agreement or disagreement; however, in demonstrative
philosophy, rhetoric and logic. Philosophy encompassed the 
first function; rhetoric the second and logic the final two.
I^Locke, "First Letter to Stillingfleet," cited in 
Gibson, p. 127.
Locke, An -Essay. II, 386-38?.
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knowledge the understanding uses reason to arrange mental 
propositions so that the mind might recognize the agreement 
or disagreement.
In probability the understanding also employs reason 
to arrange probable propositions, but even then the mind can­
not perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas and 
has to presume that a probable connection exists. Reasoning 
in this case results in opinion or judgment.18
Judgment is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree 
or disagree by the intervention of one or more ideas, 
whose certain agreement or disagreement with them it 
does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent 
and usual.19
In the area of probability, therefore, the understanding pre­
supposes an agreement or disagreement between ideas which re­
sults in a judgment.
Often, however, reason does not reach sound judgment. 
Locke admitted that there are three "miscarriages" which men 
make with regard to reasoning. In the first place, men 
totally disregard reason and base their judgments on the ex­
ample of others.20 Men, at other times, subordinate their 
reasons to their passions. In the third instance, men only 
partially reason because they perceive only in part.21
According to Locke the quality of judgment is dependent
iQibid.. pp. 387-409.
19lbid.. p. 409.
^^Locke, The Philosophical Works. I, 26-27.
21 Ibid.
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upon the quantity and quality of ideas. First, reason fails , 
when the understanding has no ideas. The reasoning process 
cannot extend further than ideas.^2 Moreover, if obscurity 
or imperfection exists in ideas, the reasoning process will 
be liable to confusion.23 Obviously, reasoning cannot attain 
judgment when it cannot perceive intervening ideas or proofs 
which would demonstrate the agreement or disagreement among 
ideas. Further, Locke suggested that if reasoning proceeds 
from false principles it tends to reach unsound judgments.24 
Finally, Locke concluded that just as imperfect ideas confuse 
the reasoning process, uncertain signs produce invalid judg­
ments.25
In Locke's consideration of reason, he discussed the 
relationship between reason and propositions. Propositions 
which can be concluded as true or probable by investigating 
the ideas involved in them Locke defined as "according to re­
ason."26 Propositions which are "above reason" cannot be 
judged as true or p r o b a b l e . 27 Propositions which are "con­
trary to reason" are those which are inconsistent with clear
^^Locke, An Essay, II, 405*
^^Ibid., p. 406.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.. p. 412.
^^Ibid.
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and distinct ideas.
Locke inferred that.the reasoning potential of man is 
adequate, providing he utilizes it'correctly and does not de­
mand "truth” from it. To improve the reasoning powers, Locke 
suggested reading Chillingworth, and Dr. Tillotson, late Arch­
bishop of Canterbury, both of whom demonstrated effective re­
asoning in all their w o r k s . 29
Locke reported that most of the decisions which men 
must make lie in the area of probability.30 Since man reasons 
most often about probable propositions, Locke's discussion of 
probabilities is significant to his philosophy of discourse.
Consideration of Probability
Probability, according to Locke, is the likeliness to
be true. The understanding assumes that a probable proposition
is true or false on the ground of intervening ideas.
. . .  So probability is nothing but the appearance of 
such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention
28jbid.
29Locke, The Philosophical Works. II, 499. William 
Chillingworth, 1602-1644, was a theologian and Fellow at 
Trinity College, Cambridge. Some of his works are; "A Dis­
course Against the Infallibility of the Roman Church," and 
"Additional Discourses." His major work is The Religion of 
Protestants A Safe Wav to Salvation. 1637. See Leslie Stephen 
and Sidney Lee, (ed.). The Dictionary of National Biography 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1917)» IV, 252-257. John
Tillotson, 1630-1 6 9 4, was educated at Cambridge. He was one 
of the most famous and eloquent preachers of Locke's day.
One of his famous sermons is "The Wisdom of being Religious," 
1664. Rule of Faith is his major work. See Stephen and Lee, 
XIX, 872-878.
30Locke, An Essay, II, 364.
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of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, 
or at least is not perceived to be so, but it, or ap­
pears for the most part to be so, and is enough to in­
duce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or 
false, rather than the contrary.31
Locke was persistent in the point that the mind receives a
probable proposition as true only on the bases of intervening
proofs.
The one essential difference between judgments of
probabilities and knowledge of certainty is the existence of
Interventing i d e a s , 32
. , . Probably propositions therefor are only conc'ernd 
in and capable of proof but certain knowledge or demon­
stration makes it self clearly appears and be perceived 
by the things them selves put togeather in our sight or 
their clear distince Ideas put togeather and as it were 
lyeing before us in view in our understanding.33
Hence, the legitimate domain of the rhetorician is the area 
of probabilities since the understanding can perceive the agree­
ment or disagreement of certain knowledge without proofs.
Another distinct difference between judgment and knowl­
edge is that the likelihood of a probable proposition’s being . 
true increases or decreases in proportion to its usualness or 
u n u s u a l n e s s . 34 He illustrated this position by indicating 
that new ideas are usually suspected simply because they are
31lbid/, p. 363.
^^John Locke, An Early Draft of Locke’s Essay, ed. by 
R.I. Aaron and Jocelyn G-ibb (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1 9 3 6), p. 5 6. (Hereafter referred to as An Early Draft.)
33lbid.. p. 4 7 .
34iTjid.. p. 58.
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not c o m m o n . 35 Locke admitted that in certain instances prob­
abilities come very close to knowledge, but he maintained the 
distinction between them.
Probabilities occur in several different degrees, for
Locke, ranging from the "very neighbourhood" of certainty to
impossibility.^^ The highest degree of probability exists in
regard to particular matters of fact.
The first . . .  is when the general consent of all 
men, in all ages, as far as it can be known, concurs 
with a man’s constant and never-failing experience 
in like cases, to confirm the truth of any particular 
matter of fact attested by fair witnesses. . . .37
Locke encountered some difficulties in distinguishing this 
instance of probability from certain knowledge; "these prob­
abilities rise so near certainty that they govern our thoughts 
as absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the 
most,evident demonstration. . . ."38
The second degree of probability occurs when a propo­
sition is not contradictory to experience and when various 
credible witnesses attest to the validity of the proposition. 
The understanding presumes such probable propositions to be 
true for the most part. Locke alleged that the mind naturally 
assents to this level of possibility, since it is so p r o b a b l e *39
35iocke, An Essay. I, 4.
^^Locke, An Early Draft, p. 55.
37Locke, An Essay. II, 375.
38lbid.. p. 376.
39lbid.
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Locke identified the assent to the highest degree of 
probability as assurance. Confidence was his term for judg­
ment on the second level of probability.^®
In an early draft of the Essay. Locke discussed the 
third and fourth degrees of probabilities. The third degree 
of possibility occurs when experiences conflict on a partic­
ular matter. The judgment then is grounded in the number and 
credibility of witnesses.41 The fourth degree of probability 
exists when, according to general observation, the proposi­
tion is contrary to the natural order of things but several 
witnesses recommend its validity. "The probability of this 
depends wholy upon the veracity of the witnesses or of the 
usefulnesse of such strange events to some end aimd at by him 
who had power to produce such irregularitys."42
Implicit in Locke’s discussion of probability is the 
inference that probability is not inherent in the content of 
any message but is contingent upon the audience which the 
speaker addresses. ¥hat appears improbable to one group might 
seem highly probable to another. Hence, the difficulties in 
a rhetorician’s task would increase or decrease in regard to 
his audience’s view of the probability of his message.
After considering the dimensions of probability, Locke 
next investigated the means by which the understanding comes
40lbid.
41 Locke, An Early Draft, p. 58.
42ibid.. p. 59.
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to accept or reject a proposition as probable or improbable, 
true or false.
Consideration of Assent 
The assent to judgment is always grounded on certain 
features in the reasoning process which act as inducements for 
the mind to accept the proposition as true or probable. These 
proofs or inducements do not enable the understanding to per­
ceive intuitively that the proposition is necessarily and 
certainly true. But the understanding had no other alter­
native but to accept the proposition as valid and probable 
because of the warrant of the proofs. Locke elucidated the 
understanding's lack of freedom: "As knowledge is no more ar­
bitrary than perception, so I think assent is no more in our 
power than k n o w l e d g e . "4-3 Locke, thus, implied that judgment 
is determined by the content and proofs of the proposition.
Locke made an explicit distinction between the proof 
and the content of a proposition. The inferiority of judgment 
to knowledge is not the lack of objective determination. The 
inferiority stems from the fact that the connection which the 
mind asserts in judgments of probability is not perceived to 
exist in the essential nature of the propositions, but is pre­
sumed to exist.
That which makes me believe is something extraneous 
to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined 
on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the
^^Locke, An Essay, II, 455.
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agreement or disagreement of, those ideas that are
under consideration.44
In probability, therefore, proofs which are not intrinsically 
part of the content of the proposition determine the under­
standing.
"Well-weighted reasons" are the inducements which 
should determine the Judgment. Although Locke did not elab­
orate on "well-weighted reasons," he did explain that they 
are those which "the mind should be always ready to hearken 
and submit to, and by their testimony and suffrage entertain 
or reject any tenet. . . ."45 Assent of judgment is always 
contingent upon the warrant of the proofs. Over estimating 
and assenting to proofs beyond their strength results in un­
sound judgments;
How a man may know whether he be so in earnest is worth 
inquiry; and I think there is one unerring mark of it, 
namely, the not entertaining any proposition with 
greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will 
warrant. For the evidence that any proposition is 
true . . . lying only in the proof a man has of it, 
whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the 
degrees of that evidence, it is plain that all the sur­
plusage of assurance is due to some other affection.
. . . Whatsoever credit or authority we give to any 
proposition more than it receives from the principles 
and proofs it supports itself upon is owing to our in­
clinations that way as it can receive no evidence from 
our passions or interests. . . .46
The rhetorician, accordingly, cannot expect the acceptance of 
44ibid., p. 365.
^^Looke, The Philosophical Works, I, 79.
4^Henry Richard Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke 
(New York: Harper Brothers, 1 8 7 6), II, 9^-97•
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a proposition on a liigher degree of probability than the evi­
dence warrants.
In considering the relationship of proof to the assent -
of judgment, Locke specified that the understanding must base
its judgment on the proofs of which the proposition is capable.
In other words, the understanding cannot expect more evidence
than the nature of the proposition can produce:
. . .  It would be very convenient . . .  to consider what 
proofs the matter in hand is capable of, and not to ex­
pect other kind of evidence than the nature of the thing 
will bear. Where it hath all the proofs that such a 
matter is capable of, there we ought to acquiesce, and 
receive it as an established and demonstrated truth; 
for that which hath all the evidence it can have, all 
that belongs to it, in the common state and order of 
things, and that supposing it to be as true as anything 
ever was . . . whatsoever is so, though there may be 
some doubts, some obscurity, yet is clear enough to de­
termine our thoughts and fix our a s s e n t . 47
Locke suggested that expecting more evidence than the nature
of the proposition is capable of often leads.men to scepticism.
A speaker then must build his case on the evidence inherently
available in the nature of the proposition.
If the assent of judgment is grounded on proper and 
appropriate proofs, how is it possible for men to assent to a 
judgment which is contrary to probability?^ In so far as the 
conditions of such wrong assent are merely negative, they pre­
sented no particular difficulty for Locke’s point of view.
Thus, where there is ignorance of proofs or lack of skill to
4?King, p. 107.
JiQ
'Locke, An Essay. II, 442. See also, pp. 443ff.
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utilize these proofs, the understanding may assent to fal­
lacious judgment.
Generally speaking there are two classes of people who 
judge in error because they lack proof. Some are incapable of 
discovering proofs because of the lack of opportunity for con­
ducting experiments, making observations, or collecting testi­
monies.^9 Next, some men are ignorant of the proofs for 
probability simply because they fear that an investigation of 
the matter "would not suit well with their opinions lives or 
d é s i g n é s . " 5 0  in both cases there is a strong tendency that 
these people will assent to a judgment which is contrary to 
probability.
People who cannot properly use proofs are liable to
judge fallaciously, also».
Those that want skill to use the evidences they have of 
probabilitys, that cannot carry a traine of consequences 
in their heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of 
contrary proofs and testimonys making every circumstance 
its due allowance, may be easily misled to assent to 
doctrines that are not probable and doe not always in­
cline to that side on which the strongest proofs lye 
and therefor doe not alway follow that which in its self 
is the more probable o p i n i o n . 51
According to Locke, then, the absence or ill use of proofs re­
sults in invalid judgments.
Locke, however, recognized the existence of more posi­
tive causes of error. He enumerated the influences exerted
^^Locke, An Early Draft, p. 60.
SOlbid.. p. 62.
Sllbid.
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upon the mind by preconceived opinions and hypotheses, de­
ference to authority, and "predominant passions." The under­
standing sometimes assents to unsound judgment because it re­
lies on supposedly established, but unproven, principles.52 
In this category Locke placed "men whose understandings are 
cast into a mold and fashond just to the size of a received 
hypothesis."53 Closely associated with this instance of fal­
lacious judgment is the assent based on pseudo-authority of 
the common opinions of the environment. In such an instance, 
people judge by "fashion and examples."5^ Because of the fact 
that "our understandings |^r^ no less different than our 
palates," the understanding, when predominated by passion, is 
liable to invalid judgment.55
Probabilitys too which crosse mens appetites run the 
same fate, earthy low mindes like muddy walls resist 
the strongest batterys and though the attempts made 
against them may make some impression yet they never 
the lesse keepe out the enemy truth that would captivate 
or disturbe them. . . .56
These three forms of bias check the inquiry into probability
and artificially limit the data presented to the understanding
for judging.
Locke suggested one other possible reason for
^^Ibid., p. 63.
53i~bid., pp. 64-65*
5^Ibid., p. 112.
^^Locke, An Essay, I, 12.
■ ^^Locke, An Early Draft, p. 65*
141 .
fallacious assent. Men often give their assent to religious 
propositions without sufficient proof. Such assent is due to 
"enthusiasm":
A strong and firme perswasion of any proposition re- 
lateing to religion for which a man hath either noe or 
not sufficient proofs from reason but receives them as 
truths wrought in the minde extraordinarily by god 
him self and influences comeing immediately from him 
seemes to me to be Enthusiasme.57
Judgment assented to on the grounds of a deep religious feel­
ing of enthusiasm is erroneous since all legitimate assent 
must be regulated by r e a s o n . 58
After investigating the factors behind fallacious as­
sent, Locke was ready to consider the means of acquiring 
proofs for the valid Judgments.
Consideration of Proofs
The foundation for Locke’s inventive process is what 
he termed "bottoming." In Conduct of the Understanding. Locke 
recommended that in "every question, the nature and manner of 
the proofs it is capable of should be considered to make our 
inquiry such as it should b e . "59 He explicitly maintained 
the value and importance of the "bottoming" process: "this is 
the fairest way to search after truth, and the surest not to 
mistake on which side she is. There is scarce any controversy 
which is not a full instance of this. . . ."^0 Locke placed
57lbid.. p. 119.
58King, p. 128. See also Locke, An Essay. II, 438.
59Locke, The Philosophical Works. I, 58.
50King, p. 10 5.
142
so much significance on the investigative process that he af­
firmed that those arguments -which have not been thoroughly 
examined "to the bottom" are not worth advancing in support 
of a contention.But what is the nat-ure of this "bottoming" 
process?
Locke defined this means of finding proofs in prob­
abilities in several different ways. He suggested that it is 
discovering the intuitive truth on which a proposition rests:
It is necessary in any question proposed to examine and 
find out upon what it bottoms. Most of the difficulties 
that come in our way, when well considered and traced 
lead to some proposition which, known to be true, clears 
the doubt, and gives an easy solution of the question.
♦ • •
He identified bottoming as searching for the "foundation" on 
which a proposition is based. Locke enlarged the process to 
include investigating the probabilities on both sides of a 
question:
- The way to find truth . . . is to pursue the hypothesis 
that seems to us to carry with it the most light and 
consistency as far as we can without raising objections, 
or striking at those principles as far as it will go, 
and given what light and strength we can to all the parts 
of it. And when that is done, then to take into our 
consideration any objections that lie against it, but 
not so as to pursue them as objections against the system 
we had formerly erected; but to consider upon what foun­
dation they are bottomed, and examine that in all its 
parts, and then putting the two whole systems together, 
see which is liable to most exceptions, and labours under 
the greatest difficulties. . .
^^Bourne, II, 95.
^^Locke, An Essay. II, 373*
63King, pp. 323-325.
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In still another definition of bottoming, Locke maintained 
that it is finding a "clear and true notion of things as they
are in themselves."^4
This . . . always naturally suggests arguments upon all 
occasions, e-ither to defend the truth or confound error. 
This seems to me to be that which makes some men's dis­
courses to be so clear, evident, and demonstrative, 
even in a few words; for it is but laying before us the 
true nature of anything we would discourse of, and our 
faculty of reasoning is so natural to us that the clear 
inferences do, as it were, make themselves: we have, as 
it were, an instinctive knowledge of the truth which is 
always most acceptable to the mind, and the mind embraces 
it in native and naked beauty.&5
Locke compared the investigative procedure of "bottom­
ing" to a mathematical demonstration:
For in all sorts of reasoning every single argument 
should be managed as a mathematical demonstration, 
the connexion and dependence of ideas should be fol­
lowed, till the mind is brought to the source of which 
it bottoms, and observes the coherence all along, 
though in proofs of probability one such train is not 
enough to settle the judgment, as in demonstrative 
knowledge.GO
The essence of the process of "bottoming" seems to be that of 
investigating each proposition or argument to find out on what 
self-evident principle it is based. It encompasses an analysis 
of the probabilities on both sides of the question.
In contrast to the commonplace method of finding argu­
ments, bottoming can make a substantial contribution to knowl­
edge and judgment. Commonplaces make little contribution to
G^Ibid.. pp. 104-105.
GSlbid.
^^ Ibid.. p. 116.
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the judgment but only test the retentive powers of the memory. 
Bottoming, on the other hand, does not "burden the memory," 
but provides the materials and proofs for knowledge and judg­
ment.
This way also of knowledge, as it is in less danger 
to be lost, because it burdens not the memory, but is 
placed in the judgment; so it makes a man talk always 
coherently and confidently to himself on which side so 
ever he is attached, or with whatever arguments: the 
same truth, by its natural light and contrariety to 
falsehood, still shows, without much ado, or any great 
and long deduction of words, the weakness and absurdity 
of the opposition: whereas the topical man, with his 
great stock of borrowed and collected arguments, will be 
found often to contradict himself; for the arguments of 
divers men being often upon different notions, and de­
duced from contrary principles, though they may be all 
directed to the support or confutation of some one 
opinion, do, notwithstanding, often really clash one 
with another. 67
The process of bottoming, accordingly, produces proofs on
which the understanding bases its assent.
The assent to probability is grounded in two sorts of
experience, both of which are extraneous to probable propor
s i t i o n . ^ 8  The mind readily accepts as probable that which
conforms to its own knowledge, observation, and experience.
Assent is based next on the testimonies of others about their
observations and experiences. Locke thus made all of man's
knowledge and judgment dependent upon experience:
Soe that as all our owne knowledg is noe thing but our 
owne Experience, the foundation of all our beliefs is 
ultimately grounded in Experience too. Soe that at 
last the clearest best and most certain knowledg that
G7%ing, p. 1 0 5.
^®Locke, An Early Draft, pp. 56-57.
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mankind can possibly bave of things existing without 
him is but Experience, which is noe thing but the 
Exercise and observation of his senses about particular 
objects and therfor Knowledg and Faith too at last re­
solve themselves into and terminate somewhere or other 
in Experience either our owne or other mens.°9
In the inventive process, the rhetorician investigates both 
his own experiences and the experiences of others for induce­
ments of probability.
Locke apparently did not feel the need for any analy­
sis of personal experience as proofs for judgment beyond its 
place in bottoming because he mentioned and then disregarded 
it. He did, however, develop in some detail a consideration 
of testimonies as evidence. He alluded to but did not elab­
orate six criteria by which testimony ought to be weighed!
1. The number of witnesses.
2. The integrity of the witnesses.
3. The skill of the witnesses.
4. The motive of the witnesses.
5. The consistency of the testimony.
6. Contrary testimonies.70
Locke'standards for judging the quality of testimonies sounds 
very similar to a contemporary treatment of the subject.
In considering testimony as a mode of proof, Locke 
adhered to a rule "observed in the law of England: That any
testimony the further off it is from the original truth, the 
less force and -proof it has. "7^ His point was that here say 
evidence has less credibility in proportion to the distance
69lbid.
70Locke, An Essay. II, 366.
71lbid.. p. 376.
146
from the original experience* Locke illustrated this princi­
ple :
A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good 
proof; but if another equally credible do witness it from 
his report, the testimony is weakens and third that at­
tests the heresay is yet less considerable*. So that in 
traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the 
proof: and the more hands the tradition has successively 
passed through, the leas strength and evidence does it 
receive from them.'^^
Thus, a speaker must recognize "how little credit the quota­
tions deserve, where the originals are wanting; and conse­
quently how much less quotations of quotations can be relied 
on."73 Directly criticizing the commonplace inventive process, 
Locke maintained: " . . .  That what in one age was affirmed
upon sli^t grounds, can never after come to be more valid in 
future ages by being often repeated."74
Locke categorized testimonies into two classes. In 
the first category, he placed testimonies about general princi­
ples, such as, iron placed in water will not float.75 in the 
other class, Locke specified testimonies related to particular 
experiences, like a horseshoe placed in water will not 
float. 76 Locke did not elaborate as to which category ob­
tained the greater degree of probability, but simply cited an
72 Ibid.
73lbid.. p. 3 7 9.
T^ibid.
T^Locke, An Early Draft, p. 57.
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example.
The testimony of an Historyan that Caesar at the battle 
■ of Munda made this speech being one ground of probabil­
ity to make one believe he did soe. The testimony of 
all historians that mention it, that it was a customs 
for the Roman Generals to make speeches before they 
joynd battle, being an other ground of probability 
that Caesar did soe.77
Locke's division is an obvious one and it is unfortunate that 
he did not enlarge on the effectiveness of each type of testi­
mony.
In the account which Locke gave of the extraneous 
grounds of probability, he assumed in general a natural re­
lationship between the logical validity and potency of proofs 
and their psychological influence on the mind. As the "natural 
tendency" of the mind is "toward knowledge," so, in the dimmer 
areas of probabilities it is "the nature of the understanding 
constantly to close with the more probable side."78
In one concise statement Locke summarized the process 
of invention as related to conviction:
. . . The mind, if it will proceed rationally, ought 
to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how 
they make more or less for or against any proposition, 
before it assents to or dissents from it; and, upon a 
due balancing the whole, reject, or receive it, with a 
more or less firm assent, proportionable to the pre- 
ponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on 
one side or the o t h e r . 79
7?Ibid.
^^Locke, An Essay. II, 390.
79Ibid., p. 366.
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Processes Related to Persuasion
For Locke the human being is more than a judging and 
reasoning creature; man is a moving and willing being. Be­
cause of the close association between the understanding and 
the volition, Locke considered the process of motivation to 
action. He attempted to answer the questions: what is the 
will, what determines the will, why is there variation in 
wills, and how does man will the wrong action?
Consideration of the Will
Locke defined the will as the power of the understand­
ing to regulate and direct the actions of the body.GO The 
faculty of the mind is the will; the process is willing. In 
a concise definition, Locke explicitly explained his view of 
the will :
Soe that the power of determining our facultys of 
thinking or motion to act or not act, to act this way 
or that way in all cases where they are capable of 
obedience is that I thinke which we call the Will.°1
Whenever Locke referred to the will he was identifying the
power of the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man
to motion or rest.
A more basic question to Locke's consideration of the 
will is that of what determines it. -As he has already stated, 
the mind directs the will. "For that which determines the
®®Locke, An Early Draft, p. 80.
Gllbid.
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general power of directing, to this or that particular direc­
tion, is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power it 
has that particular way."82 Accordingly, the mind, using 
knowledge or Judgment, is the essential element in determining 
the will. A person is moved to action or rest by the assent 
which the understanding gives to certainty or probability.
As Locke declared: " . . .  The will supposes knowledge to
guide its choice."83 The mind suspends determination of the 
will until it has Judged and examined knowledge or Judgment:
For, during this suspension of any desire, before the 
will be determined to action, and the action (which 
follows that determination) done, we have opportunity 
to examine, view, and Judge of the good or evil of what 
we are going to do; and when upon due examination, we 
have Judged, we have done our duty, all that we can, or 
ought to do . . . and it is not a fault, but a per­
fection of our nature, to desire, will and act according
to the last result of a fair examination.°4 
Basic to Locke's view of persuasion is the relationship be­
tween the knowledge and Judgment of the understanding and the 
determination of the will.
The actions of the will are regulated by "uneasiness." 
Locke explained uneasiness as a desire for want of some absent 
good. 85 Locke summarized his contention:
^^Locke, An Essay, I, 350.
85Ibid., p. 3 4 9. Again, Locke did not mean only cer­
tain knowledge, but he included Judgment of probability as 
well.
p. 3 4 5.
85Ibid.. p. 3 3 2. Locke commented on an opposing view: 
" It seems so established and settled a maxim, by the general
i 50
When, a zan is perfectly content with the state.he is 
in-“which Is when he is perfectly without any uneasi- 
ness~~what Industry, what a.'--.Ion, what will is there 
left, but to continue in lt?ü6
Within human nature there are natural inclinations.to 
continue in happiness and to avoid misery. These "inclina-- 
tions of the appetite," as Locke stated, are the motivating 
and determining influence on all actions of the w i l l . The 
human will, then, is determined by those actions which the ' 
understanding perceives cr judges to cause pain or pleasure. 
"Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that 
pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to 
avoid j^ain| . . .  as to pursue [^leasurej. . . , The 
essence of Locke’s view of the will was this: The will is
the power of the understanding to move the body to action.
The will.is determined by the mind which in turn is regulated 
and directed by "uneasiness." Uneasiness of desire is the 
presence of pain, misery, or the absence of pleasure, happi­
ness. All human actions and passions are grounded in the
consent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines 
the will, that I do not at all wonder that, when I first pub­
lished my thoughts on this subject I took it for granted; and 
I imagine that, by a great many, I shall be thought more ex­
cusable for having then done so, than that now I have ven­
tured to recede from so received an opinion. But yet, upon a 
stricter inquiry, I am forced to conclude that good, the 
greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, 
does not determine the will, until our desire, raised propor­
tionable to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it." Ibid., 
p. 335.
86ibid.. p. 234.
STlbid., p. 67.
8 8 i b i d . ,  p. 161.
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avoidance of misery or pain and the quest for happiness or 
pleasure.
But all the rest, terminating purely in pain and pleas­
ure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, 
desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; 
we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain 
ultimately. In fine, all these passions are moved by 
things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleas­
ure or pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or 
other annexed to them.°9
Locke indicated that the will is determined by the un­
easiness which seems most pressing and obtainable.90 Locke 
maintained two criteria in considering which uneasiness de­
termines the will. The uneasiness which directs the will must 
be judged to be pressing and urgent. "The greatest present 
uneasiness is the spur to action that is constantly most felt, 
and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the 
next action."91 Secondly, the understanding must judge the 
most pressing uneasiness as avoidable. There must exist some 
obtainable alternative before the will is determined by the 
most pressing uneasiness.92 por the rhetorician the ramifica­
tions of Locke’s view of the will are twofold. First the 
speaker must convince his audience that an uneasiness of
^^Ibid., p. 3 0 7. Locke stated; "I would not be mis­
taken here, as if I meant this as a Discourse of the Passions; 
they are many more than those I have here named: and those I 
have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger 
and more accurate discourse." Ibid.
9Qlbid.. p. 3 3 9. 
91lbid., p. 340. 
92lbid.. p. 3 3 7.
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desire exists and then he must convince them that this present 
uneasiness is both urgent and avoidable. Hence, the campaign­
ing politician must demonstrate to his audience that they are 
experiencing "uneasiness" in the form of present misery —  ' 
high taxes, government intervention, etc. -- and absent hap­
piness —  his presence in office. He must convince them 
further that this "uneasiness" is pressing and urgent and 
that it can be solved by electing him.
On the bases of the prec :ed.ing analysis, Locke de­
veloped an ethical position which we can designate as an 
"ethic of persuasion." Locke suggested that things are good 
or evil in reference to pleasure or pain.
That we call good, which is apt to cause or increase 
pleasure or diminish pain in us; or else to procure 
or preserve us the possession of any other good or 
absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name 
that evil which is apt to produce or increase any 
pain, or diminish any pleasure in us; or else to procure 
us any evil, or deprive us of any g o o d .93
Locke explicitly differentiated good and evil on the bases of 
the pleasure or pain which the action will bring. Hence, the 
ethical dimensions of rhetoric exist in the pleasure or pain 
brought about by the determination of the will. In this 
sense, rhetoric is ethically relative. There can be no ab­
solute standard of good and evil for man in Locke’s system. 
Each man’s sense of good and evil is determined by his per­
sonal perception of his own feelings of uneasiness.
p. 303.
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Locke discussed at some length, the variations in voli­
tions. Since things and actions are not inherently good or 
evil they must appear so only as man judges them to he so.
. . .  It is easy to give an account of how it comes to 
pass, that, though all men desire happiness, yet their 
wills carry them so contrarily; and consequently some 
of them to what is evil. And to this I say, that the 
various and contrary choices that men make in the 
world do not argue that they do not all pursue good; 
hut that the same thing is not good to every man
alike.94
One person may seek after knowledge, while another enjoys
other "hawking and hunting."95 One action cannot he said to
he better than the other or the one good and the other evil.
Man does not seek that which brings him pain or misery. The
obvious explanation for this situation is that one person
finds happiness and pleasure in knowledge and another thrives
on "hawking and hunting." Locke illustrated the point that
there is no absolute:
And therefore it was a right answer of the physician 
to his patient that had sore eyes: —  If you have more 
pleasure in the taste of wine than in the use of your 
sight, wine is good for you; hut, if the pleasure of 
seeing he greater to you than that of drinking, wine
is naught.9o
As Locke stated before, happiness is that which brings 
man the greatest pleasure and this condition of happiness is 
"to different men . . . very different things."97
9^Ihid.. p. 350.
95ibid.. p. 351.
9^Ihid. 
97ibid.
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Consideration of Fallacious Willing
Even though men pursue that which makes them happy,
there occurs the problem of willing that which brings misery
and pain. Locke raised the query in this manner: " . . .  How
men come often to prefer the worse to the better; and to
choose that, which, by their own convession, has made them
miserable?*'^® Locke attributed fallacious determination of
the will to wrong judgments. He affirmed:
It is impossible any one should willingly put into his 
own draught any bitter ingredient, or leave out any­
thing in his power (that would tend to his satisfac­
tion, and the completing of his happiness,) but only 
by a wrong Judgment.99
In attempting to investigate the problem of fallacious 
willing, Locke considered the manner in which actions are 
Judged to be good or evil. The understanding, first, Judges 
the immediate pleasure or pain which will be derived from any 
action. But the mind also evaluates the future results of 
that action. Locke specified this second dimension of Judg­
ment :
But because not only present pleasure and pain, but 
that also which is apt by its efficacy or consequences 
to bring it upon us at a distance, it is a proper ob­
ject of our desires, and apt to move a creature that 
has foresight; therefore things also that draw after 
them pleasure and pain, are considered as good and 
evil.100
Good and evil, pleasure and pain, accordingly, have both
9Gibid.. pp. 353-354.
99ibid.. p. 357. 
lOOlbid.
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present and future ramifications.
Men can never really misjudge present pleasure or 
pain; it is what it appears to be; there is no mistaking 
it.101 However, error occurs when present results are com­
pared with future pleasure or pain. When the mind projects 
pleasure or pain into the future it is liable to error.
But though present pleasure and pain show their dif­
ference and degrees so plainly as not to leave room to 
mistake; yet, when we compare present pleasure or 
pain with future, (which is usually the case in most 
important determinations of the will,) we often make 
wrong judgments of them; taking our measures of 
them in different positions of distance.102
Locke attributed "judging amiss" on future consequences of
any action to "the weak and narrow constitutions of our
minds."103
In essence, unsound willing caused by misrepresenting 
future consequences takes two forms. First, the understanding 
erroneously Judges that pain does not exist in the action.10^ 
Next, the understanding properly evaluates the potency of the 
consequences but Interprets them to be avoidable. Locke elab­
orated on the second means;
When we judge that, though the consequences be of that 
moment, yet It Is not of that certainty, but that It 
may otherwise fall out, or else by some means be
IQIlbid.
I^^Ibld.
lO^Ibld., p. 358. 
lO^Ibld.. p. 360.
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avoided, as by industry, address, change, repentance,
etc.105
Locke concluded his analysis of the erroneous deter­
mination of the will be describing the deficiencies in judg­
ment which lead to unsound directing of the will. Judgment is 
liable to error when there is ignorance of the probabilities 
on both sides of the question. A second cause of invalid 
judgment exists in what Locke designated "inadvertency:"
When a man overlooks even that which he does know.
This is an affected and present ignorance, which mis­
leads our judgments as much as the other. Judging is, 
as it were, ballancing an account, and determining 
on which side the odds lie. If therefore either side 
be huddled upon in haste, and several of the sums that 
should have gone into the reckoning be overlooked and 
left out, this precipitancy causes as wrong a judgment 
as if it were a perfect i g n o r a n c e . 106
In Locke's analysis of the errors of judgment which in turn
cause unsound determination of the will, he was reaffirming
his position that knowledge and judgment direct the will.
Chapter VI has presented a discussion of the mental 
aspects of Locke's philosophy of discourse. In his view, 
communication is concerned first with the attainment of in­
formation about the sciences of natural philosophy (convic­
tion) and ethics (persuasion). There are many explicit and 
implicit rhetorical ramifications in his analysis of how the 
mind is enlightened by judgments of probability and how the 
will is determined. These conclusions will be discussed in 
the closing chapter.
105lbid.
lOGibid.. p. 361.
■CHAPTER VII 
PROCESS OF STATEMENT 
Introduction
Locke clearly perceived a connection between language
and knowledge and judgment. When he began his Essay he was
concerned solely with the question: "How do we know?" How­
ever, he soon broadened his study to include language:
. . . [AsJ I began to examine the extent and certainty
of our Knowledge, I found it had so near a connexion 
with words, that, unless their force and manner of 
signification were first well observed, there could be 
very little said clearly and pertinently concerning 
knowledge. . . .1
In fact, Locke postulated "the perception of the signification
of signs" as one of the modes of knowledge.^
At the time of the Essay, the verbal facet of under­
standing, or what Locke termed "logic," had received little 
attention by other authors. Locke, therefore, defended him­
self against the charge of giving more importance to language
^John Locke, The Philosonhlcal Works of John Locke, 
ed. by J.A. St. John (London: George Bell and Sons, 1908),
II, 92. (Hereafter referred to as The Philosophical Works.)
2John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
ed. by Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publica-
tions, 1959)» I, 314. (Hereafter referred to as An Essay.)
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thazi it deserved s
What I have here said concerning words in this thl d 
book will be thought by some to be much more than x.nat 
so slight a subject required. . . .  However, I shall 
imagine I have done some service to truth, peace, and 
learning, if, by an enlargement on this subject, I can 
make men reflect on their own language, and give them 
reason to suspect, that since it is frequent for 
others, it may also be possible for them, to have some­
times very good and approved words in their works and 
writings, with very uncertain, little, or no signifi­
cation. 3
Accordingly, Locke attached a great deal of importance to the 
proper use and analytical treatment of language because words 
. . interpose themselves so much between our understanding 
and the truth . . . Q,ha^ their obscurity and disorder do 
not seldom cast a mist before our eyes, and Impose upon our 
understanding.
This chapter constitutes an investigation of Locke's 
treatment of the doctrine of signs in the verbal facet.
First it synthesizes his discussion of the general nature of 
language. A later section presents a consideration of the 
Imperfections and abuses of language and what Locke suggested 
as solutions for these deficiencies.
Nature of Languag;e
Genesis of Language
Locke adhered not only to a divine but also to a 
social origin of language. At one point Locke explicitly
3lbld.. II, 54-55.
^Ibid., I, 14-15.
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stated that God, "having designed man for a sociable creature, 
made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity 
to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished 
him also with language."5 In his Two Treatises on Government, 
Locke expounded the same contention: "God, having made man
such a creature that in his own Judgment it was not good for 
him to be alone . . . fitted him with understanding and lan­
guage. . . . Locke thus espoused the divine origin of lan­
guage .
On the other hand, however, Locke conceived of a social
genesis of language. Man, motivated by social needs to share
his thoughts with others, articulated sounds as external
signs for internal conceptions.
The comfort and advantage of society not being to be 
had without communication of thoughts, it was neces­
sary that man should find out some external sensible 
signs, whereof those invisible ideas which his thoughts 
are made up of, might be made known to others. For 
this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or 
quickness,.as those articulate sounds, which with so 
much ease and variety he found himself able to make.
Thus we may conceive how Words, which were by nature 
so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made use 
of by men as the signs of their ideas. . . .7
In what appears to be a contradiction with his first view,
Locke postulated that language evolved as a result of man’s
social needs.
5lbid., II, 3. See also, John Locke, The Philosoph­
ical Works, II, 2-3.
^John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. by 
Thomas I. Cook (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1946),
p. 159.
?Locke, An Essay. II, 8 .
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The solution to this apparent conflict is the.view 
that language development was the composite result of both 
divine and social factors. Locke suggested that God provided 
man not with language per se, but with the ability to articu­
late sounds and to comprehend words as representations of in­
ternal concepts.8 Man, thus inherently equipped for the 
formulation of language, was motivated by "the comfort and 
advantage of society" to develop a system of linguistic com­
munication. Locke's only suggestion as to why man devised an 
oral system as opposed to a system of gestures or written 
symbols was that the former consisted of "so much ease and 
variety."
Uses of Language
Locke maintained that words are used for recording and 
communicating ideas. Words are used to record thoughts 
"whereby . . .  we talk to our own memories."9 In this sense, 
language connects past experiences with the present. Man 
further uses language to communicate his thoughts to others. 0^
Communication occurs on two levels, civil and philo­
sophical. Civil communication constitutes common conversa­
tion about everyday affairs, that is, "speech of the market 
place." The philosophical use of words consists of conveying
Qjbid., 3.
^Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 79»
^^Locke, An Essay. II, 105.
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precise meaning in the expressing or searching for "truth." 
Locke differentiated these two levels by the ends and con­
tents of the communication as well as by the degree of exact­
ness necessary for each.^l
Communication is based on the premise that the lis­
tener must comprehend the signs of the speaker. As Locke 
stated in one of his journals: "What ever other men have
. . . can be communicated to me but by making me alike know­
ing. . . ,"12 Communication is ineffective when the speaker 
and the listener do not recognize the same meaning for the 
identical word.^^
Consideration of "Meaning"
Locke discussed meaning in two dimensions: from the 
speaker's point of view and from the listener's. The sig­
nification of words consists in a reference to something. 
Since words are signs, they "are of no value nor use, but as 
they are the signs of things."1^ Locke equated the meaning 
of a sign to the idea in the mind of the speaker.
When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be 
understood: and the end of speech is, that those 
sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the 
hearer. That then which words are the marks of the
^Ifbid.
^%enry Richard Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 187^), I, 364.
^^Locke, The Phllosonhical Works, II, 6-7.
I^Lord King, The Life and Letters of John Locke 
(London: Henry G. Bohn, 1 8 5 8), pp. 93-94.
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ideas of the speakers nor can any one apply them as 
marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas 
that he himself hath: for this would be to make them 
signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to 
other ideas: which would be to make them signs and 
. not signs of his ideas at the same time; and so ef­
fect to have no signification at all.15
Accordingly, the idea in the speaker's understanding consti­
tutes the meaning of a sign.
In Locke's second view of meaning, a word, after
constant connection to an idea, often elicits a response from
the listener very similar to the response produced by a real
o b j e c t . T h i s  view of meaning indicates that the word
"needle" would elicit a response from the reader or hearer
very similar to the reaction he would experience in seeing a
"needle." Lock was not clear whether this response to a sign
was physical and/or mental, covert and/or overt.
. . . There comes, by constant use, to be such a con­
nexion .between certain sounds and the ideas they stand 
for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite 
certain ideas as if the objects themselves, which are 
apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses.
Locke was careful not to suggest that the word elicits the
same response as the object.
Though words can properly signify nothing but the 
speaker's ideas, Locke identified two invalid references which 
men give words. First, speakers assume that the words they
I^Locke, An Essay. II, 9-10.
^^Ibid.. pp. 11-12.
ITlbid.
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use represent the listeners’ ideas. Men, next, suppose words 
to represent the reality of things. In this case the word 
would take on the characteristics of the object for which it 
was supposed to have stood. Locke contended that if the word 
represents reality, "it is a perverting the use of words, and 
brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signi­
fication."16 Locke's position is similar to, but precedes by 
nearly three centuries, the general semantlcists' view that 
the "word is not the thing."
Linguistic Relativity
Locke constantly maintained the arbitrary nature of
words. Words are external to reality and they have no natural
connection with ideas.
. . . Every man has so invoilable a liberty to make 
words stand for what ideas he pleases, that no one 
hath the power to make others have the same ideas in 
their minds that he has, when they use the same words 
that he does.19
By tacit consent and common usage, however, words are related 
to certain ideas in order to facilitate intelligible speech.20 
Locke maintained that common usage is adequate to regulate the 
signification of words in civil communication but is not suf­
ficient in philosophical discourse.
In Locke’s study of comparative languages, he observed
iGlbid., p. 11.
^^Locke, The Philosophical Works. II, 8.
^^ibid.
164
words in some languages which had no parallel in other dialects.
He theorized that this phenomenon was the result of the purpose
of commtinication, that is, to communicate thought with the
greatest ease and facility:
. . . They usually make such collections of ideas into 
complex modes, and afix names to them, as they have 
frequent use of in their way of living and conversation, 
leaving others, which they have but seldom an occasion 
to mention, loose and without names that tie them to­
gether: they rather choosing to enumerate (when they 
have need) such ideas as make them up, by the particular 
names that stand for them than to trouble their memories 
by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them, 
which they seldom or never have any occasion to make 
use of.21
Since language is contingent upon ideas, the development of 
words depends on the mental concepts as well as the cultural 
needs of men.22
Although Locke did not use this terminology, his con­
cept sounds similar to contemporary thinking on linguistic 
relativity:
For whence it is easy to imagine why, as in some coun­
tries, they have not so much as the name for a horse; 
and in others, where they are more careful of the 
pedigrees of their horses, than of their own, that there 
they may have not only names for particular horses, but 
also of their several relations of kindred one to
another.23
Locke cited another example of the relativity of language:
The terms of our law, which are not empty sounds, will 
hardly find words that answer them in the Spanish or 
Italian, no scanty language; much less, I think, could
Locke, An Essay, I, 383.
22ibid.. pp. 296-297.
23lbid.. p. 472.
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any one translate them into the Caribee or Westoe 
tonguess and the versura of the Romans," or corban 
of the Jews, have no words in other languages to answer 
them; the reason whereof is plain, for what has been said. 
Nay, if we look a little more nearly into this matter, 
and exactly compare different languages, we shall find 
that, though they have -words which in translations and 
dictionaries are supposed to answer one another, yet 
there is scarce one of ten amongst the names . . . that 
stands for the same precise idea which the word does 
that in dictionaries it is rendered by.24
Words, accordingly, are not inherently connected to reality 
or ideas. However, linguistic concepts influence one's per­
ception of reality.
Consideration of Names
Locke considered at length the relationship between 
names and the types of ideas for which they stand. He was es­
pecially interested in clarity. Names of simple ideas are 
less doubtful because they represent a simple sense experi­
e n c e . 25 A single sensation is more easily retained and af­
fixed to a name.26 The term "red" refers, with little ambi­
guity, to that visual sensation "red." By the same rationale 
the names of simple modes are least liable to doubt and un­
certainty.2?
By reason and necessity, the majority of words (ex­
cept for proper names) are general terms. Words, to be of
24lbid.. II, 48.
^^Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 28-29.
^^Locke, An Essay. II, 117.
27lbid.. p. 118.
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maximum use, must comprehend several particular things "for 
the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use, 
had every particular thing need of a distinct name to he sig­
nified hy."28 It would be virtually impossible for every 
particular item to have a particular name. Even if all par­
ticular objects had names it would be useless and would not 
serve the functions of Communication. Everyone would have to 
experience the same particular items in order to maintain com­
munication.29 The solution to this problem was the formu­
lation of general terms.30
In Locke'8 view of language, general words stand for 
general ideas. General ideas t-.re produced by separating them 
from their particular existence. This process of abstraction 
consists of "leaving out something that is peculiar to each 
individual, and retaining so much of those particular complex 
ideas of several existences as they are found to agree in. 
Hence, a word which signifies a general idea represents a 
group of particular ideas each of which has some conformity to 
the abstract, general idea. General words are founded upon 
individual similarities which minimize differences. Locke 
illustrated the process of abstraction with an example of the 
development of a child's concept of the general term "man:"
2®Locke, The P h i l o s o p h i c a l  W o r k s . II, 1.
29lbid.. p. 9.
^^Ibid.. pp. 9-10.
^^Ibid.s p. 10.
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And thus they come to have a general name, and a general 
idea; where in they make nothing newj hut only leave 
out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James,
. Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and re­
tain only what is common to them.32
General terms are most liable to confusion and ambiguity.
Locke noted that words such as "justice," "democracy," and 
"love" represent complex ideas which are often m e a n in g le s s .33 
Following this discussion of the general nature of 
language, we are ready to consider Locke's analysis of the ac­
curate use of language.
Accurate Use of Language 
The thesis underlying Locke's discussion of the accu­
rate use of language was that more controversies are caused 
by obscurity of meaning than by differences in concepts,
Locke considered first the inherent imperfections of language, 
the abuses of language, and finally the corrections for these 
deficiencies.
Imperfections of Language 
The chief Imperfection of words is the doubtfulness 
of their meaning. Since terms have no natural connection with 
ideas or reality, their meanings are difficult to establish. 
When the meaning of a term is settled, it is only through the 
arbitrary imposition of men.^^
^^Ibid., pp. 10-11,
33Locke, An Essay, II, 31»
3*1,0eke. The Philosophical Works. II, 80.
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Another reason for the obscure meaning of words is 
the complexity of ideas which words represent. When ideas be­
come so complex, "compounded and decompounded," men cannot re­
tain the same precise idea without some variation. This im­
precision is caused by the existence of too many particular 
ideas in the complex idea. "Hence . . . men's names of very 
compound ideas such' as . . . moral words, have seldom in two 
different men the same precise signification. . . .
A further difficulty with words which signify complex 
ideas is that neither the idea nor the term has a counterpart 
in reality. Since complex ideas are inventions of the un­
derstanding, the meaning of the general terms cannot be ob­
served in reality.
Names, therefore, that stand for collections of ideas 
which the mind makes at pleasure must needs be of doubt­
ful signification, when such collections are nowhere to 
be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns 
to be shown whereby men may adjust them.36
Locke characterized the vagueness of general terms by describ­
ing the manner in which children learn such words. Children 
most often learn first the term "justice," for instance, and 
then the meaning of the t e r m . 37
Another inherent deficiency in language occurs in 
terms which signify substances. This obscurity can be traced 
to the fact that many times the reality for which the term
33ibid.. p. 81.
^^Ibid., pp. 81-83.
3?Ibid.. pp. 83-84.
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stands is not known or is imperfectly k n o w n . T h e  ideas of 
substance should conform to reality and the signs which repre­
sent them should signify that conformity:
In these we must follow Nature, suit our complex ideas 
to real existences,, and regulate the signification of 
their names by the things themselves, if we will have 
our names to be signs of them, and stand for them.
Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; but pat­
terns that will make the signification of their names 
very uncertain. . . .39
Since ideas of substances should reflect the real essences
which often are not known, the names of these ideas are vague
and uncertain.
Locke inferred four conclusions from his discussion 
of the inherent imperfections of language. Words are most 
likely to be obscure and vague when: (l) the ideas they repre­
sent are complex and consist of a great number of particular 
ideas, (2) the ideas they represent have no connection to the 
reality of things, "and so no settled standard anywhere in 
nature existing, to rectify and adjust them by," (3) the sig­
nification of the term refers to a standard which is not 
easily known, and finally, (4) the signification of the word 
and the real essence of the object are not exactly the same.^^
38Ibid., p. 8 3 .
^^Locke, An Essay. II, 111 
40lbid.. pp. 111-1 1 2.
Ibid., pp. 106-10 7.
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Abuses of Language
Besides the inherent imperfections, there are several 
willful abuses of language. Locke designated six abuses of 
language: using words without clear meanings, using words for 
an intentional obscurity, using words inconsistently, using 
words as reality, using words to signify something which they 
cannot, and using words with inherent significations.
Speakers sometimes use words without clear and distinct 
meanings. Some words are used which signify no clear or dis­
tinct idea at all. Locke called these words "insignificant' 
terms," but did not elaborate on them. Second, words which 
commonly specify distinct ideas are often used without any dis­
tinct meaning. Locke characterized this negligence:
Wisdom, glory, grace, etc., are words frequent enough 
in every man's mouth; but if a great many of those who 
use them should be asked what they mean by them, they 
would be at a stand and not know what to answer: a 
plain proof, that, though they have learned those sounds 
and have ready at their tongues ends, yet there are no 
determined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to 
be expressed to others by them.4-2
Words which have no distinct reference in the understanding
of the communicator are liable to confusion.
Another abuse of language involves an affected ob­
scurity caused by either applying old words to new and unusual 
meanings or introducing new and ambiguous terms without de­
fining them.“^5 Locke suggested that the art of disputation
42 Ibid., pp. 123-124.
^^Ibid.. pp. 126-127.
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was to blame for this deficiency.
A speaker abuses language when he uses words incon­
sistently. ■ This neglect occurs when a speaker uses a word to 
signify one idea and then later uses the same word to signify 
a different idea.
. . . It is plain cheat and abuse, when I make [word£| 
stand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another; 
the willful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing 
but great folley, or greater dishonesty.^5
Locke stated that using words for reality instead of
ideas results in erroneous determination of the will. Words
which do not signify ideas are nothing more than empty
sounds.
A word may be of frequent use and great credit with 
several authors and by them made use of as if it stood 
for some real being; but yet, if he that reads cannot 
frame any distinct idea of that being, it is certainly 
to him a mere empty sound without meaning, and he 
learns no more by all that is said of it or attributed 
to it'than if it were affirmed only of that bare empty 
sound.47
The fifth abuse of language, according to Locke, in­
volves using words to represent ideas which they cannot sig­
nify. Locke did not suggest that language is incapable of 
representing such ideas. In essence, he maintained that there 
are some objects the intrinsic nature of which men cannot
44ibid.
^^Locke, The Philosophical Works. II, 96.
4Glbid., I, 82.
4^lbid.
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know, yet they attempt to represent this unknown reality in 
l a n g u a g e . 48 Locke admitted that this application of language 
is closely related to using words without m e a n i n g .49 As in 
every abuse of language, this unsound use causes obscurity in 
c ommuni cation.
Finally, speakers violate the purpose of communication
when they assume that words are inherently connected to ideas.
Because of constant usage, a speaker often supposes that a
word represents only the idea which he uses it to signify.
. . * They are apt to imagine so near and necessary 
a connexion between the names and the signification 
they use them in, that they forwordly suppose one 
cannot but understand what their meaning is; and there­
fore one ought to acquiesce in the words delivered, as 
if it were past doubt that, in the use of those common 
received' sounds, the speaker and hearer had neces­
sarily the same precise ideas.50
Locke suggested that this assumption caused little harm in
civil communication but was inappropriate for philosophical
inquiries.51
Corrections of Language Deficiencies
Locke suggested several remedies for the abuses and 
weaknesses of language: using words only with clear meanings, 
using words to signify only clear and distinct ideas, using 
words in their common usage, and defining the meaning of
48Locke, An Essay. II, 135*
49lbid.. p. 140.
50lbid., p. 141.
51 Ibid.
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obscure words.
Speakers must first be careful not to use words without 
signifying some idea.52 However, a word must represent a 
clear and distinct idea. If the word signifies a single ex­
perience, this idea must be distinguished from other simple 
ideas. If the word represents a complex concept, the idea must
be a "determinate," that is, clearly fixed in the understand­
ing. The basis for linguistic clarity consists of the "de­
terminate" or "determined" idea. Locke defined this charac­
teristic of a determined idea:
. . . When such as it is at any time objectively in the 
mind, and so determined there, it is annexed, and with­
out variation determined, to a name or articulate sound, 
which is to be steadily the sign of that very same ob­
ject of the mind, or determinate i d e a . 53
The clear and distinct idea played a significant role in 
Locke's philosophy of language for, as he contended, "if men 
had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, 
they would discern how far their own inquiries and discourses 
went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wran­
glings they have with o th e r s .  "5^
Locke believed that a speaker, if he proposes to be 
understood, should use words as much as possible in their com­
mon usage which "gives our thoughts entrance into other men's
S^Ibid.. p. 152. ■
55lbid.. I, 22.
54%bid., p. 24.
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minds with the greatest ease and advantage."55 Finally, a 
speaker who uses a word whose meaning is unclear should de­
fine the meaning he attaches to the term. Locke specified 
that a definition is necessary in two instances; When the 
common usage of a term is uncertain and when a term which is 
significant to an argument is obscure.55
A definition, for Locke, is the demonstration of the 
meaning of a term. The process of definition involves stating 
the genus or the next highest general term that comprehends 
the word in question.57 Terms signifying simple ideas are 
incapable of definition except by experiencing the reality 
which the ideas represent. The mere sounds of the words 
"light" or "red" cannot define these ideas; these realities 
must be experienced to be known.58 Complex ideas are most ef­
fectively defined by enumerating the simple ideas which con­
stitute them.59 Locke explicitly insisted that definition 
is not performed by using synonymous terms.
This is to translate, and not to define, when we 
change two words of the same signification one for an­
other; which, when one is better understood than the 
other, may serve to discover what idea the unknown
55ibid.. II, 153-1 5 4.
5^Ibld., p. 1 5 4.
37
Locke, The Philosophical Works, II, 13. 
SGlbid.. pp. 22, 26.
59lbid.. p. 13.
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stands for; but Is very far from a definition. . .
Locke was persistent in his belief that definitions ought to 
be used to avoid obscure language.
Locke's suggestions for the correction of linguistic 
deficiencies are based on the stylistic emphasis of perspi­
c u i t y . A b o v e  all else Locke argued that communication 
ou^t to be clear and intelligible i those who
. . . teach or maintain truth, should have nothing 
to do with all that tinsel trumpery; should speak plain 
and clear, and be afraid of a fallacy or equivocation, 
however prettily it might look, and be fit to cheat the 
reader; who on his side should, in an author who pre­
tends instruction, abominate all such arts, and him that 
uses them, as much as he would a common cheat who en? 
deavours to put off brass money for standard silver.
Locke's thinking was parallel in many ways to the rhetorical
transformation in style during the seventeenth century.
There are four essential aspects in Locke's process of 
statement. In analyzing the general nature of language, Locke 
investigated the origin and uses of language, meaning, lin­
guistic relativity, and names. Then he delineated the inher­
ent imperfections and the willful abuses of language. Fin­
ally, he recommended some practical techniques for correcting 
these deficiencies of language.
^^Locke, An Essay, II, 35.
Locke, -The Philosophical Works, II, 499. 
^^King, p. 97.
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS
This concluding chapter consists of two parts: a sum­
mary and a discussion of the relationships of Locke's philos­
ophy of discourse to the history of rhetoric.
Rnmmarv
The basic element of Locke's philosophy of discourse 
is his division of the sciences into natural philosophy, 
ethics and semiotics. The third category, the doctrine of 
signs, involves both a mental facet (the attainment of infor­
mation) and a verbal facet (the communication of information). 
Since semiotics is inclusive of the other- two classesj. its 
subject matter is, in natural philosophy, the knowledge of 
things and in ethics, rules of conduct. Locke's method of 
discourse, accordingly, operates in both conviction (enlighten­
ing the understanding) and persuasion (moving the will).
Conviction is the result of knowledge of certainty 
and/or Judgment of probability.. The data for all of the op­
erations of the understanding are ideas which come from ex­
perience either through sensation or reflection. Knowledge, 
in Locke's limited sense, constitutes absolute certainty and
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originates in intuition and demonstration. The subject mat­
ter which is appropriate for discourse however, occurs on the 
level of probability at which the understanding makes judg­
ments.
The understanding rejects or accepts probable propo­
sitions as true on the bases of intervening ideas or proofs.
On the level of probability, the mind cannot perceive an agree­
ment or disagreement among ideas, but presumes, on the warrant 
of proofs, that a connection exists. Locke designated the ar­
rangement of proofs as argument and the process by which they 
are arranged as reasoning. Locke was notably critical of the 
Scholastics* syllogism and opposed the view that it was the 
only form of reasoning which would produce knowledge. Accord­
ing to Locke, proofs of probabilities come from two sources, 
personal experience and testimony. Proofs which induce the 
mind's assent to judgment are produced by the investigative 
process of "bottoming." Locke did not recommend the use of 
ready made arguments or commonplaces and, in fact, was strongly 
opposed to the system.
Locke defined the will as that faculty which directs 
the actions of the body. In persuasion, knowledge and/or 
judgment regulate the determination of the will. Thus con­
viction necessarily is prior to persuasion. "An uneasiness of 
desire," which Locke specified as the presence of pain or the 
absence of pleasure, determines the will. Locke established 
an ethical standard by equating "good" and "evil" with
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pleasure and pain. Because "good" and "evil" are contingent 
upon individual preferences, there is no absolute ethical 
standard.
The verbal aspect of Locke's philosophy of discourse 
consists of civil and philosophical communication. Locke did 
not elaborate on these levels of communication apart from in­
dicating the differences in purpose, content, and degree of 
exactness at each level. He did, nevertheless, accomplish a 
comprehensive analysis of the nature of language. The meaning 
of a word is the idea which the speaker uses the term to rep­
resent. Language is arbitrary and is not inherently connected 
to either ideas or reality. This arbitrary nature of language 
coupled with communicative and cultural needs accounts for the 
existence of linguistic relativity.
Language contains two deficiencies. First, there are 
natural imperfections of language, the most important of which 
is vagueness of meaning. Speakers also often consciously abuse 
language when, for example, they use words without clear mean­
ings. Clarity in 1 language is not so much related to sign or 
to "meaning" as it is to distinct ideas. In other words, ^  
idea must be clear and distinct before the meaning of a word 
can be clear and intelligible. This contention constitutes 
the foundation of the corrections which Locke offered for the 
weaknesses of language.
Locke advocated the teaching of discourse through the 
study, but not imitation, of models. Effective speaking and
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reasoning cannot be taugbt, he held, by rules and principles. 
Locke was outspoken in his criticism of verse and theme mak­
ing particulary in Latin which were considered valid teaching 
devices of his day. He was critical of the art of. disputation 
because it concentrated on words and not reality, on victory 
and not knowledge.
Relationships
There are certain explicit and implicit relationships 
between Locke's philosophy of discourse and the history of 
rhetorical theory.
Locke was explicit in explaining his attitudes toward 
seventeenth century rhetoric. He indicated rhetoric as em­
bellishment with little concern except for style. He identi­
fied rhetoric as immoral when he stated that the art of rhet­
oric dealt in deceitful practices. It would not misinterpret 
Locke to say that he viewed the art of rhetoric as the counter­
part of the art of disputation. Most of the charges which 
Locke leveled at disputation are applicable also to his view 
of rhetoric.
There are some similarities as well as differences 
between Locke's views on discourse and those of the classicists, 
Locke's criticism of rhetoric was motivated by much the same 
situation as that which Plato and Aristotle experienced and 
discussed in their G-orgias and Rhetoric. Both Aristotle and 
Plato appraised the rhetoric of their days as shallow and then 
proceeded to develop what they considered sound approaches to
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discourse.^ Locke also criticized the deficiencies of con­
temporary rhetoric hut praised the value of "speaking well." 
Even though Locke maintained that "lovers of truth" should 
avoid the "trickeries of rhetoric," he developed a detailed 
philosophy of discourse. Locke specified, however, that the 
communication of information on the verbal level is logic and 
not rhetoric.
One of the most obvious similarities involves Locke's 
proofs of probability which are personal experiences and tes­
timonies. These categories relate closely to the classical 
concept of artistic and non-artistic proofs. Non-artistic 
proofs consist of those inducements which are external to the 
speaker and the subject matter. The classics specifically 
identified testimonies as inartistic proofs. A personal ex­
perience could constitute an example of logical, emotional or 
ethical proof.2
Both Locke and the classical tradition limited rhet­
oric or discourse to subject matters at the level of probabil­
ity. Aristotle stated that rhetoric was concerned with mat­
ters "contingent in human affairs."3 Much along the same
^Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric 
and Rhetoricians," in Historical Studies of Rhetoric and 
Rhetoricians, ed. by Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca; Cornell 
University Press, 1961) pp. 36-41, 5 6. See also, Aristotle, 
The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. by Richard McKeon (New 
York: Random House, 19^1), 1354 a 10-1354 a 20.
^Aristotle, 1356 b 35-1357 a 20.
^Ibid.. 1357 a 1-3 5 . Aristotle stated: "The subject
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lines, Locke inferred that deliberation depends upon an in­
vestigation of the evidence on both sides of the question.
In probabilities, according to Locke, there is no absolute 
answer as there is in certainty, but decisions rest on the 
warrant of the evidence.
Locke's four types of agreement or disagreement could 
be conceived as a type of classical topic system. Most of 
the classical writers devised a system by which the speaker 
was able to discover a line of arguments in a given speech 
topic.^ These predetermined lines of argument were known as 
a topic system. In Locke's philosophy of discourse, a speaker 
could search for lines of argument in identity or diversity, 
relation, coexistence or non-coexistence, and actual real 
existence. Cockerham in his thesis on Locke’s theory of log­
ical proof suggested that these four types of connection were 
the criteria of logical proof.5
Neither Locke nor Aristotle viewed the syllogism as 
suitable for discourse. In rhetoric, Aristotle recommended 
the enthymeme and restricted the syllogism to dialectic and 
science.^ Locke conceived of the syllogism as a means, not of
of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with al­
ternative possibilities. . . . "
^Ibid., 1358 a 10-35.
^Louis Cockerham, "John Locke's Theory of Logical 
Proof" (unpublished Master’s thesis. University of Oregon, 
1959), pp. 30-31.
^Aristotle, 1356 b 5-25.
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communication but, of testing for validity and discovering 
fallacies. They maintained that the syllogism was too complex 
for reasoning in discourse.
Locke departed from Aristotle and much of the clas­
sical tradition in his division of the subject matter of dis­
course. Whereas Aristotle categorized rhetoric into delibera­
tive, forensic and ceremonial speeches, Locke divided dis­
course into the subject matters of natural philosophy and 
ethics.7 However, it seems that Locke's class of practica or 
ethics would include both politics and law. With such an in­
terpretation, Locke appeared to have added another category, 
that is, natural philosophy.
Harding, in "Quintilian's Witnesses," discussed the
similarities between Quintilian's Institutio and Locke's
thinking on education;
A reader who has the main doctrine of the Institutio 
in mind is at once impressed with the humane reasonable­
ness of Locke's theories. Nor can we escape the gen­
eral similarity of the Thoughts [~5n EducatloiM and the 
Institutio on the subject of the ëarly training of
children.Ô
Quintilian and Locke suggested that excellency in the art of 
rhetoric stems from the study of models. However, Quintilian 
developed his devices of progymnasmata and declamations of
?Ibid.. 1358 b 5-20.
g
Harold F. Harding, "Quintilian's Witnesses," in 
Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. by 
Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961 ),
p. 97.
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which Locke was notably critical.^
Locke's philosophy of discourse is similar to Wilson's 
Rhétorique of the sixteenth century in some ways. Locke, like 
Wilson, visioned his theory of discourse as encompassing both 
written and oral communication.^^ Locke also agreed with 
Wilson in insisting on a plain, clear and intelligible 
s t y l e . .
Locke made some important contributions to the new 
rhetoric of the eighteenth century which Howell identified.
As we have just pointed out, Locke suggested plain and clear 
language in discourses and therefore paralleled the transition 
in rhetorical style which we considered in Chapter III. One 
of his most significant contributions to the new attitude 
toward rhetoric was his emphasis on an investigative process 
of invention. Even Bacon who supposedly was the first to sug­
gest an investigation of the evidence outside of the set lines 
of arguments relied on his "Formulae and Lesser Forms."1^ 
However, Locke completely rejected all forms of commonplaces 
and topics and argued that the nature of the case must be
4 9lbid.. pp. 90-93.
I^Russell H. Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Contributions to 
Rhetoric," in Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, 
ed. by Raymond P. Howes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1961), p. 109.
1llbid.. p. 112.
I^Karl R. Wallace, "Bacon's Conception of Rhetoric," 
in Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. by 
Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961),
pp. 129-1 3 3.
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Investigated. He devised the process of "bottoming" for the 
purpose of collecting evidence on a question.
In other areas, however, Locke opposed the new rhe­
torical movement. He still maintained that the discipline of 
logic was a communicative art. Notwithstanding, he advanced 
a very modern view of the syllogism. He held that the syl­
logistic form of reasoning was not fitted for communication 
but its prime value was searching for validity and fallacies. 
Locke also maintained the distinction between "popular" and 
"learned" communication which he designated as civil and phil­
osophical. Although his method of discourse did not suggest 
any differences in approach for these levels, he nevertheless 
affirmed the distinction.
Since Locke never proposed to develop a system of com­
munication, he did hot investigate all five of the rhetorical 
canons. He had nothing to say concerning rhetorical arrange­
ment.
One of the most interesting aspects of Locke’s philos­
ophy of discourse, especially in the area of language, is the 
manner in which it resembles some aspects of modern linguistic 
thought. For instance, Roger Bowen, in Words and IhinKs, dis­
cussed Whorf’s theory of linguistic relativity:
A thoroughgoing linguistic relativity has, in 
recent years, been proposed by Benjamin Lee Whorf|~ln 
Language. Thought and Realityj. It is his belief that 
each language embodies and perpetuates a particular 
world view. The speakers of a language are partners 
to an agreement to perceive and think of the world in 
a certain way— not the only possible way. The same 
reality— both physical and social— can be variously
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structured and different languages operate ■with, dif­
ferent structures. ”• 3
However, some two hundred and fifty years earlier Locke de­
lineated at some length a very similar phenomenon.
Locke’s theorizing on language also foreshadowed many 
of the significant concepts of'general semantics. A reading 
of Lee, Johnson, or Korzyhski indicates a surprising similar­
ity to Locke’s view of l a n g u a g e . L o c k e ’s treatment of the 
arbitrary nature of language, the process of abstraction, 
general words, the means of definition, and language behavior 
is very similar to that of several contemporary theories of 
semantics.
There is a striking similarity between Locke's view of 
meaning and the contemporary theory of ’’representational medi­
tation.” Osgood, in The Measurement of Meaning, espoused the 
theory that through a process of meditation a person differ­
entiates between a reaction elicited from a word and a reaction 
caused by an object.^5 Locke also indicated that the response
^^Roger Brown, Words and Thinpcs (Glencoe, Illinois:
The Free Press, 1958), p. 230. See 229-263* See B.L. TOiorf, 
Language Thought, and Reality, with an introduction by J.B. 
Carroll (Cambridge : Technology Press, 1956).
I^A. Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction 
to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics (Lancaster: 
Science Press. 1933), Wendell Johnson. Peonle in~Q,uandaries 
(New York; Harper and Brothers, 1946) and Irving J. Lee, 
Language Habits in Human Affairs (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1941).
I^charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci and Percy 
Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1957), pp. 1-10. See Brown, pp. 98-102.
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caused by a word is often very similar to that reaction 
elicited from an object. In so far as Ogden and Richards 
identified meaning with the reference in the speaker's mind, 
Locke paralleled their theory of m e a n i n g .''6
In brief, then, Locke's significant contributions to 
the rhetorical tradition are: his opposition to invention
solely by commonplaces and topics and his advocacy of the 
investigative process of invention; his adherence to a plain 
style; his appraisal of the syllogism as a means of testing 
validity; his treatment of language as an instrument of knowl­
edge; his division of the ends of communication into con­
viction and persuasion; his ethical bases for discourse, and 
finally, his epistemological foundation for discourse. Be­
cause of Locke's similarities to both the classical and con­
temporary rhetorical traditions, further study of his relation­
ship might well identify his philosophy of discourse as "the 
watershed" in the history of rhetorical theory.
1 A '
C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Mean­
ing (New York: Harcourt. Brace and Company, 1923).
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